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INDIAN IDEALISM AND MODERN CHALLENGES

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with a Foreword by

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
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FOREWORD

This book has grown out of three extension lectures delivered by Dr. P.T. Raju, at Panjab University, Chandigarh in January, 1960. The lectures were originally entitled as "SOME ASPECTS OF VEDANTA" but the title has now been changed by the author to "INDIAN IDEALISM AND MODERN CHALLENGES".

The subject is provocative and the lectures stimulated critical discussion on several issues. While it would be impossible to expect people to agree about the impact of the modern age on "Indian Idealism", it would be useful to promote thinking on a problem like this.

The author has critically examined in this book, Indian Idealism especially "Vedanta" and attempted to adjust its tenets to the modern age dominated by Science and Technology. He has brought out in sharp relief the defects of "Indian Idealism" which have created some confusion in the minds of thinkers at home and abroad and pointed out the theoretical and practical consequences. While stressing the Indian doctrine that spirit is the only reality, he has pointed out the need for man to struggle for his moral progress. In the author's view consciousness must first assert its own existence and then seek to assert the existence of God and the world. He regards subjectivism, which believes that the material objects seen by man are transformations of his mind, as a false basis for ethics.

The author strongly affirms the reality of the world and man on grounds of logic and experience. He has attempted to prove that "Indian Idealism" in final analysis

sees no contradiction between Philosophy and Science on the one hand and mysticism and Science on the other. The man and the world are not independent of each other, but they are co-relates. Only when man transcends the world of matter and rises step by step in spiritual scale, he becomes free and attains highest knowledge and perfect peace with a view to identify himself with the Absolute.

Dr. Raju has drawn repeated attention to the reality and profound significance of inner life without the understanding and proper cultivation of which all our gains and exploits in the external world are more than useless, even dangerous. He makes a powerful plea for a spiritual culture which can be achieved through the purification and universalisation of one's existential consciousness which indeed is the principal motif of Indian thought. In this emphasis on inner life lies our hope for social and educational reconstruction.

Dr. Raju's thesis is perhaps itself a challenge and might evoke sharp reactions. If it does so, it shall have served its purpose.

Vice-Chancellor's Office,
PANJAB UNIVERSITY,
CHANDIGARH.
August 25, 1960.

A. C. Joshi

PREFATORY NOTE

The occasion for writing the book was at first the invitation by Dr. C.A. Moore of the University of Hawaii] to write a chapter on "Indian Idealism" for his forthcoming book, *Idealism on the World Scene*, which is to be a re-estimate of all that idealism has done in different parts of the globe for a philosophical understanding of man and his world. Behind the project stood great idealists like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. W.E. Hocking, Dr. R.T. Flewelling and others. Dr. Moore's idea was originally that of presenting the forms which idealism took in different parts of the world. But Dr. Hocking expressed the opinion that more important than a historical presentation would be to show how idealism would transform its basic thesis about the nature of its primary concept, Spirit, in face of the modern challenges from science and depth psychology. Some transformation of its thesis has to be effected by idealism, if it is to present a picture of the world adequate to meet the demands of science and of ethics and religion, without which man's life will not only be incomplete but also mean and intolerable. Human freedom has been the first casualty of scientific outlook, communistic or naturalistic. Without admission of the reality of spirit, which alone can be free, the reality of human freedom cannot be defended.

In the contemporary West, idealism has been on the ebb. In face of the progress of naturalism and logical positivism, it has receded to the background. Its main thesis, that the object which my reason posits is as my mind posits it, could not be reconciled properly with the

independence of the objective world from my mind. But the positing of the object as well as the realization that the object is independent of my mind is a function of my own reason. Idealism has not been able to explain how the same reason can perform such opposite functions. The failure of idealism strengthened naturalism and logical positivism. But they themselves have failed to meet the demands of ethics and religion. Even if the importance of religious experience is not immediately felt in our practical affairs, the reality of the implications of ethical consciousness cannot easily be ignored; and naturalism and logical positivism have not been able to defend the reality and the value of ethical consciousness. It is the turn for idealism, therefore, to assert the reality of the being of our consciousness and, after incorporating all that is of value in the rival philosophies, to show how their shortcomings can be removed by re-asserting the reality of spirit. But the adequacy of any philosophy lies not only in answering objections which rival philosophies cannot answer, but also in incorporating the truths they contain and in being true to man and the world. Idealism then cannot remain what it has been before.

The golden age of naturalism has begun to end. It rose as a protest against super-naturalism, and so against the idealism which contained elements of super-naturalism, introduced sometimes as concessions to religious faiths uncritically accepted, and other times by uncritical and hasty conclusions about the reality and nature of spirit, resorting to whatever argument was available to prove the conclusion and often making use of a formal defect in the rival's argument. Western religion has had a long history of hostility to free thinking and science. This hostility and the anxiety of idealism to accommodate religion—although idealists

like Bradley cannot be accused for this kind of anxiety—gave naturalism its strong point. But Indian idealism, in spite of its origin in spiritual experience, was not keen in the beginning about supporting any faith; and it always emphasized the importance and necessity of reason or experience or both. Its acceptance of the authoritativeness of the Upanisads is nothing more than the acceptance of the truth-value of inward experience expressed by the Upanisadic statements. They are not literally accepted on faith in the scripture, but interpreted in accordance with experience and systematic rational thought. Thereby Indian idealism has sometimes been called naturalism, although the reality of spirit is one of its basic doctrines. Consciousness is as natural an existence as trees, mountains, sky, and oceans. And this kind of naturalism has to be accepted in spite of the fear of science that, if the existence of consciousness is accepted, the door of philosophy will be opened for super-naturalism to enter philosophy. Naturalism has, therefore, been so defined by scientific thought that consciousness cannot be called natural; The natural is that which can be predicted according to a law. But the freedom of consciousness does not allow predictability except in a very vague way. The peculiarity of consciousness is self-transcendence, which cannot be brought under the laws of objective nature. So naturalism in its narrower forms has not been able to account for the freedom of man. If traditional idealism tended towards treating the material objects and their determinate laws as unreal, naturalism has tended towards treating consciousness and human freedom as unreal.

Logical positivism and other scientific philosophies have fared no better, although they are still fairly strong. Their central conception is that of analysis and construction,

which is often logical construction; but consciousness and freedom refuse to be constructed, since the constructor itself is consciousness in its freedom from the logical determinism it observes in its objects. Although this aspect of consciousness has been expounded and brought to light by the phenomenologists and existentialists—and by the depth psychologists also who have shown that the world constructed by man is not merely the work of scientific reason but also that of certain psychic forces which combine with it—the logical positivists generally ignore their work. Logical positivism or empiricism is, therefore, foredoomed to failure in its attempts to explain the nature of consciousness and ethics. The major philosophies of the contemporary world, so far as they adopt only the so-called scientific outlook, can furnish no stable foundation for true ethics, freedom and responsibility.

Religion is in a worse predicament than ethics. In about one third of the globe religion is a taboo. In the rest of the world, it is obtaining from intellectuals only lip service, and is mostly tolerated as a social need. The intellectuals in general are indifferent to it, only because the philosophy behind it is not easily understandable to them. Religious organizations have grown into power structures, developed vested interests, and are not well prepared to satisfy the questioning reason of the intellectuals. But with the spread of education and science, man will not be satisfied if his reason and experience are not satisfied. Philosophers are shunning religion; and interest in religion, except when it is anti-religious, is considered to be a disqualification for a philosopher. The scientists in general are indifferent to philosophy, thinking that it invents problems which do not exist; and if they are not hostile to religion, they are at best indifferent to it, accepting it

either as a matter of faith or as a social need. There are indeed exceptions; but exceptions do not represent the outlook of any time. Religion in the present age is certainly on hard times, as it gets little support from science and philosophy, and is unable to answer the questions of the intellect. In some countries people seem to be turning more and more to religion, but mostly because of dissatisfaction with scientific outlook and because of lack of help from philosophy rather than because of any positive help from religion, which, they complain at the same time, does not satisfy their reason. They only hope that they will perhaps find consolation and satisfaction in religion. But religion, treading its old ways and insisting on faith in the narrow sense of the term, is not able to meet their intellectual needs.

It is at this juncture that idealism can again serve humanity, not by presenting its old theses in their old forms, but by transforming them so as to include the truths of science and so as to make science possible. And Indian idealism has much to contribute to the idealistic thought of the world. But again, it can serve humanity by adjusting its thesis to the growing demands of science and material life. If it does not adjust its thesis to them, it cannot serve even the Indian man. Indian idealism speaks of spirit as a natural entity with peculiar characteristics of its own, which are different from those of matter. It accepts religion, not as a dogma to be accepted without questioning, but as matter of reason and experience. The spiritualism of the Vedānta has been as much anaturalism to the Indian mind as the non-spiritual naturalism is the right naturalism for many of the western naturalists. This peculiarity makes Indian idealism open-minded to the results of science and the problems

of scientific outlook, and is well worth considering even by communist philosophers. In fact, Dr. Heimann¹ thinks that Indian philosophy understood spiritualism as a kind of transcendental materialism, and the *atman* (spirit) as transcendental matter—an opinion to which she is led by the peculiar naturalistic attitude of the Indian idealists and religious thinkers. Philosophically, this attitude is not a demerit but a merit, and ought to attract the attention of scientific philosophers of the West, who are still interested in discovering the foundations of ethics and human freedom and of the truth-value of religious experience. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan² was bold enough to address the Moscow University on the need for religion; and one can understand, if one knows the Indian attitude to spirit, why only an Indian idealist could do it. For man spirit and consciousness are at least as natural as matter. If science probes into the deeper levels of matter and its structure, ethics and religion probe into the deeper levels of spirit and its freedom. The structure of our conscious being is as existent as the structure of matter. What is existentially important for the being of man is his consciousness which is active in ethics and religious experience; matter is important as the support of his conscious being. He can do away with neither in his philosophy. Idealism has to recognize both aspects of his existence.

In following the suggestions of both Dr. Moore and Dr. Hocking, the author found that he far exceeded the limits fixed by the former, although generously. What had been written was therefore found to be too long for

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1. *Indian and Western philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1937).
 2. *The Hibbert Journal*, Pp. 57 foll. Vol. LV, July 1957.

a chapter. Then came the invitation of the Panjab University at Chandigarh to give a course of extension of lectures on "Some Aspects of Vedāntic Idealism". The author used whatever he had written as the basis of the lectures. But the questions raised both during and after the lectures by the thoughtful professors and students of the University brought to light more problems which Indian idealism had to solve if it were to be adequate. And the inclusion of the problems not only necessitated the addition of more paragraphs and sections but also some reshuffling of the material, which *had then become a book*. Even then the author does not think that all problems which idealism has to face have been solved finally in the book. It is too small for the purpose. But the author hopes that the clues to the solution of many of the problems which a modern intellectual will raise are given and that, if Indian idealism is to serve man fairly satisfactorily and defend its spiritual thesis, it has to work out the clues in detail and develop them. In this small book it has been possible only to give the general outlines of what Indian idealism has been and what it should be. And in the peculiar context of the situation of western philosophy, the book, it is hoped, will be of interest to western philosophers also, if they are anxious to defend the reality of spirit in order to preserve the foundations of ethics and religion and of the freedom of the human individual.



INTRODUCTION

It is very encouraging to know that interest in idealism is being revived and to be invited to write on it from the standpoint of Indian thought. It is not merely G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism"¹ and R. B. Perry's "Ego-centric Predicament"² which made idealism unpopular in the West; but the general intellectual atmosphere created by science and the scientific method was hostile to the general claim of idealism that mind is explanatory of everything in the world. Scientific discoveries bring to light objects and laws unknown to mind and unknowable by any amount of study of the nature of mind. The forces hidden in the objects are not forces hidden in the mind; and people who are unprepared to recognize the reality of material forces do so at the risk of life. The hard reality of the material world has once for all been impressed on man by the progress of science. Even Kant, who said that mind makes nature, was troubled by the irreconcilability of the freedom of the will and the determinism of nature. If mind really made nature, why should nature be opposed to mind? Fichte's forthright assertion that the ego posited the object produces little conviction in the mind of the scientist. It sounds almost like Berkeley's earlier contention that the object I see is my own idea, and it does not satisfy the scientist, although

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1. See G.E. Moore: *Philosophical Studies* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1948) First published in *Mind*, N.S. Vol. XII, 1903.
 2. R.B. Perry: "The Ego-centric Predicament", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, 1910, No. 1. See also his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, Ch. VI (George Braziller, Inc., New York, 1955).

he is told that the ego with which Fichte starts is the transcendental Ego, since its notion sounds super-natural. Hegel disagreed with Fichte and said that the transcendental Ego could not be a datum for philosophy to start with, but the result of a long process of thinking; but he himself used the concept of Absolute or Objective Reason as if that Reason was his own reason evolving the world through a dialectical process, and the suspicion of the scientific-minded philosopher that the idealists were only making subterfuges to conceal their essential subjectivism, which was inimical to man and science, became strong. It was easy to produce arguments against Moore and Perry; but they would be of no use, because already the progress of science had decided against the current idealism. People saw, in science and philosophies based on science and adopting the methods of science, a new hope that science and scientific philosophies would give better solutions of the problems of life than those offered by the grand idealistic tradition of philosophy.

But idealism had at least one strong point: it could offer fairly satisfactory foundations for ethics and religion, although it could not satisfy the scientific intellect. Science is not concerned with ethics and religion, but only with the discovery of the nature of the objective world. But its protests against idealism had great weight. Men therefore thought that, if philosophy did what science was doing and adopted its methods, it would be more satisfactory. Scientific philosophies became popular as a result. But in their hostility to idealism, these philosophies went to the opposite extreme, denied the reality of an existing spirit, and became incapable of supplying a stable foundation for ethical and religious experience. Many of the scientific philosophers speak of an ethical crisis in our modern

culture; and Russell is one of them. His pessimistic utterances about the nature of man have become proverbial. But these philosophers have not been able to tell us how to discover a solution of the ethical crisis. It is, therefore, reasonable to hope that a solution can be discovered by a re-evaluation of the neglected idealism and in reviving it in a form transformed by the discoveries of depth psychology and the pronouncements of the scientists working on the frontiers of science. Depth psychology enables us to probe into the nature of the disavowed spirit and bring out its reality. And scientific philosophers can tell us how idealism, as a philosophy, can accept the independent existence of the material world.

In India the philosophy still popular is idealism, although some discontent with it is also present. But the discontent is not due to Moore's or Perry's arguments; it is due to the growth of industrialization and technology, and the consequent necessity of viewing the material world as real. Epistemological realism is common to all schools except two schools of Buddhism and one sub-school of the Advaita. What Indian idealism has to do is not the pointing out of the reality of matter, but of the necessity of taking interest in matter and of the necessity of activism both in ethics and religion; for interest in matter and activism have been given a rather secondary place by the general idealistic tradition. Denying the reality of objective matter is as harmful as discouraging interest in the material world and in ethical activity.

A re-estimation of Indian idealism, showing at which places it has to transform its thesis in order to accommodate modern conceptions, will therefore be of great interest to every Indian, if he is anxious to have a philosophy of life which can include scientific, ethical and religious activities.

Idealism must not be content with merely giving a place for these activities, but also show their necessity for true spiritual life. Indian religion has never been hostile to science; and so the opposition between naturalism and super-naturalism has never been felt. Superstitions were certainly present in popular beliefs. But even the exponents of the *Mīmamsa* system, for which Heaven was the ultimate goal of life, said that the popular conception of Heaven as a world of beautiful damsels, wines and rivers was imaginary, and that the word Heaven truly meant a state of undiluted pleasure, and so a state of mind. So even the conception of Heaven was naturalistic, if mind is regarded as a natural entity. It is not naturalism or epistemological realism that Indian idealism is in need of incorporating, but a new kind of ethical activism with stress on the need for intellectual, ethical and aesthetic values.

Being interested from the beginning in understanding the nature of our conscious being, India's idealistic thought developed much psychology, which modern psychologists may call depth psychology. But this is not the psychology of psychopaths but of normal healthy minds, which are kept under control. Yoga is called by some western critics self-hypnotism of abnormal minds. But one of the clear-cut differences between the psychopath and the Yogin is that the former has no control over his mind, whereas the latter has more control over his mind than even the normal person. The Yogin's ultimate aim is absolute control over his mind and then even extinguishing it in the sense of assimilating it to his existential consciousness. Indian idealism has, therefore, much to contribute to depth psychology, which is generally studied in the West in abnormal persons. But the Indian depth psychology, being spiritual in interest, is metaphysics as well, and may

be called meta-psychology, which will be the same, so far as idealism is concerned, as meta-physics. They are positive counterparts of each other. But this aspect of Indian idealism has not been brought to light, because the earlier studies have been made under the influence of the philosophies of Plato, Berkeley, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Bradley, for whose philosophies depth psychology was not of great metaphysical importance. But the present work gives an opportunity for bringing out this aspect of Indian idealism. Without accepting the depths of our conscious being, idealism cannot both accept epistemological realism and establish the primacy of a spiritual reality.

Idealism is a western word, and corresponding to it and covering all the forms which idealism has taken in the history of western philosophy, there is no word in Sanscrit. Dr. Betty Heimann wrote that India had no idealism¹. But S.N. Dasgupta wrote his *Indian Idealism*², Radhakrishnan delivered his Hibbert Lectures on *Idealist View of Life*³, and the present author published his *Idealistic Thought of India*.⁴ There is no one system of thought called idealism even in the West: it is a way of thinking, a particular kind of approach to philosophical problems, treating the reality of spirit as the primary principle. There is a similar way of thinking in India also, which can be called by the name idealism.

The present author has already written on the idealistic thought of India. The present work will therefore give

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1. *Indian and Western Philosophy*, p. 47
 2. Published by the Cambridge University Press, 1933.
 3. Published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1947.
 4. Published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1953. See also his "Idealisms Eastern and Western", *Philosophy: East and West*, October. 1955.

only the central doctrines of the Indian idealists, bringing out the nature of their common approach; it will distinguish the approach from the approaches of the western idealists, show its possible reactions to certain modern trends and challenges, and will make some critical evaluations. The problems dealt with can not be given exhaustive treatment, because of the limitations imposed on space and because of the context in which the work is written. For the same reason, idealistic doctrines other than those of the Vedānta are only incidentally referred to, but not discussed. Besides, the Upanisadic idea of the Spirit is more clearly preserved in the Vedantic systems than in the Buddhist. And since the systems of Sankara and Ramanuja are the most important of the Vedantic systems, the doctrines of these two philosophers alone are utilized.

PART I

Historical: Upanisadic Foundation



CHAPTER I.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE "I"

Peculiarity of the Indian approach: The only country in which idealism is still strong is India. Even in the continent of Europe, idealism cannot be said to be strong, although one may detect aspects of idealism in certain expositions of phenomenology and in a few forms of existentialism. The aim of the great western idealists—Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce and others—was to establish the primacy of spirit, and some of them wanted to show that spirit alone is real. Indian idealism also has the same aim.

A modern student of philosophy may demand that we first give a definition of spirit, so that he can know what idealism is talking about. But it is as difficult to start with a definition of spirit as it is to start with a definition of matter. Both are objects of enquiry; and what ultimately their nature, essence, or form is can be known only after the enquiry ends. But just as the study of matter by science started with hard, solid objects, the study of spirit started in India with the "I—consciousness". The question about the I—consciousness—What is the "I"?—is not a mere psychological question but also a philosophical and religious one. Several questions—like "What is the origin of the world?"—led ultimately to the question about the "I". The first metaphysical question in the history of human

thought was raised by the author of the Vedic *nasadiya* hymn: Where does all this come from? Does Being come out of Being or Non-being? How can Being come out of Non-Being? Then followed several other questionings and reflections. We see Being in the manifold forms around us. When the eyes are open, we see colours; but when they are shut, nothing is seen. Similarly, when the ear is open, we hear sounds; and when the nose is open, we perceive smells. But when the ear and the nose are shut, we perceive no sounds and no smells. But why? What is the relation between senses and objects? When there is light, we are conscious of forms and colours. But when there is no consciousness, there is nothing. But, again, why? What is the relation between consciousness and objects? Consciousness belongs to the "I". Then what is the relation between the "I" and the objects? Thus an enquiry was instituted into the relation between the senses and objects, between the "I" and objects, and between the "I" and senses. The seeds of Indian idealism were thereby sown. For if each relation is some kind of significant relation, the resulting philosophy will be some kind of idealism.

From the religious point of view, the Upanisadic sages realized that salvation could not be meant for the physical body, which is naturally perishable, but for the "I", which has somehow to be distinguished from the physical body. Then what is this "I"? So long as this "I" identifies itself with the physical body, it has to face death and suffer death; for then the "I" has to identify itself with everything that happens to the physical body. But when one is able to realize what exactly the "I" is, he at the same time attains immortality; for then what happens to the body does not happen to the "I". So to know the "I"—not speculatively but directly—is to become immortal.

Then what is the place of God, the Supreme Spirit? He must be the Absolute. The nature of communion with it can be known after, and through the realization of the "I" in its purity, in which state it does not identify itself with anything else. Thus the problem of the nature of the I—consciousness, which is called *atman*, became central to Upanisadic philosophy. One can see that this Upanisadic thought is not Platonic, Berkeleyan, Hegelian or Bradleyan. It is not epistemological, logical or psychological. These approaches and discussions were later introduced by the Vedantic system-builders. One may call the original approach existential, ontological, self-reflective, or intuitional. It is an enquiry into one's own existence, into Being; and intuition is primary when one reflects on one's conscious self. Yet the approach is not irrational, because there is no believing without experiencing or reasoning.

The Being of Consciousness:—The *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad*, which is the earliest of the Upanisads, tells us how to get the consciousness of the *atman* apart from the objective world. The objects of the physical world are seen by us in the light of the sun. When the sun is absent, we see them in the light of fire. When fire is absent, we see them in the light of the moon. The ancient sages did not perhaps know that the light of the moon is a reflection of the light of the sun. But this objection is not relevant to the topic. The light of the sun, of the fire and of the moon is physical light all the same. But what is the light that helps us in seeing the objects of dream? The answer is: It is the light of the *atman*. What is this light? It is consciousness, and it belongs to the *atman*. It is present even when we are perceiving physical objects in our waking state. But it is so mixed up with the processes of our senses, the processes of the objects, and the physical light in which we see them that its distinct reality is missed.

Even in dream we are not conscious of our consciousness as such, but are conscious that we are conscious of objects. We are conscious of our consciousness of objects in our waking state also. But then our sense of the independent reality of the objects is so strong that we attach all importance to the being of the objects and miss the being of our consciousness which is directed towards them. But we attach no reality to the objects of dream, but only to the consciousness of those objects. We feel that this consciousness is not merely revelatory of the objects of dream, but also constitutive in some way. We give importance to the being of consciousness. We say, in a loose way, that our mind creates the objects of dream. But there is an important point to note. In my imagination I can create the objects voluntarily, but not in dream. So the "mind"—using the word in a general sense—that creates the objects of dream is something transcending, and greater than my ego in dream, which suffers from or enjoys the objects created.

The being of the "I":—The Mandukya Upanisad explains how the being of the "I", apart from the being of the objects, can be grasped. There is a peculiarity of the "I" which we must recognise, and in recognizing which we need not be apologetic lest some scientists and scientific philosophers ridicule us. Science, if it is to be true, must not ask us to deny the evidence of our experience, whatever be the explanation it may give of the experience. The peculiarity of the I-consciousness is that it is continuous in sleep, dream and waking states. In deep sleep there is no experience of objects, but the experience is found in the other two states. Now, the objects of dream and wakefulness are not the same. We say that the dream objects are not real, because they have no continuity with the objects of the waking state. But the dream "I" is continuous

with the "I" of waking and sleep. Suppose X dreamt that Y beat him in the dream and tells Y about it. If Y asks: "Did you dream so?", X will say: "Yes, I dreamt it". But if X asks Y: "Did you beat me then?", Y will say: "No, I was sleeping in my room then." This experience shows that the "I" is independent of the world of the waking state even. That is, it has its own being. The reality of the object and the reality of the subject are each based upon its continuity. But the continuity of the objective world is determined not only by identity but also by other principles like causality. The objects of the dream world are not continuous with those of the waking state in either sense, that is, they are neither the same as the latter nor have causal relations with them. The continuity of the I-conscious is based only upon identity, and the experience of self-identity is present between the dream "I" and the waking "I". If the "I" is really identical with the physical body, if the "I" dreams that its hand is cut, then the physical hand must have been cut. But as it is not cut, we have to say that the "I" is not the same as the physical body.

The "I" is present in sleep also. We are certainly not conscious of any object in deep sleep. Some psychologists say that there is no dreamless sleep, but that we cannot remember all dreams. If there is no dreamless sleep, and so there is therefore, some experience always, then the "I" must be present always, although it forgets some of its experiences. But even if there is dreamless sleep, the *Mandukya Upanisad* says, the "I" is present in it. We cannot ask any one about it, unless we wake him up. When I wake up, I say: "I was not conscious of anything, even of myself, in my sleep." But how can I know that I was not conscious of anything unless the "I" was there in sleep? The evidence of nobody is to be accepted, unless he is present as a witness at the incident. And there can be

none else than the "I" itself in sleep for giving evidence. The "I" is present there, but its consciousness of the ego and of the objects is absent.

A modern objection to this position will be that the "I" is present in dream and waking states, but not present at all in deep sleep. It has discontinuous existence. I feel that I am the same as myself before going into sleep, because my physical body is the same; and this sameness produces the illusion of the continuity of the "I" before and after sleep. But this objection assumes that the I-consciousness is a peculiar quality of the organic unity of the physical body, and that this quality appears sometimes and disappears othertimes, depending on the condition of the organism. But this assumption does not agree with the nature of the experience of the "I". If the "I" is really a quality of the whole organism, then it should be limited to, and be invariably connected with the whole. If it is a quality of the body, then instead of being confined to the body, why does the "I" see distant objects? And if it is invariably connected with the whole organism, the "I" should be experienced at the feet, hands, brain and every other part. On the contrary, every part of the body can be made an object of the consciousness of the "I". And it is wrong to say that, in any experience, the "I", which is the subject, is the same as the object. Further, in the above interpretation of dream experience, it has been shown that the "I" cannot be the same as the physical body and that the dream "I" and the waking "I" are continuous and identical. Hence the being of the "I" must be different from the being of the physical body. Then, the continuity of the I-consciousness intercepted by sleep has to be explained along the lines given by the Upanisads. It is true that the "I", when it wakes up, rises

as related to the physical body; and when it dreams or sleeps well, certain organic changes take place in the body. But this admission is not the same as admitting that the I-consciousness is nothing but a quale of the organism. The experience of self-identity before and after sleep must be due to the continuity of the existence of the I-consciousness.

Reflection over dream experience brings out another feature of our consciousness. In dream our physical senses are not operating. Yet, we see colours, hear sounds, and perceive objects in their individuality. We have therefore to infer that our senses are not merely physical, but psychological. Next, what is the stuff of which the objects of dream are made? It is usual to dismiss them as impressions left by experiences of the waking consciousness. True, they are *due to* such impressions, but they *are not* the impressions. We become conscious of our impressions in memory. We project them in our imagination. In either case, we do not assign independent existence to the objects. But in dream the objects are as independent of the dream "I" as the physical objects are of the waking "I". Interpreters of the Upanisads say that the stuff of the dream objects consists of subtle elements (*tanmatras*). Moreover, in dream there is no possibility of distinguishing the process of perception and the objects perceived. The sense that perceives and the perceived object appear together as two poles of one and the same entity.

CHAPTER II.

SUBJECT-OBJECT POLARITY AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

The bases of experience and the correlation of senses and their objects:—The *Aitareya Upanisad* gives, in a semi-mythological form, an account of the basic correlation of the subjective and objective poles of experience. The Atman (Absolute) first created a total mass—which we may interpret as the original undifferentiated form of our common world. This was the egg of the universe (*brahmanda*). It then became the gross cosmic person called Virat. Its senses—eyes, ears, nostrils, skin (touch), taste, and mind—and the five organs of action—hands, feet, mouth, and the generative and excretary organs—burst and out came the corresponding gods. The Atman then gave them man. Then each god entered the corresponding organ and became the organ and the object in man's experience. And the Atman itself entered man as the "I". The gods enjoy themselves through the enjoyment of man. This account looks like a mythological narrative. But we may leave out mythology and consider only the philosophical import.

As early as the *Aitareya Upanisad*, the Indian seers felt that, because every sense organ is associated with a particular kind of object, some self-same entity must have divided itself into the subjective and objective poles of experience in man. Democritus among the Greeks held the same view. But he developed a materialistic view of man

and his senses, whereas the Upanisadic thinkers developed a spiritual view of even the objective world. It was gods—who were spiritual beings—that became senses and their objects. The correlativity between the senses and the objects does not mean that the object is a psychic state or sensation, but that the sense and the object are constituted by an entity, the activity of which is self-polarization. This activity is, again, not the kind of transformation like that of solid wax into liquid wax, but self-polarization into the knower or a part of the knower and the known or a part of the known—, which is possible only in the case of a spiritual entity, but not in the case of a material entity.

Now, if the senses belong to the “I” and are co-ordinated and controlled by it, and if the objects are correlates of the senses, then that which co-ordinates the objects must be the correlate of the “I”. Then the underlying unity of the “I” and the objective correlate must be a spiritual being knowable to man through the “I”. The ultimate basis of the “I” and its correlate must be the God of gods, the Great Atman, the Brahman, the ultimate creator of the universe, and is said to have entered man and become the I-consciousness. It is really the support and source of the I-consciousness.

Thus was the way cleared for a spiritual philosophy, an idealism for which the Absolute Spirit is the creator and sustainer of the universe. Even the organs of action and their objects are polarized forms of some deities and “deities” mean spiritual entities. And all deities are controlled by the Supreme Spirit. Each sense, taken along with its object, is really a base, a field (*anyatana*)¹ of experience. For philosophical purposes, it may be repeated,

1. Here I have simplified the Upanisadic account.

we may not use the words gods and deities, but a word like spiritual force or entity. Thus, we may say, that the *Aitareya Upanisad* gives an account of the correlated subjective and objective poles of our being, with different underlying unities, all being integrated in the Absolute Spirit. It is not a closely argued philosophical account. But one may see in it the peculiarly idealistic approach.

Levels of the atman:—The *Taittiriya Upanisad* gives another account of the consciousness of the "I", and it is given in terms of the *atman* and its body. The Upanisads used the word *atman* in different senses—the "I", soul, spirit, person, and self. It will be wrong to translate the word always as spirit. In literary language the word has several other meanings. The *Taittiriya* word may be translated as the "I" or the self. Now, man thinks of his physical body as his self; but a dead body does not speak of itself as the self or as "I". What is absent from it is the vital principle. So the vital principle is identified as the self. But in sleep, although the body is living, man does not speak of himself as "I". What is absent then is mind (*manas*). So next mind is said to be the self. But a lunatic may say: "I was dead long ago", and may refuse to respond to our calling. Reason (*vijnana*) is lacking in him. So reason is considered to be the self. But reason itself is possessed by something. That something, therefore, is the self¹. I say: "I have reason", "I am conscious of my reason", but not "I am the same as my reason".

Why are the physical body, the vital principle, mind and reason called self? It is the peculiar nature of the "I" to identify itself with many of its objects. I identify myself with my body and say: "I am so many feet tall". Similarly, I say: "I am alive, I am happy, I am rational." But the

1. Here I have simplified the Upanisadic account.

truth of the "I" does not lie in any of these; it is beyond them. This transcendence, this "being beyond", brings the "I" into contact with the Absolute Spirit.

Self-transcendence and inwardness:—One might have seen by now that the account of the "I" given by the Upanisads, particularly by the *Taittiriya* and the *Aitareya*, makes the I-consciousness the most inward of our experiences and also the most comprehensive. The "I" in our being is a form of the Supreme Atman, a centre of its processes, according to the *Aitareya*. Through the mind and the senses, it covers the whole objective field of our experience. According to the *Taittiriya* also, the "I" is the most inward of our being, more inward than reason or thought (*cogito*) and, through its peculiar capacity for identification, covers all levels from reason down to the physical body. And it covers everything not only in the form of "I am this or that", but also in the form of "this is mine and that is mine". It is the nature of the being of our consciousness to project objects out of itself, identify itself with some of them as "I am" and with others as "I have, or know or perceive". This identification is due to the power of the spiritual reality within us to self-polarize itself keeping its own integrality unaffected, and yet to identify itself with one pole of the process as "I am" and keep the other pole as "mine" or my object. And since the "I", which was originally the Atman, identifies itself with several levels, it can transcend each lower level, when it begins to reflect on its being and retraces itself back, until it regains its original being. This process is called self-transcendence. It is the realization of inwardness.

The process of self-transcendence and the regaining of inwardness are explicitly mentioned by the *Katha*

Upanisad. It says that the self-born (Supreme Spirit) created the senses with an outward direction and so the objects of the senses are perceived as external to us. The truth is seen by one who can turn his senses inward. Turning the senses inward is not introversion, which is a psychopathological state. The process of turning inward is explained by the same *Upanisad*. Objects are higher than the senses, because the senses depend on them for their activity. Mind is higher than the objects, because it is mind that knows the objects as individuals. Reason is higher than mind, Cosmic Reason higher than individual reason, the undifferentiated Unmanifest (Unconscious) higher than Cosmic Reason, and the Atman (Purusa) higher than the Unmanifest. And in order to reach the highest, one has to pass through the various levels in this order.

As mentioned already, the *Upanisads* do not give systematic disquisitions. They mix up several ideas and standpoints—the mythological, metaphysical, epistemological, psychological, and religious. A step in explanation lacking in one place is to be obtained from another. What the *Upanisad* means by “higher” is really “more inward”. Senses¹ are known by the mind, but not *vice-versa*; so mind is more inward than the senses. Reason knows the activities of the mind, but not *vice versa*; so reason is more inward than the mind. In this way, the Atman is the most inward. The process from the Atman towards the objects is an outwardizing process; the opposite is the

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1. Certainly, objects like tables and chairs are not more inward than the senses. The *Upanisad* is mixing up the idea of self-transcendence in our being with the idea of epistemological truth. The senses are dependent on the objects for truthful activity. This is the usual interpretation given by the commentators. But one can give another interpretation. The word “objects” here may refer not to physical objects, but to the subtle spiritual elements, which polarize themselves into senses and objects. In that case, they can be inward to the senses.


inwardizing process. Nothing is lost in either process. There is only a kind of transformation. But this transformation is not like that of milk into curd or of solid wax into liquid wax. The outwardizing process is the self-polarization of spiritual reality; and the inwardizing process is the depolarization of the polarized reality.

Some essential questions:—If the world is created through the polarization of the Atman, did the process take place in time? The Upanisads mix up mythology and philosophy; we have therefore to be careful in interpreting them. Time is said to come out of the Atman, and so the latter could not have acted in time. Two great mistakes which idealism, in the its history, committed are: First, because Spirit is said to be the cause of the world, the objects are treated as mental states. Second, for the same reason it is said that, if we understand the nature of mind, we can understand the nature of matter. It is difficult to say that the Upanisadic language does not yield these two conclusions. A few system-builders, we shall see later, drew these conclusions. But we have to be careful in interpreting the Upanisads, and we have to take primarily their central doctrine and interpret the others in accordance with it and with doctrines not touched by the Upanisads. The creativity of spirit is not transformation of itself into something else, but self-polarization, in which spirit, while remaining itself in tact in one pole, objectifies itself in the other pole. An analogical process in our experience is that of imagination. When I produce the mental image of a mountain before my mind, I do not become the mountain; the "I" as the knower of the mountain is still different. If the Absolute Spirit has created the world in some similar way, it has not transformed itself into the world, but has projected it as its own object.

But so far as we, finite beings, are concerned, the objectivity of the world is not our projection, but a projection by the Absolute Spirit residing within each one of us. So the objects are not made of our mental stuff. What they are and what their nature is can be known only by an objective study, not by a mere study of mind. True, the correlativity of senses and their objects, and of mind and its objects is accepted. But the correlativity does not mean that, if the senses are part of my subjective being, the objects also are its part. On the other hand, it means that I along with my senses am part of a wider and more comprehensive being, which includes myself and the objective world around me. The different forms of correlativity cancel the apparent isolation of my being, both inwardly and outwardly. This correlativity, as has been mentioned, is due to the several spiritual forces—called deities or gods by the Upanisads—connecting me and the objective world at various levels from the senses to the "I". If the "I" can realize its oneness—whatever be its form, identity or identity-in-difference—with the Absolute Spirit, then only can it realize how 'the latter' produces the world out of itself through self-polarization.

PART II

Historical: Idealism Of The Systems



CHAPTER III.

SELF AND THE ABSOLUTE

Introduction—The Upanisads, as pointed out earlier, are not systems of thought, but analyses of inward experience given by the ancient sages, who did not even belong to the same period. Their ideas, when brought together, can be differently interpreted; and some of the great spiritual leaders felt differently about the inward reality. So the Upanisads—which are called also Vedānta, since they come at the end of the Veda—gave rise to different systems of Vedantic philosophy. All are absolutistic in one sense or another, although they have been carrying on controversies with one another under different names like non-dualism (*advaita*), non-dualism of the qualified Brahman (*viśiṣṭādvaita*), non-dualism-cum-dualism (*dvaitādvaita*), and dualism (*dvaita*). Each, again, has more than one form. Of all of them, the first two, propounded by Sankara and Ramanuja respectively, are the most important. This Part will deal mainly with them, and only incidentally with the others. Incidental mention will be made of Buddhism also. In Indian thought idealism is found in the Vedantic thought and in the Mahayana schools of Buddhism.

The individual self and the Absolute—The *Aitareya Upanisad* tells us, we have seen, that the Atman, as the Absolute, entered man as the finite self (*jīvā*). But what is the nature of this “entering”? If it could enter any man, it must have entered all men. But if it entered one man,

how can it enter others? So the relation between the self as it is in man and the Self as the Absolute needs further philosophical explanation. In explaining this relation, Sankara and Ramanuja differed from each other. Sankara says that the two are essentially identical; the finite self is the Absolute limited by man's mind, senses and the physical body. If man's consciousness is able to transcend this limitation, it becomes the Absolute Self. But Ramanuja says that there is still some ultimate difference between the finite and the Absolute selves. The limitations have certainly to be transcended for the realization of the original (own) form (*svarupa*) of even the finite self (*atman*). But the Absolute Self is that which is still within the finite self, and which yet transcends it. The former is the Spirit within spirits and is therefore called the Supreme Spirit (*Paramatman*). Sankara says that the relation between the finite spirit and the Infinite is non-duality or identity (*advaita*). Ramanuja says that it is that of body and spirit. Just as the finite *atman* is related to the physical body, the Supreme Atman is related to the finite *atman*. Spirit and body are different, but yet inseparable.¹ The Absolute is non-dual not apart from spirit and matter, but as including them. They are its attributes. The non-duality of the Absolute is a qualified non-duality.

From this central point of difference the Vedantic schools diverged farther and farther and developed different philosophical doctrines. And in the controversies, they relied not merely upon the unsystematic utterances of the

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1. Differing from both Sankara and Ramanuja, Nimbarka held that the relation between the two is identity-cum-difference, which may be freely rendered as identity-in-difference. Madhva maintained that the relation is complete difference. There are other views. See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, Chapter IV (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1953).

Upanisads, but also upon logic and experience. And the schools developed various metaphysical, epistemological, logical and psychological theories. In discussing these theories, however, philosophy cannot start with the Absolute, which is not within the reach of the ordinary consciousness as a datum, but only with the experience of the finite individual. And unlike the Absolute, the finite individual cannot create the objects he perceives. Idealism, while it accepts the ultimate reality and primacy of Spirit, has therefore to explain and defend the reality of the objective world around us. We come across the distinction between reality and unreality at first in the empirical world. And if the whole empirical world is condemned as unreal, then we shall have no basis for the distinction.

The Brahman and the empirical world—The Upanisads declare that everything came out of the Brahman. But this statement is not our datum or major premise to start with, but a conclusion or goal. Whereas the Upanisads start with the Brahman and say that the creative forces of the elements first came forth, and then polarized themelves into the senses of man and their objects, we have to start with the observed correlation of our senses and their objects, postulate identical forces underlying the correlations, and then say that, just as the "I" controls the mind and senses, there is something which is the controlling force of the polarized forces and that force is the Brahman. The "I" is the controlling agent of the subjective poles of the forces. It has no control over the objective poles; in order to control them it needs action. Now, if each subjective pole is correlated with an objective pole, there must be something on the objective side, which is the correlate of the "I". But if each correlated pair constitutes

a unity, then there must be an underlying unity of both the "I" and its correlate. And this unity is the Brahman. The correlate of the "I" must be as independent of the "I" as any object is independent of the corresponding sense. But neither can be independent of the underlying unity, the Brahman. The correlate of the "I" is the material world and is called differently as Prakrti and Maya. It is the undifferentiated origin of the material world, which is absolute unconsciousness.

The word Maya does not have the meaning of unreality in all the Vedantic systems. Even for Sankara, it means that which is neither existent nor non-existent nor both nor neither. For all the Vedantins, it is a peculiar force (sakti) or power of the Brahman. The Vedantins are not unanimous about the number of forces which the Brahman has. Sankara accepts only one; some accept two, and others three. The material world is the manifestation of one force; the finite selves are the manifestation of the second; and the power to control both is the third. But all the three belong to the same Brahman. Sankara says that there is no difference between the Brahman and its power, just as there is none between fire and its power to burn. The burning power has no separate existence from fire. Similarly, the creative power, Maya, of the Brahman has no separate existence from the Brahman. But it cannot be said to be non-existent, because it is the force of the Brahman and the Brahman is existence and we perceive the power. Whether these forces of the Brahman are many or one is an unimportant question, because they have no existence apart from the Brahman.

But Ramanuja says that they have a different, though not a separate, existence from Brahman. That is, inseparability is accepted by Ramanuja, who says that

inseparability is not absolute identity. The Brahman is non-dual (one) in the sense that it and its forces constitute a unity.

We know that the material world is unconscious. We do not know whether it is unconscious or not in itself; but so far as our understanding of the material objects goes, their behaviour does not seem to be the behaviour of conscious beings. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy led some to think that the ultimate constituents of matter have a free will. But the evidence is not strong enough to prove that they are spiritual entities. We think that chairs, tables, rocks etc., are unconscious, and that we are all finite. Now, if the Brahman is the Infinite Spirit, how can unconscious matter and finite selves come out of it? The reply may be the counter-question. Why must they not come out of it? What is there to prevent an infinite, dynamic, conscious being from creating finite conscious centres and unconscious matter out of itself? Why should dead hair and nails come out of a living body? Sankara did not ask the counter-question, but said that we cannot explain. Creative process is an inexplicable process; it is Maya. We can only say that we and matter are, but we cannot say why and how we have come out of the Brahman. But if we analyse our experience, we find that, ultimately deep within, it is the Brahman to which it has to be traced and with which it is identical. But Ramanuja, while agreeing that the creative power is certainly inexplicable and is Maya, adds that it is a real existence different from the Brahman. Even unconscious matter has its own existence within the Brahman.

From our point of view, there is one difficulty in appreciating and accepting Ramanuja's position. The truth of the general Vedantic position is that to be an object implies to be unconscious. The object may be

conscious in itself. Yet for me it has to be opaque to my consciousness; otherwise, it ceases to be an object and becomes a part of my mind or mental state like the object of my imagination. So true objectivity means opaqueness to my consciousness, and therefore, so far as my consciousness goes, to be unconscious. Ramanuja says that this unconscious matter, like the *atmans* or finite centres of experience, is eternal and constitutes the body of the Brahman. Now, my own body is made sensitive (*cetana*) by my consciousness, and I identify myself with it and say: "I am so many feet tall." "The body ceases to be unconscious and insensitive in the experience, "I am." Then how can Prakrti or Maya retain its unconscious nature and have its own existence when it becomes the body of the Brahman? Sankara, therefore, is more reasonable when he says that Maya, so long as it retains its own reality, remains an object (*visaya*) of the Brahman. But when it enters the Brahman, it loses its reality. And as an object, it does not affect the purity of the Brahman, just as the table I see does not affect me. But my own body affects me. Ramanuja's position may be satisfactory to some religious people, because God (Brahman) is afflicted by the afflictions of his creatures, of whose pleasures and sorrows He partakes. But epistemologically there is a weak point in Ramanuja's position. And he denies that God partakes of our joys and sorrows.

According to Ramanuja, the world is due to the transformation (*parinama*) of the material energy (*Maya Sakti*) of the Brahman. The finite selves (*atmans*) are eternal, but the material energy overwhelms them because of their *karma* (ethical action), and they identify themselves with it. Then the whole creation starts. The energy then transforms itself into reason, then the ego (which is

not the I-consciousness according to Ramanuja but is the consciousness that identifies itself with the senses and the physical body), and after that into mind (*manas*), senses, organs of action, and their corresponding objects. Sankara has no objection to this kind of transformation after the material energy issues out of the Brahman; but he would say that the finite *atmans* and the material energy have no ultimate reality of their own. Furthermore, Ramanuja regards the transformation as the transformation of the Brahman itself. But Sankara says that such a transformation is impossible; for if the Brahman transforms itself, then it will be lost in the transformation, become the material world, and cease to be the Supreme Spirit. To the contention that only a part of the Brahman—that is, the material energy—transforms itself and the other part remains unaffected, Sankara replies that the Brahman is an integral unity and that no part of it can undergo separate transformation without affecting the rest; we cannot cut a fowl into two, eat one part, and allow the other to lay eggs.

At this stage Sankara is right as against Ramanuja. Instead of the transformation theory, the former advocates the doctrine of *vivarta*, for which there is no English word. As explained by Sanskrit writers, the word means transformation without losing one-self in the process. Such transformation is possible mainly in the case of spiritual beings. When a material object like milk is transformed into curd—the classical example of the Sanskrit writers—we no longer get milk. But when a lump of clay is transformed into a pot, the clay is not lost but a form is imposed on it. When a crystal reflects the colour of a nearby object, the original crystal is not lost but is temporarily coloured. The change of milk into curd is an example

of transformation (*parinama*), and the change of clay into pot and of a white crystal into a coloured crystal are examples of *vivarta*. But these examples do not really give the idea in Sankara's mind. It is the peculiar ability of a spiritual being to project an object out of itself and yet be conscious of it without being lost in the process. With some of these objects, our consciousness can even identify itself. For instance, my consciousness can identify itself with the idea of being a professor; but my consciousness is not a professor; and so it can later identify itself with the idea of being an administrator. This kind of identification is called super-imposition (*adhyasa*) by Sankara. The process of the Brahman in creating the world is a similar process. It cannot be described in any of the usual ways; it is *Maya*, inexplicable. The laws of the processes of matter are not applicable to the processes of Spirit, not even to all the processes of the finite spirit.

But the examples of clay and crystal given by Sankara and his followers for explaining the process of the Brahman are not really applicable to the latter. There is something besides clay—the potter, the wheel etc.,—which is responsible for the form of the pot. The form is imposed on the clay from outside. Similarly, colour is imposed on the crystal from outside. But there is nothing besides the Brahman; and Sankara is not prepared to accept that *Maya* has a different existence from the Brahman. So Ramanuja's arguments against Sankara's conception of *Maya* to the effect that it is neither an existent entity nor a quality with a locus either in the Absolute or in the finite individual become relevant; for even if the world has the same metaphysical status as an illusion, there must be a cause and locus for illusion, and the Brahman cannot be either according to Sankara. Even if the world is neither

real nor unreal, it is there before us and there must be a cause for it; it must have some origin somewhere. Even if it is a playful activity (*lila*) it must be the activity of someone, and that someone can only be the Brahman. Even if we accept, for argument's sake, that Maya is only an appearance, that appearance must have a source; it must be the appearance to some one. Otherwise, no positive source of the world can be found. The only way out of the difficulty is to understand the process of creation as the activity of a spiritual being, which can project an object out of itself and yet be unchanged and unaffected. We have an example of the process in the activity of our imagination. I can imagine a cobra on my table and be not frightened by it. Not only am I not frightened by it, but also my existence with reference to it is not changed; I am still what I have been. The creative activity of the Supreme Spirit must be similar. Such activity is possible only in the case of spiritual beings. For it is the nature of spirit to produce something out of itself and yet remain in tact.

If the above peculiar nature of spirit is recognized, then Sankara's objections to Ramanuja's position and Ramanuja's objections to Sankara's position can be met. The Upanisads repeat several times that the origin of the world is the Brahman and that everything, including the finite spirit, is the Brahman. And we have to understand how this origination is possible, in spite of the Brahman remaining in tact after the creation. The source and locus of the creative force cannot be other than the Brahman; even Sankara says that the burning power of fire cannot be a different existence from fire. The example amounts to an admission that the force of Maya belongs to the Brahman. There is an important difference. The

burning power of fire does not produce the object burnt; nor does fire remain in tact after the power is spent in burning the object. It is given only to the being of consciousness to produce the object and yet remain in tact. The object produced is the result of the activity of consciousness, and the activity is the power of consciousness. It is not enough to say that the activity has no existence apart from consciousness, it has also to be said that it belongs to consciousness. Apart from consciousness, the activity is, of course, neither existent nor non-existent. But when the being of consciousness is recognized, the activity has to be attributed to consciousness itself. And when the activity is withdrawn into the being of consciousness, it becomes one with consciousness. Only because I am not the mental image I project, it is wrong to say that the mental image exists in some subtle form in me even when I withdraw the projection. Prakrti (matter) and the finite *atman* cannot have their own existence in the Brahman at the level of experience of the Brahman; and yet Maya, their originating force, must belong to the Brahman as its projective force.

CHAPTER IV.

CONSCIOUSNESS, REASON AND THE "I".

Nature of consciousness—We have now to raise the question: Whatever be the way the objects come into existence, when once they are created, is spirit the consciousness of the objects or is it the owner of the consciousness of the objects? How does spirit know itself and know its objects? Are the two knowings different or are they one? In answering these questions Sankara and Ramanuja differ from each other. There are some differences of view among the followers also of each.¹ Only the main trends will be presented here.

There are three factors in the cognitive situation: the object perceived, the consciousness of the object, and the perceiver of the object. That is, I am conscious of the object, I am conscious of the consciousness of the object, and I am conscious of myself as conscious of the object. We may leave out the question whether my consciousness of myself is explicit or implicit in my consciousness of the object. In either case, it is there. The consciousness of myself is the consciousness of my existence, which is called *svarupajnana* by both Sankara and Ramanuja and which may be freely translated as *existential consciousness*.

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1. There are more differences of view among the followers of Sankara than among those of Ramanuja. It is impossible even to mention them, for want of space. For knowing them the reader has to consult several works and commentaries. See also the author's article, "Post-Sankara Advaita" in *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western* (Vol. I, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1952).

The consciousness of the object which I have is called *dharmabhutajnana* by both and is translated as *attribute consciousness*, because it is not the perceiver or the "I" itself but *is had* by the perceiver as an attribute of himself. Both the existential consciousness and attribute consciousness are self-revealing, *i.e.*, they reveal themselves to me. But there is a difference: the "I" reveals itself to itself; but the consciousness of the object, which is an attribute consciousness, reveals itself not to itself, but to the "I". But in the process of self-revealing, neither consciousness depends upon anything else. The attribute consciousness, in order to arise at all, needs the object; but in order to reveal itself to me, it does not depend on the object. But the object, in order to be known, depends upon my consciousness.

Ramanuja says that both the existential and attribute consciousnesses are existent, each has its own reality, although inseparable from each other. Sankara holds that at the empirical level the two kinds of consciousness are distinct and inseparable, but the attribute consciousness has no ultimate reality of its own. It is the very nature of existential consciousness to project itself out of itself without losing its self-identity and self-awareness and at the same time be conscious of the consciousness projected towards the object. We should understand the nature of the processes of consciousness as they are, but not on the analogy of material objects. Ramanuja says that, just as the flame and its light are both self-revealing and yet different, the two kinds of consciousness are self-revealing and different. To this contention, Sankara would say that the analogy is not applicable to consciousness.

If the attribute consciousness is a distinct existence, then I need another consciousness to know that conscious-

ness. If the third consciousness is conceded, we need a fourth to know it, and so on *ad infinitum*. We have, therefore, to accept that the attribute consciousness is a peculiar force or power (*citsakti*) of the existential consciousness itself. But Ramanuja thinks that it is different, although a force. According to him, both the Brahman and the *atman* have each its own attribute consciousness. Even the attribute consciousness is not like the passive light, but is a dynamic force. Of course, in the case of finite beings, its power is limited; but in the case of the Brahman, it is a creative force which transforms itself into all the inward experiences except the *atman* and the mind¹ (*manas*).

According to Sankara, the attribute consciousness is a transformation (*vrtti*, *parinama*) of the inner sense (*antahkarana*, which roughly corresponds to mind in all its aspects in western psychology). In the perception of a pen, this consciousness goes out and assumes the form of the pen and coincides with the object. The object itself is not a state of this consciousness. It is there independently of the consciousness and is a form of the material energy of the Brahman. Ultimately of course, its nature is spiritual. We may remember that, according to the *Aitareya Upanisad*, the objective world is originally the cosmic egg (*brahmanda*), out of which finite spirits are created. Man's finitude consists in his consciousness not being the objects also; or it consists in the objects not being modes or states of his consciousness. But the principle of correlativity discussed above shows, that behind these differences and oppositions, there is an underlying unity with which we are one through our conscious being.

1. L. Srinivasacharya: *Darsonodaya*, p. 211 (Government Branch Press, Mysore, 1933).

In my consciousness of the pen are involved three factors: "It is a pen"; "I am conscious of the pen"; and "I am conscious of my consciousness of the pen". Except for the differences pointed out already, Ramanuja also accepts this analysis of perception.

The world of dream and of waking consciousness— Epistemology and the problem of truth are as important for Indian philosophy as they are for the western. But the Indian approach, even that of Indian idealism, to philosophy itself is not epistemological, but that of our conscious being. As shown in the above section, the epistemology of both Sankara and Ramanuja is realistic. Without assuming that objects are independent of our consciousness, the distinction between truth and falsity cannot even arise. But when a metaphysical position is accepted, it needs support from epistemology. Both Sankara and Ramanuja attempted to furnish the support.

Whatever is experienced as an object and as independent of our mind cannot be non-existent: this is accepted by both Sankara and Ramanuja. But Sankara says that it may not be existent also. Only because it is neither existent nor non-existent, do we call it illusion. When we mistake a shining shell for silver, there is illusion. If that piece of silver is existent like the shell, there is no illusion. But Ramanuja says that both silver and shell are existent; but the difference between the two existents is that the shell is a part of the pragmatic world as it performs the function (*arthakriyakarita*) for which it is meant, whereas the illusory silver does not perform the pragmatic function and so we call it illusory. The distinction between truth and falsity is only a pragmatic distinction.

Sankara does not accept that the pragmatic criterion of truth is ultimate. Truth is that which is not contradicted

and is not contradictable. From the point of view of human knowledge, the judgment, "It is a shell", is not contradictable; but the judgment, "It is a silver piece", is contradictable. So it is not the pragmatic criterion but that of non-contradiction that is the criterion of truth and existence.

But if the criterion of truth is non-contradiction, is any existence in the world non-contradictory? Like Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*, Sankara uses his dialectic to show that every phenomenal reality is self-contradictory. If it is self-contradictory, then illusoriness¹ applies to it. Whereas Ramanuja says that everything experienced is existent and real, Sankara comes to the conclusion that even those objects which are regarded as real by us are illusory from the ultimate point of view. If they are truly illusory, why do we treat them as real and existent? Sankara's answer is the same as that of Ramanuja: they have only a pragmatic (*arthakriyakarila*) reality².

Although opposed to each other, Sankara and Ramanuja come, curiously enough, to the same view about the phenomenal world: its reality consists in serving the purpose for which it is meant. The test of the phenomenal reality is the pragmatic test. It is certainly not utility. Poison is meant to kill. But killing is not necessarily utility but harm. For a long time the term *vyavaharika*, which is often translated as "empirical", has intrigued the present writer, because *vyavahara* does not mean experience. In western idealistic thought the empirical world is generally opposed to the noumenal world,

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1. See the author's *Thought and Reality* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1937).
 2. See Madhavacharya: *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, p. 163 (Anandasrama Press, Poona, 1928).

of which we do not have experience, and the former is, for that reason, called the phenomenal world also. Although the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds can be discovered in the philosophies of Sankara and Ramanuja, *vyavahara* does not mean experience, but conduct, action, profession; or as defined by the philosophers themselves, it means activity for producing the result for which the object is meant. Indeed, the followers of Sankara do not accept that it is a criterion of truth, reality or existence; and their rejection of the criterion made many Indian writers translate *vyavaharika-satta* as empirical existence. But if the question about the criterion of *vyavaharika-satta* is raised—this has not been often raised¹—the followers of Sankara also have said that it is the capacity for serving the purpose for which the object is meant.

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1. This problem has intrigued the present writer for several years. Except in the philosophy of Ramanuja, the idea of *arthakriyakarita* (serving the purpose for which the object is meant) is not prominent in Vedantic idealism. Buddhist Vijnanavada also enunciates it somewhat clearly. In the Advaita of Sankara it is often mixed up with the criterion of non-contradictability (*abadhyatvam*) and is left in the background. It is present fairly prominently in the Nyaya-Vaisesika, and to some extent in the Mimamsa. But that the prominence is not given is not due to unawareness of the problem, but due to the great spiritual interest of the idealistic philosophies. The present writer made reference to the importance of the pragmatic criterion some years ago. (See Radhakrishnan and Muirhead: *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, P. 520, 2nd. edition, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1952). The Mimamsa philosophy of action implies it—whether all the Mimamsa writers accept it or not as a test of truth—because its basic idea is that the world is a result of ethical action. (See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp.429 foll., published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1953). Unfortunately the Indian writers have not discussed the full implications of the pragmatic criterion, except saying that right action purifies the mind. But why it purifies the mind, and what are the implications—logical, epistemological, metaphysical, and spiritual—of this purification have not been seriously discussed.

Evidently, the mundane world—whether it is regarded as real or unreal from the absolute point of view—is a world of action (*karmamayam jagat*) for all the Vedantic philosophers. It has its own being, structure, truth, and form. Its truth can be known only in action.² The denunciations of the world in the popular expositions of the Advaita (Non-dualism) of the Vedanta and Buddhism—Buddhism also has its Non-dualism—have made people think that the world is unreal even for man, even from the finite point of view, and that man should conduct himself in the world as if it were unreal. But this kind of thinking is not in conformity with the spirit of Vedic thought. What should strike any serious student of Indian thought is the similarity of the views of Sankara, Ramanuja and Vijnanavada Buddhism about the pragmatic structure of our common world. Sankara says that both the illusory and real objects of this world are neither existent nor non-existent; they are *maya*, *anirvacaniya*, inexplicable. Ramanuja contends that every object of perception, even the illusory object, is existent. Vijnanavada maintains that every object, even the real object, is non-existent. But all the three say that the non-illusory mundane object is a pragmatic object. Indeed, it is not the pragmatic test that confers existence on the object, the test enables us only to know whether the object is an existent object of this world or not. So far as man is concerned, he can know whether or not he is living a true life, a life in conformity with the objective world, with a true reality—attitude,

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2. If the gross world in which we live is the result of ethical action, —as the Indian schools, except the Carvakas, maintain,—and if action is purposive, then the truth of any object is known only if the object, in action, serves the purpose for which it is meant. Then, the idea or form of the object, action of the perceiver, and his feeling or realization that the object has served its purpose are all involved in the epistemology concerning the objects of this world.

only through activity. A mere cognitive life is not enough; it may be an illusory life. Cognition has to be confirmed by action, and action has to be confirmed by cognition, and both have to be confirmed by the feeling or realization, through action, that the object *as known* has served the purpose for which it is meant. If the world is really a world of action, it is wrong to think that certainty can be attained through cognition only or through action only. For man, the cognition of an object and the being of the object are not identical. In feeling being and knowing are identical; but man's feeling is not always reliable. So the inter-dependence of cognition, action, and feeling has necessarily to be accepted for the life of man. Feeling also has its epistemological use, and is often called intuition.

So far as our experience goes, none of the criteria given by the epistemologists can be theoretically adequate for convincing us about the certainty of our perceptions. The inadequacy is natural to our experience, because of the correlativity of the subjective and objective poles of experience. What we know is always what we can know through the subjective pole, whether it be mind, sense, or reason. Even if we take the help of an instrument like a microscope or telescope, the object is what is known through the subjective pole. Russell¹ says that the self makes no difference to the object. The answer is that, if it makes a difference, it ceases to be the subjective pole. Yet, it is an essential correlate of the object. And because the subject is only a correlate, we are able to speak of the object without mentioning the subject, just as a physician treats a defect of our body without reference to the subject

1. *Bertrand Russell's Best*, p. 96 (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, (1958).

present in the body. How then can we establish the essential spirituality of the world?

Here the Vedantins take the help of dream experience in order to establish the spirituality of the world.¹ Dream also has its epistemological implications. So long as the dream lasts, its objects are not regarded as illusory and we do not doubt their reality. Only when I wake up, I say that they are "mental" and that, although I do not create them voluntarily by my mind, somehow they are created out of my "mind". Dream experience, much more than illusions and hallucinations, confirms the doctrine of correlativity, the doctrine that the world of experience with its subjective and objective poles is an occurrence within our conscious being. Because it occurs within our conscious being, the latter must be wider than the subject and object put together in dream. The experience is "mine", and this "mine" includes, therefore, the subject and the object and is not limited to the subject. If so, my waking experience also, with its two poles, must be comprehended by, and must occur within a conscious being, which is still in some sense "mine", but a "mine" not limited to the subject of waking experience, but going

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1. There is only one sub-school of the Advaita which may be called subjective idealism and which enunciates the doctrine that creation is perception, that is, to be created is to be perceived. (See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 103 foll.) For Ramanuja, Prakṛti or Matter has its own reality and while entering the constitution of mind and the senses, becomes the objective material world also, and preserves the latter's independence from the former. It will be a mistake to interpret the Vedānta, except the Advaita sub-school referred to, as subjective idealism. Furthermore, although this sub-school is usually interpreted as subjectivism, it is possible to re-interpret it as a philosophy of transcendence, and reject the charge of subjectivism, with the help of the idea of correlativity. The creation is of correlates by something other than the correlates, not of one correlate by the other correlate.

beyond. It is the real ground of waking experience. If the true nature of dream is realized in waking experience, the true nature of waking experience is realized in that higher experience, which will still be "mine". It is as futile for the dream subject to ask itself how it knows the truth about the independent dream objects as it is for the waking subject to ask itself how it knows the truth about the independent objects of the waking state. The reason for the failure of all the epistemological criteria—coherence, correspondence, pragmatism—lies here. One can be certain of the truth of the object, if it is part of one's consciousness; but if it is part of one's consciousness, it ceases to be an independent object. So either we deny the reality of objects or we admit that we can not be certain of their truth only through cognition. And whatever criterion is chosen, it is wrecked on the horns of this dilemma. The difficulty is overcome by postulating a higher experience.

Nature of the I-consciousness—The I-consciousness of the higher experience must be continuous with the I-consciousness of the waking experience. It has been mentioned earlier that the "I" of dream, waking state, and deep sleep are continuous. In the waking state, the "I" realizes that not only the subject of the dream but also the objects are its own being. Similarly, in the higher state, if it is attained, the "I" will realize that the subject and objects of the waking state are forms of its own being, which is polarized into opposites. But this higher "I" is not the "I" in its identification with the physical body of the waking consciousness. It is futile for the latter "I" to think that the object is its own being. By mere wish and without action, the being of the object cannot be manipulated by the being of the "I".

The views of Sankara differ from those of Ramanuja on the nature of the I-consciousness. Both accept that the true "I" is not the "I" that identifies itself with the physical body. Both call the latter the ego (*ahamkara*). But Ramanuja says that the *atman* (the true "I" or self) is the I-consciousness (*ahamdhi*) as distinct from the ego (*ahamkara*). But Sankara says that ultimately in the existential consciousness, in the true self, there is no sense of the "I", no sense of being a subject with an object facing it. Self-consciousness is there, but it is a consciousness of existence only. It is a consciousness that realizes that both the "I" and the objects of the waking state are forms of its own being. There is, indeed, continuity of consciousness, and in this continuity the I-consciousness is transformed into a consciousness¹ without the "I". This transformation is a gradual transcendence. Just as the "I" of the waking state transcends the "I" of dream and is yet continuous and identical with it, the I-consciousness of the higher state also transcends the I-consciousness of the waking state and is continuous and identical with it. But the I-consciousness with the "I" is not its ultimate nature² (*svarupa*), which is infinite, dynamic and pure, and is the underlying unity of all the three states—waking, dream, and sleep—, in which it is present as the background. So long as it is associated with the subject-object form of experience, it remains as a pure witness consciousness (*saksicaitanya*) directed towards the ego and its

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1. There are some more fine distinctions made by the followers of Sankara when they discuss the forms of transcendence. But they cannot be discussed here for want of space. What is given here is enough for our purpose. See Appayadikshita's *Siddhanta-lesangraha* (English translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, published by Madras University, Madras, 1935).
 2. See N. Anantakrishna Sastri: (*Satabhusani*, p. 29 (B.G. Paul and Co., Madras, 1956). The ultimate nature is pure consciousness (*samvit*), not I-consciousness (*ahamdhi*).

experiences and lying behind them. But this being directed also can be transcended, when the witness consciousness becomes the Absolute¹.

But Ramanuja is committed to the ultimate difference between the *atman* and the material world. He treats the former as atomic, as a point or centre of experience. The experience of the different states is given to it by the attribute consciousness (*dharmabhutajana*). The higher "I" is free from the material world, which assumes at that stage the original form of Prakrti. The *atman*, along with its attribute consciousness, regains its original purity, and realizes its original nature as a mode (*prakara*) of the Brahman, and remains for ever in communion with that Supreme Spirit.

The above position of Ramanuja is not of great importance for epistemology approached from the side of dream. Sankara's position supports the ultimate spirituality of even the material world; for in the higher state the material world is realized to be the result of the dynamic power of the *atman*, just as the objects of dream are realized to be the result of the dynamic power of the "I" of my waking consciousness. But on Ramanuja's view, the material objects are realized as the forms of Prakrti, which is independent of the *atman*. But then the question, how

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1. It is usual to treat the witness consciousness as empty and as not affected by what it witnesses, because it does not identify itself witnessed with the experiences in the form of "I am". But if we accept that the "I have" somehow issues out of the "I am", that Maya is the projective energy of the Brahman itself, we have to accept that ultimately what the witness consciousness witnesses must belong to the witness consciousness itself, just as the dream ego and its objects belong to the I-consciousness (ego) of the waking state. It is in the nature of spirit, both finite and infinite to project an ego and its objects out of itself, identify itself with the ego in the form of "I am" and yet differentiate itself from the ego and watch it and its objects as pure witness.

consciousness penetrates Prakrti, becomes inexplicable¹. The epistemological problem remains unsolved for ever. The "I" never transcends itself. Certainly it transcends the ego, which identifies itself with the physical body; but it does not reach a stage in which it can become universalized into a consciousness that is not particularized as some particular "I".

Reason and the I-consciousness—The place of reason in the metaphysics of the Vedanta has not been properly evaluated. The question is not about the use of logical reasoning by the Vedantins, but about the entity called reason. Plato and Aristotle spoke of the rational soul in man; but this is not the reasoning of man, but an existence. Similarly, the Vedantins accept an existential reason, which has a significance corresponding in essence to the rational intuition of God, as propounded by Kant. Aristotle maintained that there is a similar intuition in man also. Pointing to an object, if I say: "That is a horse", the horse is an Idea (universal) which is at the same time intuited; but it is not intuited by the senses but by reason, and yet its location is in the object itself. But Plato maintained that the Idea is remembered and that it exists in reason, not in the object.

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1. For any impartial student of philosophy, Ramanuja's criticisms of Sankara's concept of Maya are not as important as they appear to be. The former is right in pointing out that Maya must be the creative power of the Brahma itself and in demanding that the locus of Maya must be pointed out, if it does not have an existence of its own. Sankara also is right in saying that Maya cannot have a separate existence of its own. But as in the example given, the burning power of fire must belong to fire itself, the creative power of the Brahman must belong to the Brahman itself. The nature of the creative power can be appreciated only if we understand it as the power of consciousness. Ramanuja himself has no objection to calling Prakrti Maya, Avyakta, etc. If Maya is the power of consciousness, its original nature at least must be consciousness; when it is projected out as an object, it becomes unconscious, material.

The Vedantins have a peculiar doctrine of reason, and this doctrine is similar to the Greek doctrine in important respects. The Upanisadic conception of reason has already been referred to; and that conception is elaborated by the systems. In their views of reason also, Sankara and Ramanuja differ from each other.

According to Sankara, reason is a stage of our conscious being. But it is a higher stage than that of the I-consciousness as the ego. 'Reason is universal by nature, but the "I" as the ego is a particular. Mind (*manas*) is lower than the "I" (ego), and performs the function of analysis and synthesis of sensations. The I-consciousness, we should note, has two stages, the stage of the ego which attributes to itself all cognitions and actions as in saying: "I see and I act", and the stage of the pure witness¹ (*saksi*), which only watches all functions including those of reason. We may say that reason is higher than the former I-consciousness (ego) and lower than the latter (witness consciousness). The function of reason is to co-ordinate all cognitions (and other experiences), and assert their existence and the existence of their content. Some followers of Sankara differentiate these two functions and attribute them to two levels of reason, *buddhi* performing the function of assertion (*niscaya*) and *citta* performing the function of co-ordination and apperception. But usually these two are combined and the two entities are called together by the name *buddhi* (reason). The peculiarity of our conscious being is that the higher stage is not lost when man descends to the lower stage, but remains in the background as a witness, whereas the lower stage is assimilated and the distinctions within it disappear when man ascends to the higher stage.

1. There are differences of view among the Advaitins in their analysis of the different stages of our inward conscious being. I am giving the views which fit into the general perspective of the work. See Appaya Dikṣita: *Siddhantaśaṅkaraśāstra*.

There are two points to be noted here. First, reason is a stage of our conscious being at which the lower I-consciousness (ego) is transcended. This process can be understood thus. During the process of reasoning, for instance, the ego with its particularity has no place; and if it intrudes into the process, reason becomes faulty. Yet the higher I-consciousness is not transcended, because I still watch my reason's work and say: "I reason", but not "I am reason". Second, the function of reason is to assert the existence of objects, both perceptual and inferential, and also to coordinate and apperceive the experiences. Co-ordination and apperception involve the laws of logic and other sciences. Here also if the ego intrudes into the process, reason becomes faulty. Assertion and apperception also are objects of my consciousness, and are therefore below the higher I-consciousness.

Now, perception of an object and assertion of its existence are not two processes, but one and the same. We speak of them differently for purposes of analytic explanation. My perception of the pen in front is at the same time the assertion of its existence. I may commit errors as in the case of illusions, but the assertion is there. When I am perceiving the pen, my consciousness is focussed on the pen and coincides with it, and my ego is held back or transcended. At that time, I am not conscious of both my ego and the pen, but only of the pen. The perceptual experience of every one is similar. We have to conclude, therefore, that, in the case of all true perceptions, the consciousness of all the percipients is similar, that is, universal. And universal consciousness is reason. Still, this reason, although universal in its significance, is separate for each man. It is limited to a particular centre with a particular circumference of experience. But the objective world is a totality and is the common world of all the knowers.

When my reason is able to assert this totality in its truth, then it can become completely universal and will be the same for other knowers also if their reason can rise to the same level. Such reason will be the universal reason, the Logos or Cosmic Reason. The followers of Sankara distinguish between two kinds of reason, the reason of the individual called *buddhi* and the Cosmic Reason called Mahat (the Great) and also Mahan Atma (the Great Atman). In the case of the former, there is dependence on the object for truth, although perception and assertion are identical and involve apperception also; But in the case of the latter, there is no such dependence, i.e., the existence of the object is not independent of the reason that asserts it. But the reason of man is only one centre of the Great Cosmic Reason, and man asserts the existence of the objects through this centre.

Ramanuja also says that there are two kinds of reason. The higher reason is the attribute consciousness (*dharmabhutajnana*). Although inseparable from the "I" it has its own reality. It is pure, and comparatively infinite and all-knowing. But it is overpowered by the material Prakrti and becomes the lower reason (*mahat*) and then the ego (*ahamkara*). Its power becomes narrowed and it can know objects only with the help of mind (*manas*) and the senses. At both the higher and lower stages, its functions are the same as those in Sankara's philosophy. But in Ramanuja's philosophy dependence of even the higher reason on objects cannot be avoided, because, even for it, matter is independent of the *atmans* and their attribute consciousness, although it is called one form of energy of the Brahman. The so-called omniscience of the attribute consciousness in its pure state can only be relative omniscience and is much less than the omniscience of the Supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER V.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXISTENCE

Epistemological process—Although correlativity of senses and their objects is accepted and underlying unities common to all percipients are postulated, it is not accepted that whatever one percipient sees with any of his senses is necessarily the same for all percipients. Illusions, hallucinations and dreams are private to the individuals. Only in the case of true perceptions are the objects common to all. The object is not seen without the processes of the senses and mind. Mind reaches the object and takes its form. This mental process is called *vr̥tti* and is defined as the transformation of mind produced by the object outside and by some latent force (*adr̥sta*) inside. When both the agencies, the outside object and the inside latent force work normally, the transformation of mind coincides exactly with the object. When there are hindrances which act as defects or refractors, the transformation of mind will be different from the object. In either case, reason asserts the result (*phala*) of the transformation as "S is P". We may take a concrete example. If the object in front is a piece of rope and if the perception is true, reason asserts: "That is a rope"; if the perception is false, reason asserts: "That is a snake". It is the nature of reason not to include the "I" also in the assertion, although the "I" is involved. The assertion is first not of the form, "I see the rope" or "I see the snake", but of the form, "That is a rope" or "That is a snake". For the result (*phala*) of perception, "That is a rope" or "That is a snake", is meant

to be of universal significance; it is to be true for all percipients. If my "I" also is included in the result, then there will be no falsity in any perception, because in the illusion of the snake—taking the classical example—the "I" concerned does perceive the snake. "I see the snake" is not false; it is a fact; but "That is a snake" is false, and the snake is, therefore, called illusory. Thus reason, even in the cognitive process of perception, takes us beyond our particularity and subjectivity to the level of universality and objectivity.

One may ask: How can reason, which is universal and is the same for all percipients, assert a false judgment like "That is a snake" in the illusion in which a rope is mistaken for a snake? That reason makes impersonal judgments, from which the "I" is excluded, shows that within man's conscious being itself, there is something universal and above the particularity of the "I". But that this something can commit errors shows that it is not true universality always. Only when reason attains true universality, can it be a true part of Cosmic Reason. It is because man's reason can commit mistakes that the Upanisads and the Vedantins draw a distinction between Cosmic Reason and individual reason¹. The distinction implies that the "I" may lift itself to a false universality,² which cannot be part of Cosmic Reason. But in either case—whether reason is true or false—the tendency of our consciousness is to transcend the "I" and attain universality and impersonality.

That there is no subjectivism in the above epistemological position can be seen in the fact that the object perceived

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1. The Samkhya philosophy has not made this distinction.
 2. Compare the concept of rationalization of the psycho-analysts. Rationalization, right or wrong, is objectification. The psycho-path tries to universalize his idea and make it objectively valid. But it is not true rationalization; and so his idea becomes objectively invalid.

is not a transformation (*vrtti*) of our mind, but that the transformation takes the form of the object and coincides with it. The object is there independent of our mind, and the mental process (*vrtti*) takes the form of the object, coincides with it, and stays there so long as the perception lasts. The Vijñanavadin Buddhists¹ do not accept the reality of the object existing independently of the mind and say that the object is a transformation (*vrtti*) only of the mind. These Buddhists may, therefore, be interpreted as subjective idealists in epistemology².

Kinds of existence:—It has been said that, in perceptual experience, the existence of the object is asserted by reason. So everything that is asserted by reason has an existence. But in illusion, reason asserts: "It is a snake"; and in the true perception, it asserts: "It is a rope". How can both the snake and the rope be existent? Sankara holds that they have different kinds of existence. The existence of the illusory snake is only apparent (*pratibhasika*); it is mere appearance. The existence of the rope is real. But we cannot stop with the reality of the rope as ultimate. We have distinguished between the two forms of existence—of the snake and the rope—with the help of a criterion. The existence of the snake is contradicted by that of the rope. Contradictability is the criterion of falsity, and non-contradictability is the criterion of truth. But now, is the existence of the rope non-contradictable? The rope is a substance with qualities, and it has a cause. With the help of a dialectic similar to that of Bradley, with which the West is acquainted, Sankara and his followers show that the idea of a rope is self-contradictory and the rope cannot

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1. This school does not have extensive literature or discussions on epistemology. See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 227.
 2. But see *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 277-78.

therefore be ultimately real. It can have only empirical reality. And empirical reality means pragmatic existence (*vyavaharikasatta*). Ultimate reality can only be some undifferentiated and indeterminate conscious being, which is the Brahman. It alone can have true existence (*paramartika-satta*). To these three kinds of existence—apparent, pragmatic, and true—Sankara adds another, which he calls *tuccha* (insignificant, worthless), and which like the existence of sky-lotuses and of the sons of barren women. We use these expressions and speak about such entities; but we know also that they do not exist. A few writers have interpreted these four kinds of existence as degrees of reality; but they are not really degrees, but levels or kinds, although Sankara calls the highest true existence, and the others not true.

Ramanuja rejects the above doctrine of the four kinds of existence. But his criticism and rejection of Sankara's views have not enabled him to treat the truth of the existence of the world of perception as being known through perception itself, but through the pragmatic test. Everything—the Brahman, the pragmatic world, and the objects of illusion—exists. Ramanuja has no criterion, except the scripture, for the existence of the Brahman. In some places, Sankara gives a higher place to the authority of scripture than to perception and inference; yet as a criterion of the truth of the Brahman, he uses non-contradictability also. However in spite of the differences between the two philosophers, their positions seem to be practically the same on the question of the levels of existence. Sankara regards the world as neither existent nor non-existent, and yet calls it pragmatic existence. On the one hand, he refuses to treat anything except the Brahman as existent; on the other, he speaks of four kinds of existence. Ramanuja refuses to

accept different kinds of existence, and says everything that is experienced—material objects, illusory objects, hallucinations, and dream objects—exists. Yet, he draws a distinction between existences which are pragmatic and those which are not. He speaks also of insignificant (*tuccha*) entities. The reason behind Ramanuja's position is that everything that is experienced by the I-consciousness as an object is a form of Prakrti; and Prakrti is real even ultimately. Therefore everything that is experienced must be existent. But within the infinite realm of existents, Ramanuja is obliged to draw distinctions like spiritual existents, pragmatic existents, non-pragmatic existents, and insignificant existents. But Sanakra does not treat Prakrti as ultimately real and existent; and so he calls everything except the Brahman as neither existent nor non-existent. Yet, violating this own principle, he uses a terminology which accepts different kinds of existence. Of course, he would say that this acceptance is a concession for the immature mind.

The crux of the problem is to be traced to the I-consciousness being continuous in dream, waking state, true perceptions, illusions and hallucinations, and to the objects experienced in the states and experiences being discontinuous. If we are in our senses, that is, if our minds are normal we do not relate the objects of all these different states. Men, except the savages and the lunatics, do not relate the worlds of dream and waking consciousness. The dream is nearer hallucination than illusion. Taking the classical example of the illusion of the snake, we have the true judgement, "That is a rope", and the false judgement, "That is a snake". The latter is called false, because it is contradicted by the former. The former is called true not merely because it contradicts the latter, but also because

it satisfies the pragmatic criterion. And there is contradiction between the two judgements, because the subject of both is the same. If the two "Thats" refer to two different objects, there will be no contradiction. In the illusion the "That" is the same; and so we call "That is a snake" a false judgement. Between the dream world and the world of waking consciousness there is no such contradiction. Yet we call the dream world false not because we have any basis for contradiction, but because we cannot bring the dream world into causal or substantive relation with the world of waking consciousness. But what right have we to call the dream world false? There is no "That" with reference to which we compare the two sets of ideas of dream and waking state except my I-consciousness which is continuous. In the illusion of rope-snake, not only the I-consciousness but also the "That" is continuous. So Ramanuja says that whatever is experienced by me as independent of my consciousness is existent: the dream object as well as the illusory object is existent. Of course, there can be various kinds of existents. Hallucination is nearer dream in this respect than illusion is. In illusion there is mistaking of one object for another; there is a "That" to which both the true and false judgements refer. But in hallucination, as in dream, there is no mistaking of one object for another; there is no "That" to which both the true and false judgements refer. But there is a difference between dream and hallucination. The subject, the perceiver, of hallucination belongs to the same waking consciousness. If I perceive a ghost near a tree, I perceive the tree also, which belongs to the physical world. I perceive the ghost in the physical world, although the ghost does not belong to it. After the hallucination is over, I perceive only empty space where I saw the ghost; there is, therefore, no mistaking of one object for another. Both illusions and hallucinations belong

to waking consciousness; the ego, as perceiver, is the same. But the dream ego and the waking ego are different, although the I-consciousness is continuous and identifies itself with each ego and yet differentiates itself from each. Such an I-consciousness has to be postulated even in the case of illusion; for contradiction can be observed only if the I-consciousness is able to liberate or disentangle itself from the ego that perceives the snake and also perceives the rope and then realizes the mistake.

Falsity is, therefore, of various¹ kinds. In some cases, the object referred to is the same; in some other cases, the ego alone is the same; and in the others, the I-consciousness only is the same. Ramanuja says, therefore, that whatever is perceived as independent of our mind is existent. Objects of imagination are insignificant (*tuccha*) for epistemology. But Sankara is not prepared to accept the principle that whatever is perceived is existent. He wants to add the principle that it must not be contradictable. And contradiction may take many forms: perceptual contradiction as in the case of illusions; experiential contradiction as in the case of dreams and hallucinations; and dialectical contradiction as in the case of the dialectical examination of concepts used for understanding reality. And in all cases, wherever there is a contradiction, the result (*phala*) of the assertion by reason has to be treated as false, and something true has to be postulated as the basis of the falsity. But falsity—but not falsehood—does not mean that we do not experience something as independent of our minds; it only means that it can be sublated in a different experience. The objects sublated may be called existences, but the levels of sublation have to be recognized. However,

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1. One can now appreciate why the idea of falsity engaged the minds of Indian philosophers much more than the mind of western philosophers. See the author's "Idealisms: Eastern and Western", *Philosophy: East and West*, October, 1955.

strictly speaking, whatever can be sublated cannot be existence; for existence can never be sublated. But the only existence that cannot be sublated is the Brahman. Sankara also says that the objects of imagination are insignificant (*tuccha*) for epistemology.

Forms of transcendence:—We have seen above that, in the case of all true perceptions, reason asserts as impersonal truth like "That is a pen", and that this assertion is the function of reason, but not of the ego. The ego is pushed back in the act of assertion. But the consciousness that is the ego and the consciousness that is reason are not two consciousnesses, and the expression, "holding back the ego", is only figurative. There is no agent other than the ego to hold the ego; and when the impersonal cognition of the pen is asserted, it is impersonally asserted. The impersonal consciousness that makes the assertion and the ego-consciousness have a continuity of being. For the ego says later to itself: "I saw the pen" and "I saw that it was a pen". We have, therefore, to say that, in the act of perception, the ego transforms itself into reason, and then re-transforms itself into the ego. This power of self-transformation belongs to the nature of our conscious being, which is dynamic, and its dynamism consists not only of transformation, but also of polarization.

The above explanation agrees with the position of Ramanuja also; for he also distinguishes between two forms of the "I", the higher I-consciousness, which is the *atman* for him, and the lower ego, which is a product the original attribute consciousness and the material Prakṛti. Reason (*mahat*) is higher than the ego.

Thus in the cognitive situation, there is self-transcendence of the ego, a lifting of the ego by itself to the level of reason. In this process, not only has the ego become

impersonal consciousness, but also has it attained an at-one-ness with the object. The insularity of the ego is thus overcome through reason¹, and man becomes one with the objective world. Because of the impersonal nature of reason and its at-one-ness with the objective world, it is often said that reason is cosmic in its significance. But by this cosmic significance we should not understand that, from the structure of man's reason, we can deduce the laws of physics and of other sciences. We can make such deduction from Cosmic Reason or Logos, in which many Greek and Indian philosophers believed; but the Logos is beyond man, although his reason partakes in it and although it is immanent in his reason. But he cannot study Cosmic Reason by making it an object; it is inward to him, and he can study bit by bit what it is outwardly through his own outwardness. The realization of inwardness belongs to spiritual religion.

Man's reason or impersonal consciousness is existential, because it is this reason that asserts existence. That which confers existence on something must itself be existent. Therefore one stage for transcendence is that of existential and universal reason, to which the ego rises in perceptual truth. The other transcendence is the transcendence of the object. The object also is independent of the ego and, therefore, transcends it. The ego does not become the material object, but impersonal reason, in asserting the existence of the object.

A similar self-transcendence of the ego in order to become one with reason is involved in ethical and aesthetic consciousness. Ethical activity is the activity of man, when

1. See the author's paper, "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought", contributed to the Third East-West Philosophers Conference. Honolulu, Hawaii, 1959. (Published in the *Proceedings*, edited by G.A. Moore, University of Hawaii).

his ego lifts itself to the level of reason. This idea is clearly enunciated by the *Bhagavadgita*¹. At the level of reason, man takes a universal standpoint, the point of view of Dharma or universal law, but not that of his ego with its urges and selfish desires. His reason will become psychological rationalization, if his ego intrudes into his activity and misdirects reason; if his ego does not intrude, his reason approaches the Logos, Cosmic Reason, and he identifies his own desires with the desires of Cosmic Reason. Thereby his being is not lost but elevated.

The ego is transcended in aesthetic consciousness also. There is no desire to possess the object in aesthetic pleasure, but only to enjoy its existence. Just as there is absolute conformity between the asserting reason and the object asserted in true cognitive activity, and between the individual's desire to achieve something and the desire of Cosmic Reason in ethical activity, there is complete conformity between emotions and sentiments on the one hand and the aesthetic object on the other. The ego does not intrude whenever and wherever there is such conformity, and such conformity is possible only when the ego does not intrude. Classical philosophers, therefore, advised purification of mind for making this conformity possible.

The peculiarity of the philosophies of Sankara and Ramanuja lies in their attributing rational, ethical, and aesthetic values to reason (*buddhi*), although they explain its nature differently. It is the same universal consciousness, which is higher than the ego, that becomes rational

1. See the author's paper, "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought", contributed to the Third East-West Philosophers Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1959. (Published in the *Proceedings*, edited by C.A. Moore, University of Hawaii).

consciousness in the cognitive situation, ethical consciousness in the situation of action, and aesthetic consciousness in the aesthetic situation. And in every situation the ego is transcended.

The above forms of transcendence are experienced by us at the ordinary level. None of us, so long as we remain finite, can become Cosmic Reason. But we have clues to it in our own experience and can, with patience and perseverance, discover several tracts of its being through our intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic activities. Through spiritual discipline, we can know more about it, because it is present in our being also, not merely in the structure of the spatio-temporal world¹. Religious discipline and experience are concerned with the realization of the conscious aspect of Cosmic Reason.

But transcendence does not end with Cosmic Reason. Philosophically or metaphysically, from the standpoint of epistemology which is generally adopted by the western idealistic tradition, the nature of experience at the level of Cosmic Reason must be "I am that", in which, "I am" and "I have" are amalgamated. For Cosmic Reason is what Kant calls intuitive reason or rational intuition, in which the subject's consciousness is at the same time the existence of the object. The certainty of the existence of the object is possible only when it is made part and parcel of the existence of the subject. I cannot doubt my existence and, if the "That" is part and parcel of my existence, I cannot doubt its existence also. Even the possibility of doubt is then removed. Such is the experience of Cosmic Reason.

1. Einstein, for instance, thinks that the structure of the cosmos is Divinity, and reminds us of Heraclitus and the Upanisads.

But transcendence goes beyond. For how can the "That" enter the "I" even at that level? Without the "That" being there, the "I" cannot identify itself with it. The "That" is the pure undifferentiated form of objectivity, which the original consciousness of the Absolute Spirit must have posited or projected before identifying itself with it. So beyond the "That" must lie the Absolute transcendent Spirit, the nature of whose experience cannot be even the "I", since there is no "That" there to face which the "I" is required. It is an experience of inexplicable being or existence only. The experience of the "I" is a self-separation from "I am that".

In Indian religious thought, these transcendent levels of consciousness are differently explained.¹ But we need not discuss them, as the discussion will take us beyond the limits of our study. But they show that man's inwardness is as real as his outwardness, that spirit is as real as matter, and that the two are ultimately aspects of one and the same Spirit. If outward consciousness reveals different kinds of being existing independently of our mind and hence claiming reality, inward consciousness also reveals several levels in our being, which are equally independent of our imagination and fantasy and therefore claim reality. Only because science cannot say much about them and religion only has shown interest in them, we should not say that they are unreal and unimportant. They belong to the being of man.

1. See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 140-7. These transcendent levels, also called divine levels, are discussed in detail by the Pasupata and Pancaratra literature. The former discusses them in the epistemological terms of the "I" and the "That"; but the latter in terms of the powers (*saktis*) of the Supreme Godhead. The former can be more easily appreciated by western philosophers than the latter, although Ramanuja, whom western theologians like, belongs to the Pancaratra tradition.

Ultimate spirituality of the universe:—One can see that neither Sankara nor Ramanuja is a subjective idealist in epistemology. The object is not a mental state of the subject of perception. The world is a world of action, not a world meant for mere cognition. Action implies an independent material world, which is brought into conformity with our desire. In aesthetic consciousness the object is already in conformity with our being. Hence aesthetic consciousness is the highest form of our being, in which man's conformity with the world and the world's conformity with man are realized in however finite a way. But to say that aesthetic consciousness is thus the highest form is not the same as to say that, in any particular aesthetic experience we are at one with the cosmos; it is only to say that, if we are at one with cosmic objectivity, the cognitive experience of that one-ness must be aesthetic also.

But on what grounds, it may be asked, does Indian idealism believe that there is an underlying conformity between subject and object? Cosmic Reason, it may be admitted, can have such thorough conformity with the physical cosmos. But how can it be shown that there is such a Cosmic Reason? The Upanisads express their belief in the form of a story; and Sankara and Ramanuja accept the Upanisads as authoritative and undeniable. But one need not accept a story as a philosophical truth, and everyone will not accept the Upanisads as an undeniable authority.

The answer to the question has its clue in the doctrine of the correlativity of the subjective and objective poles of experience. If the object in front of me is red, it is red to all other percipients. (Here we take into consideration only normal men, not even animals, for some of which there are no colours. But for even the animals, if the objective

pole does not exist, the corresponding subjective pole has to be said to be non-existent). If there is an eye, the colours are seen; and if colours are seen, there must be an eye. The two are thus correlated. And correlation is possible only if there is an underlying unity. But one of the two poles, the object, is correlated to the sight of the other percipients also. Then the underlying unity must be a single force that polarizes itself in the same way in the being of every one of the percipients. When once this conclusion is accepted, others follow. The underlying unities of all the other sense experiences also must be the same for all the percipients. Next, the underlying unities of the minds and the objects constructed out of the different sense objects—colours, smells, tastes etc.,—must also be the same. Then the underlying unity of the reasons which underlie the activities of minds and the objective cosmos must also be the same¹; and it is Cosmic Reason.

So far Sankara and Ramanuja can agree with each other on general principle. Now their differences begin. Sankara would say that all these underlying unities, which are included finally in the unity of Cosmic Reason, have ultimately to be traced to the integral unity of the Brahman or the Absolute. They are the polarizations of the inherent energy of the Brahman itself; and this

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1. The cosmic underlying unities of the *jivas* (finite *atmans*), minds, and egos are given in the Pancaratra tradition as Samkarsana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. But there are different interpretations of the three in the same tradition. See Ramanuja's *Sri Bhāṣya*, II, 2,41. But Sankara rejects the Pancaratra tradition. See his *Commentary on the Bhāṣyasūtras*, II, 2,42. The controversy seems to me to be due to ignoring, now and then, the correlativities established by the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* and also due to ignoring the peculiar nature of creativity by spirit. Spiritual creativity is not the same as material causality: had this difference been fully realized, much of the controversy would have become unnecessary.

energy has no existence of its own apart from the existence of the Brahman. But Ramanuja would say that the energy in the Brahman has its own existence. The material world is the material energy of the Brahman, and takes on the forms we see. The different finite spirits are also the forms of another energy. These energies constitute the body of the Brahman. However, for both Sankara and Ramanuja these energies or forces are the energies of the Supreme Spirit. In it there is complete harmony and conformity of every part to every other; in fact, the Brahman is an integrality and does not consist of divisible parts. So there is absolute bliss, whether the parts have their own existence as Ramanuja says or lose it as Sankara maintains. For Ramanuja, the correlativity of senses and their objects is due to the same Prakrti overwhelming and obscuring the infinite attribute consciousness of the different *atmans*, for Sankara, it is due to the same Prakrti (which he calls *Maya*) assuming the forms of different souls or centres of experience somehow and in a mysterious way, and then dividing itself into the subjective and objective poles of experience.


The difference between Sankara and Ramanuja seems to be mainly speculative. Certainly, both cannot be true; and merely with the help of reason or logic we cannot establish either position except as a possible hypothesis. Whether or not Prakrti and the finite spirits possess an existence different from that of the Supreme Spirit, an element of mysteriousness is accepted by both the philosophers, since the question concerned is an ultimate one. All that human reason can and must accept, on the basis of the doctrine of correlativity, is that there is a higher reason than that of man, with which man's reason can identify itself through true assertions, and that this higher reason

must be absolutely universal. It never commits errors in its assertions, and the condition for complete absence of error is that the assertion of the existence of an object is the same as the existence of the object. Such a reason, as Kant thought, can belong only to God or the Absolute. Now this reason, like the reason in man, is also a universal consciousness, not merely an inter-connected series of logical judgements, and must have an integrality of its own. Understood as an integrality, it is the Supreme Spirit, for which the material world is a pole of experience and an object of rational intuition or assertion. If correlativity is true, then the Supreme Spirit must be true. But in the integrality of experience, it need not perceive the material world as an object but as part and parcel of its own being¹. If the experience is integral, there can be no object set in opposition to the subject; if it is not integral, then to assert the existence of the object may not be the same as the existence of the object. Cosmic Reason comes midway between the two, the integral unity of the subject and the object and the opposition between the subject and object. At the highest stage Being becomes indescribable. We cannot therefore derive the world from the Supreme Spirit; but we can understand how it is the ultimate ground of our experience.

Furthermore, the correlativity accepted by the Upanisads is not to be understood as parallelism. The

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1. Sankara's distinction between the higher and lower Absolutes is not discussed here, as it is not of much relevance for the general spirit of the volume. The lower Absolute is called *Isvara* and is the Supreme Spirit with the objective world facing it, but not overwhelming and obscuring it. The higher absolute is the same but with the objectivity absorbed into its very being. In fact, many levels of the Absolute can be discovered in the Vedanta and its schools. All the levels of being transcending man's reason are supra-mundane forms. They are forms of the Absolute comprehending the cosmos in its different universal aspects.

senses and the objects act on each other, and then only does the percipient know the objects. Since every sense knows only a particular kind of object, it is thought that there is correlativity between the sense and the object, and that it is due to an underlying unity. If so, it may be asked, why is the activity of the sense needed? The answer is that the underlying unity is a spiritual force which projects the objective pole through itself, becomes the subjective pole, and knows the objective pole through the subjective pole, which is one of the senses of man, who is not infinite and is not the same as Cosmic Reason. He can become partially one with Cosmic Reason through the activity of his senses, organs of action, mind and reason. Polarization of a spiritual force is not mere splitting up into two parts. It is not to be understood mechanically on the analogy of the two poles of the magnet even. The word polarization is used because the word comes nearest to expressing the creative activity of a spiritual entity. But the activity is more than polarization, because behind the two poles stands the creative spiritual entity in tact in spite of the activity.



PART III

Critical And Comparative



CHAPTER VI.

INTRODUCTION

Prefatory remarks:—So far a general presentation of the Vedantic idealism as expounded by Sankara and Ramanuja has been given. One may say that the presentation has not been made along the usual lines, but along lines which will agree with the general aim of bringing Vedanta into line with western philosophy. But none of the basic doctrines given here is one not advocated by the one or the other of the classical texts. One may say that in the interpretations the present author has gone beyond what was said by Sankara and Ramanuja. But even their own followers went beyond them. And as we have to face new problems posed by western philosophy, we have to go beyond what Sankara and Ramanuja and even their own followers have said. Western scholars may say that what is propounded in these pages is not what they mean by idealism; and Indian scholars may say that this is neither Sankara's nor Ramanuja's philosophy. But if idealism is to develop its thesis in the context of modern challenges, it can neither be what western idealists think it to be nor stay where Sankara and Ramanuja left it. The aim of the present work is to know how Indian idealism can still defend its spiritual standpoint in face of the many questions which several sciences have raised. We have therefore to orient our idealism to those questions, if it is to furnish answers to them. And these sciences have not remained mere sciences, but have reared several philosophies, which have raised several

philosophical questions. Indian idealism has to give its own answers to them, and thereby make its own contribution to a fresh defence of the spiritual view of the world.

In spite of the orientation given to Vedantic idealism in the preceding pages, many readers may still be vague about its nature and about its difference from some of the western forms of idealism. So not only in order to show how Vedantic idealism would answer some of the questions raised by western scientific philosophies, but also to indicate how it differs from some of the western forms of idealism, the Third Part will be devoted to a critical and comparative estimate.

We may give ourselves a few notes of caution about idealism answering questions raised by scientific philosophies. First, the aim of philosophy, like that of science, is to understand the world of man. So both science and philosophy are rational disciplines. Yet, philosophy is not science, although etymologically *scientia* and *sophos* are associated in meaning. Apart from the fact that the field of study of any science is limited, whereas that of philosophy is the whole experience of man; the aim of philosophy is to be a guide to the whole life of man. Who am I, what is the relation between myself and the world, what am I to do with my life, and how am I to live and plan my life in the best possible way? These are some of the questions in answering which philosophy has to be our guide. But in answering these questions, the "I" to which reference is constantly made has also to be understood, not explained away. The "I" is often said to be subjective. But the use of the word subjective in western thought has led to an unreasonable and dangerous devaluation of the "I", as if it has no existence. Science deals with objectivity;

even when it deals with mind, subjectivity as such is ignored by science, and mind is treated as a kind of shorthand expression for certain forms of objective behaviour. The result is that no scientist, no scientific psychologist, no scientific philosopher can treat me as an individual with a subjective being of my own. But philosophy has to take both subjectivity and objectivity equally seriously into consideration. Moreover, it is not the aim of philosophy to answer the questions of each of the sciences as such. For instance, it is not the task of philosophy to tell us how many kinds of atoms there are in the universe. However, philosophy, like science, is a disciplined way of thinking. One may call it, if one likes, a science of the life of man, provided one notes the ambiguity of the expression. A scientific philosopher may say that philosophy then becomes the field of the biologist. But what the philosopher and the biologist study is not the same. For the philosopher the truth of subjectivity, with its ethical, aesthetic, and religious experience, is as important as the truth of objectivity. Even intellectual experience has its two poles, the subjective and the objective. In the case of the experience of any individual, any transformation in the grasp of objective truth involves a corresponding transformation of his subjective being; similarly, any transformation of ethical behaviour involves a corresponding transformation of the being of man. Philosophy is, therefore, interested in the transformation of the subjective being as well, and aims at being a guide for the best possible transformation of the inward being of man, which is called subjectivity by western philosophers. A philosophy that does not have this aim is not worth the name.

Again, the word man is ambiguous in meaning. It may mean the physical body of man or his I-consciousness or any intermediate level between the two. Man

can be studied by every science, because he includes all these levels in his temporal being. But philosophy studies all these levels together, because it is the peculiar nature of the "I" to identify itself with, and also to detach itself from every one of the levels. Philosophy cannot ignore the peculiarity of this experience; but science can. Philosophy wants to study the nature of the "I" in man in all its concreteness, and the "I" cannot be divided. But science studies only objectivity, even turning subjectivity into objectivity, and objectivity can be divided and each division can be isolated from the rest. It is this difference that we mean when we say that philosophy studies our experience as a whole, whereas science studies only a part of experience arbitrarily isolated for some purpose.

Furthermore, philosophy recognizes freedom where it exists; and the recognition does not violate the rationality of the philosophical method. Freedom is the freedom of the subjective from the objective or of the inward from the outward. Since philosophy recognizes the truth of the subjective, it can recognize the truth of freedom. But science cannot study the subjective as subjective; it has to turn the subjective into the objective for study; but in the process it destroys the freedom of the subjective. But those philosophers who are attracted by the word science, may use it instead of philosophy, provided they make science recognise all that philosophy can. But when a word is used in its unconventional meaning, the danger of slipping into the conventional meaning is great. Philosophy, when it deals with man, deals with him as a self-conscious being, with an inwardness of his own. Yet, philosophy is not the autobiography of the philosopher, true only for him, and applicable only to his life. It is, on the other hand, a rational explication of the self-conscious life of man and has, there-

fore, universal applicability and truth. Of course, a philosopher may commit mistakes, just as a scientist does; the truer will be his philosophy, the more rational and universal he becomes in his thought. Even subjectivity has universality, and as such is objective in that it is possessed by every man. But the truth of subjectivity is grasped by every man only by looking inwards, but not outwards as if it is an object that can be placed before him. My subjective being cannot be placed before my mind as an object. I do not infer my existence or even construct it in terms of my outward behaviour, as if bits of my behaviour are bricks of my being. I know my being directly, my being is self-revealing. Similarly, every one knows his subjective being directly, and for him it is at least as real as the being of the objects around him. "If "objective" means what is real to every man, then the subjective is as real and, therefore, as objective as what is usually called objective. There is a reality which is known when our consciousness is turned inwards; and there is a reality which is known when the same consciousness is turned outwards. The sciences study the reality which is given to us when our consciousness is turned outwards, and ignore what is given to our consciousness in its inward direction. But for disciplines like ethics, politics and religion, which involve the concept of the essential freedom of man, what is given to inward consciousness can never be unimportant. *A fortiori* philosophy cannot ignore this aspect of experience. Furthermore, sciences generally ignore even outward consciousness, and study only what is *given to* outward consciousness. The result is that the conscious being of man—not only the inward but also the outward—is isolated, ignored, denied all importance. The defect—often called a disease—of modern outlook is due to the ignoring of our conscious being and submerging it in the objectivity of the external world.

But this objectivity is not complete objectivity—in the sense of reality—and is only a partial reality treated as a whole; it is not a correct picture of “man and his world”, but of the world minus man. It is a picture of a body without the soul. In ethics and all its branches, it accounts for conduct without the agent. We obtain a picture of the world as if it has no conscious beings living in it, for whom it is true. It is at this juncture that idealism, which, throughout its history, has defended a spiritual theory of the universe and the primacy of the reality of spirit, can raise its hand and join issue. It is here that Indian Idealism also can show what contribution it can make to a solution of the crisis in the present outlook.

Four main defects in India's idealistic thought:—Classical Indian Idealism not only has maintained the primacy of spiritual reality, but also, in some of its forms, has attempted to show that spirit is the only reality. But when once this spiritual reality is accepted and the relation of man's essential and original being is defined, man is asked to live and act as if he is already that original being. But this original being for man, is something to be attained (*sadhya*), but not something that has already been attained (*siddha*). If there is no difference between the two, there will be no difference between the “Is” and the “Ought”, actuality and value. Ethical struggle is needed in order to attain the latter, to turn value into actuality. But when the ideal is presented as eternally attained, the impression is produced as though ethical activity is unnecessary. Much evidence can be produced in order to show that this conclusion was drawn by some classical writers.¹ One interpretation of the Advaita of Sankara is that the world

1. Cp. *Abhinavagupta's* views also.

is not there and that it has never been born.¹ If the pragmatic world is not there, what is the need of ethical activity? Certainly, Ramanuja's philosophy is not open to this criticism, since the world of imperfection is real for him, the attainment of the original reality is also real, and he insists on ethical activity till death. For him, ethical life is a life of real activity of a real individual; whereas for Sankara it is an inexplicable (*mayiya*) activity of an inexplicable individual. And some extreme and popular expositions of his philosophy drew fantastic conclusions².

The above difficulty is connected with another. When once it is admitted that the highest reality is beyond reason and that its activity is mysterious and inexplicable, it is risky to deduce ethical laws from its nature. If Cosmic Reason itself is beyond our reason, much more so is the Supreme Spirit. As Kant says, it is like the ultimate major premise³ of all syllogisms, which is yet a postulate but never a datum. Even to speak of premises and postulates is only figurative. The Supreme Spirit is infinite, creative, dynamic; and from a creative entity nothing can be logically deduced. Its mysteriousness lies primarily in its creativity. But some of the Advaitins made attempts to derive the world from the Brahman⁴. And their attempts are logically as defective as the attempt of Ramanuja to preserve the distinct reality of the finite spirits and the insentient matter in the being of the Brahman as its forms of

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1. Called *ajativada* attributed to Gaudapada. The Buddhist, *Nagarjuna*, was the first to propound this view. Buddhist idealism is equally open to this charge.
 2. Ordinary popular interpretations drew wrong conclusions even from Ramanuja's philosophy. It is said that, if one surrenders oneself to God, one may do whatever one likes. This advice can be a license for licentiousness.
 3. See the author's "Idealisms: Eastern and Western", *Philosophy: East and West*, October, 1955.
 4. See the author's *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 11-120.

energy. We cannot understand how they remain in the Brahman. Even if they remain there, they must have been absorbed into its being and must have lost their distinct individuality.

A third mistake is the attempt to explain, in terms of truth and falsity, the status of the world from the standpoint of the Absolute. It is forgotten that the explanation is given by human reason to human reason; it is not given by the Absolute to us. Human reason is not the Absolute; yet it is full of intellectual curiosity and raises questions which it cannot answer. It asks: If the Brahman is the final truth, what is the status of the world? The answer is: The world is false, because whatever is not the truth is falsity. If the Brahman is eternally present and does not come into being only when it is realized, then the world, which appears as different from the Brahman but which is really the same as the Brahman, must be false; for truly the world does not become the Brahman but is, and has always been the Brahman, but is only appearing differently; and appearance is always a falsity. But has human reason a logical right to give this kind of answer? For the human reason, the world is not yet the Brahman in actual experience, but only an idea. In the example of the rope being seen as a snake, unless we see the rope we have no right to call the snake an illusion. Even if some one tells me that the object in front is not a snake but a rope, I shall not be convinced until I myself see the object in front as a rope. I know about the Brahman with the help of dialectical reasoning, presuppositional logic and the logic of transcendence; but this knowledge does not enable me to get rid of my finitude. I know with the help of chemistry that the water I drink consists of oxygen and hydrogen atoms; but this knowledge does not enable me

to get rid of thirst. Nor does it deprive water of thirst-quenching qualities. These qualities are not false. Similarly, the world is not false, although it is essentially the same as the Brahman. If we reject the analytic philosopher's view that the chair as a fiction and reality is a logical construction of sense qualities and that therefore I am sitting in a logical construction of such qualities, we have also to reject the view that the world is false because it is truly the same as the Brahman, and must not have appeared as the world. Just as the chair in which I sit is not a fiction, the world is not a falsity. The difference between the Brahman and the world is not that between truth and falsity. To understand the relation on the analogy of the relation between the rope and the snake is misleading and has misled many interpreters of the Advaita.

When everything is seen as the Brahman, the world is not seen at all. This position may be accepted at least for arguments sake. But then, there is nothing to be denied, not even a trace of the memory of the world, which, if it remains, will prevent realization of the Brahman. But when the world is being experienced by us, the Brahman is not experienced. In the case of the illusion, it is the same ego or subject that makes the judgements, "That is a serpent" and "That is a rope"; the "That" being the same, one at least of the judgements must be false, for that ego. In the case of hallucination, even though there is no common "That" between the true and false judgements, "There is nothing" and "That is a ghost", the ego or subject at least is present to deny the latter judgement by making the former judgement. But in the case of the Brahman and the world, there is no subject at all to say, "That is the Brahman", when man experiences the Brahman. In one experience there is no ego and no judgement; but in the

other, there is an ego and a judgement. Ramanuja is, therefore, right in saying that the former experience cannot falsify the latter experience and that, therefore, both experiences are true, although it does not follow from his criticism that the world somehow retains its individuality in the experience of the Brahman¹. Of two judgements

1. On this point Ramanuja and his followers enter into very interesting and intricate controversies with Sankara's followers. See *Sri Bhāṣya*, George Thibaut's English translation, pp. 73 foll. (Sacred Books of the East Series, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1904.) Should we say that a perceptual judgment can be contradicted only by a perceptual judgment, but not by an inferential judgment; that opposition is possible only if two opposed predicates are referred to the same "That"; that when inference conflicts with perception, inference is true and perception is false or that perception is true and inference false; and that without some common point of reference, the opposition between truth and falsity is inapplicable? These questions are of great importance not only for idealistic philosophy but for all philosophy. We know that, in the rope-snake illusion, the opposed predicates, snake and rope, are referred to the same "That", and so one of them is false. When I realize that the object in front is a rope, I say that even during the time of illusion it was a rope, but not a snake. Hence there is opposition. But in hallucination, at first my perception is of the form, "That is a ghost"; but when the hallucination disappears, my perception is merely of the form, "There is nothing and there was nothing". Here both the subject and the predicate of the hallucinatory judgment are denied; because the correcting perception is not of the form even of "That bit of space is not a ghost", but merely of "There is nothing." Nor can we maintain that a perceptual judgment can be contradicted only by another perceptual judgment. If I see a mirage at a distance, I may know through inference that it is only a mirage, but yet continue perceiving the mirage. The mirage is very nearly like a hallucination in that there is no common "That" to which the opposed judgments refer; and the common point of reference for both the mirage and hallucination is the common experiencing ego. The difference between the two is that in the experience of the mirage an inferential judgment can correct a perceptual judgment. But in certain cases both perception and inference, even when opposed, can be true. The scientist tells us that the table in front of me is a beehive of electrons and protons with intervening empty spaces; but my perception tells me that it is a solid object. The judgment of the scientist is based on inference based upon certain observations and conflicts with my perceptual judgment. Yet both

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one can be false only if one is the opposite of the other; and this opposition can lead to the establishment of the falsity of one judgement, if the other intentionally contains the falsity of the first. The experience of the Brahman does not intentionally contain the falsity of the experience of the world; for the former experience, as the Advaitins themselves say, is not directed towards anything other than itself. Only because when one experience is had, the other cannot be had, we are not justified in saying that one of the two is false.

Human reason, in its process of asserting, first asserts the world and next the Brahman. But so long as human reason remains human, it asserts the Brahman in idea, but the world in fact or actuality. But when the Brahman is asserted in actuality, neither human reason is present as finite nor does the world continue to exist as the world. But human reason raises the question about the relation between the two as if they are experienced by the self-same ego and as if they are the two terms of a relation existing in an ego's objective field. Our reason has, therefore, no logical right to pronounce the judgement of falsity on the world. If it does, then reason condemns itself as false, since it belongs to the order of that very world. If reason is a false existence, then what is true for it, namely, the Brahman, need not necessarily be true. Then if reason is to assert the truth of anything, it must first assert the truth

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judgments are true. It is, therefore, wrong to generalize from any one example, since from an over-simplified generalization wrong conclusions can be drawn. The controversy between the two schools is vitiated by such generalizations, although it helps clarification of many issues. In any case, without some common point of reference, there can be no opposition; and without intentional opposition, no falsity can be established. Even then, the common point and intended opposition are only necessary conditions, not sufficient conditions for falsity.

of its own existence; and the assertion of reason's existence is possible, if man's existence is asserted. And along with the assertion of man's existence, the reality of the world has to be accepted. It does not follow, therefore, that, if the existence of the Brahman is true, the existence of man and the world is not true.

Unfortunately, some of the statements of Sankara and some extremist interpretations of his position tended to denounce the world as unreal. But more cautious interpreters emphasized that the world is neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent. They developed the principle of double negation, which is different from the usual logical principle that goes by the same name; for "nor non-existent" is not equal, for the Advaitins, to "existent". This two-fold negation was further developed into the principle of four-cornered negation; and it was said: "The world is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both, nor neither."¹ It is not existent, because the Brahman alone is existent, and the world has no separate existence of its own. It is not non-existent, because it is experienced as existent and is not an object of imagination like the sky-lotus or the son of a barren woman. It is not both existent and non-existent, because the two adjectives are opposed and cannot belong to the same subject. And it is not neither existent nor non-existent, because we cannot think of a third adjective as an alternative. The world is, therefore, mysterious (*Maya*). It is inexplicable. But is the Brahman explicable? Although it is not the world, it also is inexplicable as it is indeterminate and is existence itself. Existence is self-revealing, it is not explained in terms of any characteristic or essence. Since the Brahman is not

1. See the author's article, "The Principle of Four-cornered Negation", *The Review of Metaphysics*, June 1954.

the world and since the world is given as the four-cornered negation, the Brahman is the negation of the four-cornered negation, and is therefore, a fifth kind of negation. The Advaitins were thus led, in their logic, to develop an intricate theory of negations and negation of negations.

The logic and metaphysics of negations is interesting and may even be useful to explain certain situations. But for a man who wants a positive of theory life and its values, it is puzzling and perplexing. This logic is due to the desire to treat the Brahman alone as real and to treat the world, including man, as other than real and yet not as unreal, in spite of the objections of Ramanuja, which do not seem to be unreasonable to any one who takes a positive attitude to the world. The right method seems to be not to treat man as inexplicable even, but as the concrete reality with which we have to start in philosophy. In the analysis of man's I-consciousness and experience, we may then point out different levels of transcendence. The level that is transcended need not be unreal. "Inexplicable" is certainly a better term than "unreal", because we cannot explain why there are different levels in our consciousness. Really, no level is "explicable", if the word means giving its sufficient reason; for even the Brahman is mysterious and is beyond the possibility of explanation. It is the ultimate ground of everything, and itself has no ground. If the world has no sufficient reason, neither the Brahman has it. If it is said that, since the Brahman is existence itself, the world cannot be explained as existence or non-existence, then one may retort that, if the world is existence for human reason, then the Brahman will be neither existence nor non-existence. The safest method is, therefore, to treat all levels as existing and regard the highest level as the highest value and reality. It is the nature of our conscious being

to have the different levels, to identify itself at one time with one and at another time with another, and to transcend itself from the lower to the higher. What is natural to our conscious being cannot be unreal. Sankara's central position can be said to be logically true; but it cannot give a connected picture of the world, man, and the Supreme Spirit—but such must be the philosophy which idealism has to present man as a way of life—unless it treats all levels as real and existent. Reality at every level corresponds to a particular level of our conscious being. Any transformation of our conscious being involves a corresponding transformation in the objectivity we experience; and any transformation of the objectivity we experience produces a corresponding transformation in our conscious being.

A fourth mistake committed by some—though a few—interpreters of Sankara is their thinking that, because the Brahman is self-conscious Spirit and is the origin of the material world, the material objects seen by man also must be explained as transformations of his mind in order that our epistemology can be consistent with our metaphysics. This attempt, if true, implies that a spiritual view of the universe and man is essentially subjectivism in epistemology. It does not need elaborate proof to show that subjectivism in epistemology is not only false in itself, but also leads to a false philosophy of our consciousness and of our life. Independent existence of the object apart from our mind is a condition of epistemology. Knowledge, so far as human experience goes, is discovery, not creation or invention. If to perceive an object is to produce it, then there will be no question of truth and falsity, neither will there be any need for our activity to transform the object according to our needs, since all that will be required then is only to transform our mind and the desired object will be there.

There will be no need of ethical activity even. But even the dream objects are not produced by us by voluntary transformation of our mind. Subjectivism is, therefore, false as epistemology and as a basis for ethics.

And subjectivism is false as a philosophy of our conscious being. If, according to subjectivism, the object is a transformation of mind, then the only mind I can know is my mind. But my mind itself is an object of consciousness in the experience, 'I know my mind'. Otherwise, if the "I" and the mind are one and the same, when the mind is transformed into an object, the "I" also must be so transformed. But it is absurd to think that I am transformed into the object I perceive, even if, for argument's sake, we accept that the object is a transformation of mind. Moreover, the ego, which is higher than mind, is itself transcended in perceptual assertions like "That is a pen". Man generally fails to recognize this self-transcendence, because the transcendence of his mind by the object is more strongly felt and is more pressing than the transcendence of his ego by his reason; and what is more pressing is more on the surface of our consciousness than what is less pressing. The object etymologically means that which objects (resists), and the corresponding Sanscrit word, *visaya*, means that which binds or ties down our mind. And generally in perceptual consciousness, we are more aware of what fixes down our mind than how we are fixed down. The answer to the "how" lies in the necessity of the self-transcendence of the ego. When the ego rises to the level of reason and becomes reason, there is no ego and we are what our reason is. This self-transcendence is more clear in our ethical and aesthetic consciousness than in our cognitive consciousness. In ethical consciousness, the conflict between our ego and reason and the binding

nature of reason is clear and tangible. In perceptual consciousness, the object diverts our consciousness from its inward transcendence. But in the consciousness of ethical tension and the final decision, our consciousness of transcendence is less obscured¹. The object of ethical consciousness is a value, an idea, but not an actuality. But when the decision is made in its favour, the binding pressure comes from our own reason (usually called conscience) and, therefore, we observe the self-transcendence of the ego. In the aesthetic consciousness, we are able to observe this transcendence without a binding compulsion.²

We have, therefore, to say not only that it is unnecessary to accept epistemological subjectivism in order to defend the ultimate spirituality of the universe but also that such subjectivism leads to a false philosophy of our being. There is transcendence both inwardly and outwardly in the consciousness of man. Religious experience is based on inward transcendence; and science is based on the outward. Without the two kinds of transcendence, there will be no religion and no science. But we have to note that our reason is as much concerned with ethics and religion as with science. We do not have two reasons, one concerned with ethics and religion and the other with science, but only one, making decisions in each case and

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1. Bernard Bosanquet: *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 37 foll. (Macmillan and Co'. Ltd., London, 1914) One point which seems to be ignored by the existentialists is that decision is involved even in perceptual consciousness. But because of the presence of the object and of the coincidence of our consciousness with the object, the decision aspect of our consciousness is not clearly observed. Bosanquet, among western idealists, recognized this aspect, when he said that will is involved in perception.
 2. The peculiar characteristics of judgment in cognitive assertion, the binding force of reason in ethical decision, and the experience of aesthetic pleasure have to be noticed in the phenomenological and existential study of consciousness. These characteristics belong to the same consciousness.

lifting the ego up to the level of universality. And because of the polarized divisions of the Supreme Spirit, the situations in which our reason works are different—scientific or intellectual, ethical, aesthetic, and religious. And finally in the religious situation, our rational consciousness transcends itself into a complete integrality and intensity of being called beauty, bliss, and so forth, and becomes an absolute self-affirmation.

One doubt may still persist in the minds of some readers: How can a spiritual view of the universe support the independent reality of atoms, electrons, protons etc., into which modern science has reduced matter? They are also objects asserted by reason. Objective qualities, like colours and smells, are cognized through the senses, and their existence is asserted by reason through the senses. Quantitative objects—called primary qualities—and results of physical analysis are also objects asserted by reason. To be asserted by finite reason is not the same as to exist. Only when man's reason becomes one with Cosmic Reason can assertion be equated to existence. Without patient and careful analysis and study, neither the structure nor the content of Cosmic Reason can be grasped by us. And for the purpose is required purification of human reason through intellectual, ethical, aesthetic, and religious activity. We should not forget that the starting-point and standpoint of philosophy as a guide to life and the corresponding activity of life belong to man, but not to Cosmic Reason or the Absolute.

CHAPTER VII.

VEDANTA, BERKELEY AND PLATO

Vedanta and Berkeleyanism—Berkely's idealism may be considered first, as it is simpler than Plato's although Plato lived long before Berkeley. The latter's idealism has two forms; the earlier subjectivism, which enunciates the principle, *esse est percipi*, and the later theological idealism, according to which the physical objects are ideas of God's mind, but not of our mind. The later form preserves the independence of objects from our mind. But still two questions remain unanswered: First, even if the objects are independent of our mind, why should we treat them as God's ideas? Why should we accept God at all? The answer is: Every object, like red colour, implies a mind; therefore, an object independent of our mind implies a mind independent of our mind; and this mind is God's mind. But this line of argument was not further developed by Berkeley. He did not show how the same object, like the pen in front of me, can be an idea of both the finite and the infinite minds. He did not notice the self-transcendence of the ego involved in asserting the existence of the objects. And secondly—and this is his crucial mistake—Berkeley seems to have accepted that the object, as an idea, is the transformation of a mind, a mental state of some one, the finite mind or God. We may accept that the object is *known through the transformation of a mental state*, but not that it is *such a transformation itself*. If it is such a transformation, then transcendence is sacrificed, and there

need be no God; for, since the object I see is the transformation of my mind, the object's independence and along with it the necessity of postulating an Infinite Mind become superfluous assumptions. As the phenomenologists say, our consciousness is intentional; intentionality is the directedness towards the object, which is independent of our mind. This directedness towards objects is what has been called the outwardness of our consciousness.

As has been mentioned in the earlier chapters, the Vijñānavādins and a few of the followers of Sankara propounded an epistemology similar to the Berkeleyan, so far as our knowledge of external objects was concerned. But all of them, on the other hand, recognized the inward self-transcendence of the "I". But the other followers of Sankara and the other Vedantic schools recognized both the inward and outward forms of transcendence. Although Berkeley was an intensely religious man, his exposition of man's inwardness is little when compared to that given by the Vedantic idealists. And that is the reason why we do not get in Berkeley's thought a proper clue to the understanding of the relation between the finite and the Infinite minds.

*Indian idealism and Platonism*¹:—Like Locks, Berkeley did not explain clearly what exactly he meant by "idea".

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1. It will be interesting also to show how Indian idealism will react to Augustinianism and Thomism. But for want of space, such discussion is omitted. The two forms of Christian philosophy are forms of Platonism and Aristotelianism. It is not, however, their doctrine of Ideas that finds a place in Indian Idealism, but their doctrine of spirit. Ramanuja and others who accept the reality of the world will have no objection to the doctrine of Ideas and categories. But Sankara and the Mahayana Buddhists do not accept the ultimate realism of the universals. They will, however, have no objection to certain categorial features of our existence, provided they are not regarded as having ultimate reality.

But the Greek philosopher, Plato, was clear in his mind about the meaning of "idea". The Idea is the norm and also the universal, because the universal is the norm, the ideal object, or the object conceived in its perfection. The Ideas or universals are real and eternal. Often it has been asked how we are justified in comparing Plato's idealism with Vedantic idealism—particularly with Sankara's Advaita—since the latter does not accept the reality of universals. The objection needs to be noted; for it refers to an important difference between Platonism and the Vedanta. But the doctrine of the reality of Ideas is not the differentia of idealism; on the other hand, the differentia is the acceptance of the primacy of the reality of spirit. And spirit may be understood in different ways. Plato held that the rational soul in man is real and eternal. It is the highest in man and is part of the Logos or World Soul. The rational soul is eternal and Ideas also are eternal. Now, Plato is not clear about the relation between the rational soul and Ideas, and resorts to myth in explaining it. Do the Ideas constitute the structure of the rational soul or are they remembered by it as objects experienced in some earlier existence? In the former case, the rational soul is only the Ideas with a particular structure and does not transcend the Ideas by making them its objects. In the latter case, since it remembers the Ideas, it, as the agent of remembering, must be distinct from the Ideas which it remembers; the rational soul, therefore, transcends the Ideas, just as the "I" in my being transcends the emotions and ideas which it cognizes. The Vedantic systematizers will have no objection to accepting the latter alternative but they will add that, because of the further transcendence involved in the conscious being of the rational soul, neither this soul nor its Ideas must be regarded as eternal, in the sense that they continue to have their own individuality

even when transcended. But for Plato, not only the categorical but also the empirical Ideas are eternal, fixed and absolute. But the Vedantins would say that in the consciousness that transcends the rational soul, the rational soul and all that pertains to it must be transcended.

Moreover, Plato's Idea of the Good has a logical difficulty¹. We can understand the Idea of horse, of man, or of angel; but we are told that all these Ideas are subsumed under the Idea of the Good. How can we subsume, for the purpose of classification, under either the Good or its Idea actual entities like horse or man or even their Ideas? So classification is not possible. And we may ask: Is the Idea of the Good the Good itself or is it a concept of the Good? If it is the Good itself, are we to say that the Idea of man is man himself? But according to Plato, the Idea of man is not a man distinct from the individual men. Then it must be the concept of man. But if it is, then similarly the Idea of the Good must be the concept of the Good. But the Good itself is not an actual entity like man. So it must be a concept itself. Then is the Idea of the Good the concept of the concept of the Good? An affirmative answer will lead to an infinite regress, for then we have to accept the concept of a concept of a concept *ad infinitum*. Then should we be wrong in saying that the Idea of the Good is the Good itself and that the Good, in its turn, is the same as the rational soul? If this solution of the difficulty is accepted, then what is good is the being of the rational soul itself. This conclusion can be supported by the Platonic view that the best in man is

1. One difficulty was already pointed out by the present author. See his chapter in *Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951).

reason or the rational soul, which has to be cultivated and realized by every man.

It is the above line of thought in Plato's philosophy that reveals its kinship to the Vedantic thought¹. The differentiation of the levels of transcendence², implicitly present in the so-called doctrine of the parts of the soul in Plato's philosophy, but not his doctrine of eternal Ideas, is akin to, but not exactly the same as the doctrine of transcendence present in Vedantic philosophy. The epistemological function of the different levels of our conscious being is explained by the Vedanta, but not by Plato's, for whose epistemology the doctrine of Ideas is central. However, even Sankara will have no objection to treating universals as relatively real and eternal, provided they are confined to the pragmatic world.

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1. Platonic scholars may say that this interpretation is not the correct interpretation of Plato. It is not possible to enter into details in this work. But it can be said that this line of thought also belongs to Plato.
 2. We find them in the philosophy of Aristotle also.

CHAPTER VIII.

VEDANTA, KANT, HEGEL AND BRADLEY

Kant and Indian idealism—Instead of asking the question why our ideas correspond to objects, Kant asked the question why objects correspond to our ideas. The object as perceived—which Kant calls the phenomenon—is the result of the activity of the transcendental ego, to which the categories are said to belong. Thus there is a distinction between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego. The object as asserted in the judgment, "This is a pen", is the result of the activity of the former, not of the latter. And since the judgment is the same for all percipients, the transcendental ego must be similar in all. This ego, we may say, is the reason (*buddhi*) which is above the ego of Vedantic thought. Actually this ego is reason,¹ because the categories belong to it, just as the Ideas belong to the rational soul in Plato's philosophy.

The philosophers coming after Kant equated the transcendental ego to the Absolute or Absolute Reason. In this equating is hidden an error. The transcendental ego, though spontaneous in its activity, still commits errors. In the illusory perception, when a rope is seen as a snake, the assertion, "That is a snake", is the result of the spontaneous activity of the transcendental ego; yet the snake is not a real object. We have, therefore to say

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1. Kant speaks of the Ideas of Reason. One may ask. To whom does this Reason belong? What is its status with reference to mind, the empirical ego, and the transcendental ego?

that the transcendental ego is still the finite reason in man, not the Absolute Reason. For the finite reason, the assertion of the existence of the object is not the same as the existence of the object. For the transcendental ego, therefore, there is still a transcendental object: this has to be said from the Vedantic point of view. There is only correlation between the two. And this correlation implies an underlying unity transcending both; and for it the assertion of the existence of the object will be the same as the existence of the object. This unity is called by Kant intuitive understanding and rational intuition. And he attributes it to God, but not to the transcendental ego.

There is thus a distinction—although not well clarified by Kant—between finite reason and Absolute Reason. Plato distinguished between the rational part of the soul and World Reason. Kant distinguished between understanding, reason, and rational intuition. The categories belong to the understanding; the three Ideas of Reason belong to reason; and rational intuition belongs to one of the Ideas of Reason, which is called God or the Supreme Ideal of Reason. Kant thinks that the three Ideas correspond to Platonic Ideas, and that they are not embodied in the world of understanding. They are the transcendental subject—but not the empirical—in itself, the transcendental objectivity in itself, and the unity of the two, which is the Supreme Being. These three roughly correspond to Spinoza's two attributes and Substance. For Kant, they are hypothetical postulates or regulative ideas; whereas for Spinoza, they are the starting points of his philosophy and are constitutive principles.

Now, for Kant the Supreme Ideal of Reason, which is rational intuition, is an ideal of reason, not reason itself

in its actuality. So the higher reason, for which the concept is at the same time an intuition of existence, must be distinct from the lower reason, for which it is only an ideal, a regulative idea. The latter reason belongs to a finite being, that is, to the transcendental ego in us. Kant is not very clear about the question whether the transcendental ego is the same as finite reason. But a Vedantin will say that the two are the same and that to interpret them as the same will accord with our experience. Kant may be justified in calling it an ego—although transcendental—because our ego, the empirical one, is consciously continuous in its inwardness with it. What the Vedantins call Mahan Atma or simply Mahat, which is the Reason underlying the rational consciousness of every one of us and which Plato calls the Logos or Cosmic Reason, corresponds to the rational intuition of God. The Atman or the Brahman transcends even this rational intuition. This transcendence has to be accepted because, even at the level of rational intuition, there is a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity—although the latter is transparent to the former—and there must be an underlying unity that is capable of projecting this distinction out of itself and that unifies the two poles in itself. Although God, Brahman, and rational intuition will be regulative ideas for Kant, the Vedantin will say that they are constitutive of our being, but constitutive in transcendence and inwardness. What is missing in Kant's philosophy, for the Vedantin, is the explicit recognition of the presence of transcendence in our inward being. Kant might not have been unaware of such transcendence; but he did not expound it in his philosophy.

Hegel and Indian Idealism—Coming after Fichte, Hegel cancelled not only the distinction drawn by Kant between

our reason and understanding, but also that between the lower and higher reason. In his *Phenomenology of Mind*, he thought that he reached the level of Cosmic or Absolute Reason. And then in his *Encyclopaedia*, he built up a philosophy, which is a dialectical deductive system and which purported to explain every universal feature of existence in this world. Compared to Hegel's, Kant's was a modest attempt in philosophy. The latter recognizes that the higher or Absolute Reason is a ideal. His treating it as only a regulative idea is an error; it is constitutive also, but only in inwardness and transcendence. That is, it is active through our reason, but transcends it inwardly. But Hegel did not see that to *know the ideal as an ideal* is not, so far as finite reason is concerned, the same as *to be the ideal*. To be the ideal only in a transcendental way is not the same as to comprehend it or cover it and go beyond it and make it part of the finite reason. Hegel was concerned, like Fichte, with the cancellation of the transcendental ego (subject) and the transcendental object, and wanted to make them identical with our reason. But they can be identical with each other only in Absolute reason, but not in our reason. So they cannot be cancelled by our reason, because their transcendentalness is presupposed by our reason. We have seen that the transcendental ego in us is our reason, not necessarily the Absolute Reason, although it also has a transcendental existence in our inwardness. The transcendental ego is postulated, because the construction of the phenomenal object is done through the spontaneous activity of something within us, but not through our voluntary activity. Spontaneous activity belongs to the transcendental ego and voluntary activity to the empirical ego. But spontaneity does not ensure that the object constructed has existence and reality. The serpent in the classical example of illusion is as much

the result of spontaneous activity as the rope. The presence and possibility of error even in spontaneous activity lead us to the conclusion that the transcendental ego, though transcendental, is finite and is human reason, but not the Absolute Reason. Absolute reason, for us, is only an ideal. Hegel ignores its transcendence of finite reason and built up his idealism, as if he were the master of Absolute Reason. But what he could actually work with was the finite reason, for which even empirical objects have transcendence. And what he could accomplish was collecting together the discovered categories of logic and of the empirical world of matter and mind and marshal them into a dialectical chain. Consequently, neither the scientists nor the philosophers were satisfied with the result.

Certainly, we have to say that the principles of pure sciences like logic and mathematics and certain universal categories of even empirical sciences are some of the aspects of spontaneity. The dialectical process also must be an aspect of spontaneity. But the spontaneity of Absolute Reason must include much more than what our finite reason has been able to discover, because there can be no errors for Absolute Reason, but finite reason commits them. The spontaneity of Absolute Reason must be such as to make the assertion of the object the same as the existence of the object without exception. But for finite reason even the discovery of formal laws governing its own activity and the processes of the material world are the objects of slow and patient discovery. For Absolute Reason even empirical content ceases to have the transcendence which it has for us. For it the "That" in "I know that" must somehow become the "That" in "I am that."

From the Vedantic point of view, if we re-orient it towards modern problems, we have to say that the

distinction between Absolute Reason (Mahan Atma) and finite reason (*buddhi*, called transcendental ego by Kant) is important and necessary. Finite Reason, in its turn, transcends the empirical ego. What Kant calls understanding is the finite reason turned outwards towards the objects of the ego. But objects always involve transcendence for the finite reason. And therefore the laws which govern the objective world are the results of discovery, not projections of our reason. Nature has to be carefully studied and its laws discovered with patience. But we cannot reject the contention that, in understanding nature reason works with certain principles, which, as Kant said, are *a priori*. Nature is nature as understood by man's consciousness. There is much that is beyond what is understood. But on what man has understood are impressed the principles immanent in the understanding, e.g., the laws of logic and mathematics. These laws, whatever be their final form and whether man has finally grasped that form or not, are fixed. But the physical laws are a matter of discovery not by a study of reason, but by a study of existent physical nature, which, for human reason, is contingent. Thus is Kant's dictum that mind makes nature to be understood in its proper context. The mistake of Hegel is that he straight away identified our mind with Absolute Reason and made it "make nature". He ignored the different transcendent levels of our conscious being, particularly the fact that human reason cannot work in an absolute way and cannot make the discovered laws of the world the laws deduced from its own nature.

Bradley and Indian idealism—Bradley's approach to the Absolute is a mixture of Kant's and Hegel's. His Absolute transcends thought, as it does in Kant's philosophy; but

Bradley says that thought has to commit suicide in order to become truth. Yet he says, like Hegel, that it is a coherent whole. But coherence is a criterion of thought, and thought has to remain as thought if the application of the criterion of coherence to judgments has any point. What Bradley has really in mind when he says that thought must become the "Other" in order to become complete truth is that finite thought, which faces the "Other", has to transcend itself and become Absolute Reason or what Kant calls intuitive understanding and rational intuition, for which alone there can be no difference between the "That" and the "what" and between thought and the "Other", and for which the assertion of the existence of the object is the same as the existence of the object. Instead of calling it rational intuition, Bradley calls it feeling. But one can easily see that this feeling is nothing else than rational intuition, which is the Logos or Cosmic Reason of the Greeks and the Mahan Atma of the Vedantins. That thought commits suicide and becomes one with the "Other" means that at that stage of consciousness the experience of "I know that" is also "I am that".

But is Cosmic Reason a coherent whole in the sense of a closed system of judgments, interlinked and interlocked? One of the conditions of judgments is that there must be the distinction between thought and its "Other", *i.e.*, the object. Where the distinction is not present, there is no judgment, and there can be no system of judgments. That is why Bradley holds that the Absolute Whole is of the nature of feeling. Really it is rational consciousness comprehending the being of all objectivity, asserting itself and the objectivity in the same act. As the Kashmir Advaitins say, it is spirit and matter in one. It is the inwardness of matter and the outwardness of spirit, both

comprehended and affirmed in one act of self-affirmation. It is not incoherent; and yet it transcends coherence. For our finite thought, which suffers from incoherence, the Absolute is a picture of coherence. It is an ideal. But when our finite thought transcends itself and reaches its ideal—as it should—there will be no coherence but only self-affirmation of conscious being. This is the Brahman.

Now, if the ideal is of the nature of feeling and transcends our finite reason, shall we be justified in calling it the World-as-a-whole? Some British idealists, particularly Bernard Bosanquet, spoke of the Absolute as the World-as-a-whole. But the world-as-a-whole is the totality of the objective world and corresponds to the *Natura Naturata* of Spinoza's philosophy and to the second Idea of Reason in Kant's philosophy. Bosanquet started with the question of the truth of the objective world; and according to him, it consists of a coherent system of judgments, which constitute the Absolute Individual. The only true Individual is the Absolute. This Individual, though an ideal, remains only the ideal totality of the objective world. Hence Bosanquet often calls it the World-as-a-whole. This expression misses the inwardness¹ of the Absolute. The result of Bosanquet's thinking is due to the attempt to construct the Absolute with judgments, ignoring the transcendence of the judging consciousness. Hence the Absolute remains for Bosanquet the World-as-a-whole, and does not become the Supreme Spirit. Bradley also now and then uses the term the World-as-a-whole. But in his Absolute, thought commits suicide in order to become the Absolute Truth. But if thought commits

1. See the author's article in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, 2nd edition. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1952) Edited by J.H. Muirhead and S. Radhakrishnan.

suicide, then its "Other" also commits suicide; that is, if thought becomes its "Other", then the "other" loses its otherness and becomes thought. The result, in which the difference between thought and its "Other" is lost, is the Absolute Reason or the Logos, which is essentially Spirit. But in Bosanquet's philosophy, thought does not commit suicide; and if it does not, then the Absolute reached by logical coherence can only be the World-as-a-whole, which, since it leaves out thought and the thinker, is external to them and cannot be the true Absolute. If, on the other hand, it includes thought and the thinker, it cannot be external to them, but must be inward to them. As including thought, it will be the Cosmic Reason; and as including the thinker, it will be the dynamic, creative Spirit. And both are inward to our finite conscious being.

CHAPTER IX.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE OBJECTIVE WORLD OF SCIENCE

It will be relevant here to discuss the role of consciousness in the explanation of the objective world. Russell writes: "One of the 'grand' conceptions which have proved scientifically useless is the soul. I do not mean that there is positive evidence showing that men have no soul; I only mean that the soul, if it exists, plays no part in any discoverable causal law."¹ What Russell says may be taken to represent the attitude of the scientists and scientific philosophers towards, self, soul, and consciousness, and contains the reason for their indifference to the being of consciousness. Certainly, our conscious being does not enter into the causal processes of the material world. When A causes B, my consciousness does not enter A and make it cause B. Even when I push an object with my hand, neither my consciousness pushes the object nor my hand pushes my consciousness. If consciousness were otherwise, it would not be consciousness. But does this peculiarity of consciousness mean that it does not exist? Does it also mean that I, as a conscious being, am not the agent of my actions, and am not the initiator of movements in my body and in the objects? Is it necessary, in order to be the initiator of movement, that my consciousness

1. Robert E. Egner: *Bertrand Russell's Best*, p. 96. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958) Quoted from *Unpopular Essays*, pp. 172-3.

become part of the object that moves? What exactly the nature of consciousness and of the "I" to which consciousness belongs is, may be a problem in which science may not be interested; and it may confine its interest to the behaviour of objects. But philosophy cannot ignore either our conscious being or the correlations which exist between its various forms and the objects. What is more important for my existence is my conscious being and its various forms than the objects. Man's conscious being does not become the objects when he knows them or acts on them; but it undergoes a transformation; it is expanded or narrowed, becomes rational or irrational, universalized or particularized. And his personality is changed either for the better or for the worse.¹ Change of personality does not mean change of physical form or of the physiological structure, but change of our conscious being. Just as I am conscious of objects, I am conscious of my freedom and initiative. I may be mistaken about the "What" of an object; similarly I may be mistaken about the "What" of my freedom. Yet, neither objects nor freedom can be denied. If the existence of consciousness is denied, then automatically the existence of objects has to be denied. It may be asked: Will there be nothing, if conscious beings disappear from the universe? But this question has to be answered by conscious beings only. There may be something; but that something will be what a consciousness posits hypothetically as if it itself does not posit. In asking me this question, I am asked to think as if I do not think. But this is an absurd situation. One may say that geologists and biologists tell us that there was a time when there was no life on this planet and that,

1. See the author's paper, "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought" (Proceedings of the Third East-West Philosophers Conference, Honolulu, 1959).

therefore, there can be something when there is no conscious being. But the answer can be: If consciousness of extreme heat is not that heat itself, then consciousness can be present even in extreme heat, at any temperature; only the kind of life with the kind of physical body we see cannot exist at that temperature, but consciousness in some other form can be present. And life also can be present in some form like matter. The answer is certainly as hypothetical as the question. And the question is no serious objection to the ultimate spirituality of the universe.

As my experience stands, in understanding which my philosophy can primarily be sure if it can be certain of anything at all, both the existence of my consciousness and the existence of objects are affirmed equally by my consciousness. Science is a study of only the object, but not of the subject and its consciousness. It may be said that psychology, as a science, studies the subject and its consciousness. But it does not study the subject as a subject existing with a consciousness, but only as an object with a particular kind of behaviour. The self-affirmation of the subject is not even a part of the subject-matter of psychology; and modern psychology, particularly in its extreme form of Behaviourism, does not even recognize the value of introspection, not to speak of the subject's self-affirmation. But what is of primary importance for me is my conscious being, my own self-affirmation. If the "I am" is not real, the objective world is not real. If the "I am" disappears, what remains cannot be known. Even electrons and protons may not be real. Other kinds of conscious beings may understand them differently and may see qualities which are not known to us in the ultimate parts of the material world. The ultimate constituents of the universe need not be mere neutral entities. They may as

well be part and parcel of the self-affirming consciousness of the Supreme Spirit. As conscious beings, we are more justified in accepting the second alternative than the first.

Perhaps the scientific philosopher will say that the "I am" may be important for ethics and other humanistic disciplines, but not for epistemology. But if the "I" and its consciousness are not there, then the question of truth and falsity will not be there. Some philosophers are misled by our ability to talk of truth without the "I". They are misled by linguistic forms. There must be a mind to make even the simplest assertion, "That is red"; without a mind the subject-predicate distinction is impossible. If there is no mind, there is no judgment; and if there is no judgment, there is no truth and no falsity. Even if truth is turned into validity, validity is for some consciousness, not for itself. It is the task of philosophy to study and explain how our conscious being is involved not only in our ethical and aesthetic activities, but also in the cognitive. It is in performing this task that idealism has still much to say that is important; and the truth of much that it said in its past history has to be estimated with reference to this task. Science, but not philosophy, can ignore the truth of man's conscious being or being of consciousness.

CHAPTER X.

VEDANTA AND EVOLUTIONISM

Indian idealism has a concept of evolution. But its doctrine is not that of the change of matter into life, life into mind, and mind into spirit; it is the doctrine of the change of spirit into matter. The evolutes are not exactly four, and the accounts are different¹. Again, the process is not merely from matter at the bottom to spirit at the top or from spirit at the top to matter at the bottom, but, as in Plotinus, a circular process from spirit to matter and then from matter to spirit. It is generally thought that the doctrine of evolution and even a philosophy of evolutionism are opposed to a spiritual view of the universe; for spirit, for any theory of evolution, will be, it is thought, a product of matter, will be dependent on matter, and be a quality of matter. Darwin's theory of evolution is not concerned with the evolution of spirit out of matter, but with the evolution of the biological species. But philosophers, like Herbert Spencer, Samuel Alexander, and Lloyd Morgan, formulated theories of how some ultimate non-intelligent stuff evolved into the highest forms of spirit. Samuel Alexander starts with space-time and the others with matter. In any case, they assume that originally space-time or matter existed by itself and then after a time it took on higher and higher forms.

But why should we start with the assumption that originally matter existed by itself, but not with the assump-

1. See *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 140-7.

tion that originally spirit existed by itself? There is no *a priori* reason for making the former, but not the latter assumption. And there is an unsurmountable difficulty also if we start with the former. If the original stuff were pure matter, then it would be difficult to understand how it could have produced life and mind. But if the original entity was spirit, then, since the nature of spirit, analogously to our self, is to project objectivity out of itself, we can understand how matter could have evolved out of Spirit. Matter is opaque to the finite spirit and so overwhelms it; but it must be transparent to the Infinite Spirit as its own projection and so does not overwhelm it. One perhaps will say that, just as we start with the hypothesis that the original entity is Spirit which projects matter out of itself, we can start with the other hypothesis that it is matter which projects a controlling subjectivity out of itself. But then matter ceases to be the kind of matter with which our thought is familiar and about which the physicists tell us, namely, the stuff which is governed by certain fixed determinate laws; it will be a stuff that is governed and controlled by an inwardness which has the quality of freedom. For it is the freedom of inwardness which matter has to throw out in the higher forms of evolution.

In fact, Lloyd Morgan felt obliged to say that the *nisus* in matter is Spirit or God Himself. But he said that the higher emergents are only new qualities of matter. But is the *nisus* itself an original quality of matter? Is this *nisus*, which is patterning the evolutionary process of matter, only a quality of matter? How can a mere quality be a controlling force? Why should we not say that matter is a quality of God or Spirit? Instead of saying that God is the *nisus* within matter, we may as well say that the *nisus* is the primary reality—as for instance *duree*

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is the primary reality in Bergson's philosophy—and matter is one of its forms. What is missing in Lloyd Morgan's philosophy is the recognition that mind, for instance, is not a mere quality of matter, but a subjectivity with a freedom from matter and facing matter as an opposite pole. I face matter; I am not a mere quality of matter. The development of an opposite pole even by matter is not the development of a quality, but of an inwardness with its own freedom. This development cannot be explained, if God, as the *nisus* within matter, is only a force within matter, activating it just as electricity activates the fan. He must be the total inward subjectivity of which the whole of matter must be the total outward objectivity. But if we accept such an ultimate reality, we accept Spirit. And this will be the same as the Cosmic Reason of Plato, the rational intuition of the God of Kant, and the Mahan Atma of the Vedantins, although these philosophers explain it from different view-points.

If we start with Spirit, then matter can be considered as having evolved out of Spirit through the Spirit's creative energy transforming itself into pure determinate matter. But the energy is God's own, just as the creative energy of our imagination is our own. And just as our mind withdraws the objects of imagination into itself, God can withdraw his material energy into Himself. In this return process are created life and the finite centres of experience. The finite centres become finite replicas of God's own nature, and the saying that God created man in His own image—which is the subject knowing an object—can be justified. When the finite centres are created, all the epistemological and ethical problems arise, because the objective world, which the finite centres experience, is not their imaginative creation, but is independent of their mind. The objectivity, which is the result of the projective

power of the Absolute Spirit, is not completely opaque to the Absolute Spirit itself, just as the object of our imagination is not opaque to us. But the objectivity produced by the Absolute Spirit becomes opaques to us; or in the words of Hegel and the modern existentialists, it becomes a Being-in-itself to us, standing independently of our mind, and existing in its own right. It is independent of us, because it is not due to our projection and we ourselves are projections—images, reflections—of the Absolute Spirit in matter.

There is another reason why we should start with the creativity of Spirit, but not with the creativity of matter. If we start with the creativity of matter and treat our conscious being as a quality of matter, then our freedom, which is a necessary foundation for ethics, cannot be explained, and ethics loses its justification. But if we start with Spirit and its creative freedom, then the finite centres, which, as projections of its free subjectivity, are analogous to it, will have to be free—of course within limits—like it. We can say that the transformation of objectivity into the subjectivity of Spirit in the process of its withdrawal of matter into itself, is possible only by infusing subjectivity into objectivity—which is the same as the spiritual transformation of matter. But then the total process—from Spirit to matter and back again from matter to Spirit—will be a circular process.¹

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1. It is not possible, for want of space, to work out the details which will be consistent with Vedantic thought. The Vedantins do not agree with one another in details, and the Upanisads also give different accounts. So only the general line of thought which the Vedantins would accept is given here. We have to note that the concept of evolution was not worked out in any systematic way by the Vedantins. It is a modern concept even in western philosophy, although its rudimentary forms can be found in Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. That is, evolutionism in the broad sense of the term can be found in ancient western philosophy. Similarly, it can be found in classical Indian thought.

It may be added here that the idea of a circular evolutionary process is less inconsistent with Sankara's position than with Ramanuja's. The latter accepts that the finite spirits (*atmans, jivas*) are eternal, and that every one has its own individuality. But according to Sankara, even finite spirits can be formed during the evolutionary process and in the end become one with the Brahman. But for both the thinkers, the evolutionary process belongs to the material energy of the Brahman. Ramanuja's account is similar to that of the Samkhya with minor differences; and even Sankara's followers accept it on occasions, although they contend that Prakrti (primeval subtle matter) has no existence of its own. But the Samkhya account, as generally understood, seems to be more of an unfoldment of the perceptual process starting from spirit than one of cosmic evolution. Nevertheless, it gives a clue to the discovery of the spirit even in cognitive experience. There are involved in perceptual experience, first the spirit, then reason, next the ego, then mind, then senses, and then the subtle objects we see in dreams, and last the gross objects we see in the waking state. These levels are described as the levels of an evolutionary process unfolding itself and expanding outwards from the spirit until it reaches the object. If it is interpreted as cosmic evolution, it becomes absurd. If God created the ego prior to matter, He must have created men prior to matter. But the assumption cannot be true. But the same Vedantins as wish to incorporate the Samkhya account into their absolutism, postulate cosmic entities¹ corresponding to these levels—Cosmic Reason,

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1. See Ramanuja's *Sri Bhasya*, II, 2,41; and Sankara's Commentary on the *Brahmasutras*, II, 2,42. There are differences among the Vedantins about the number and nature of the cosmic entities. Any discussion of the differences will be too long to be incorporated in this work. Cosmic Matter is the Prakrti
(Continued on next page)

Cosmic Ego, Cosmic Mind, Cosmic Senses, and Cosmic Matter—and accept the evolution of the finite man in the return movement of Cosmic Matter towards the Cosmic Spirit. The doctrine of cosmic entities preserves the objectivity of the world and its independence from man, and overcomes subjectivism.

What then is the status of the object with reference to man? It is not a state of his mind, not even an objective pole created by his mind, but something given and opaque, something to be understood by observation through mind and senses and by reason and thought. The object exhibits the formal structure of reason, because objectivity is one of the poles of Cosmic Reason of which human reason partakes. Cosmic Reason contains much more than the formal structure revealed to human reason in logic and mathematics, because the subjective pole of Cosmic Reason comprehends the whole of the objective pole. But what in detail the content of Cosmic Reason can be, both logical and factual, is a matter for patient discovery for human reason. When Lloyd Morgan speaks of God as the *nisus* immanent in matter, if he

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Avyakta, Maya. Cosmic Senses are the deities given by the *Aitareya Upanisad*. Cosmic, Mind Cosmic Ego, and Cosmic Reason are found in the *Pasupata* and *Pancaratra* accounts of the higher stages of descent from the Supreme Spirit. (See *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 135-147) The *Katha Upanisad* also gives the cosmic forms of reason and matter (Mahan Atma and Avyakta). The Advaitins postulate three cosmic forms corresponding to the three states of the finite *ātman*, the waking state, dream and deep sleep, and call them *Virat*, *Hiranyagarbha*, and *Isvara*. These accounts are diverse, and no modern attempt has been made to reconcile and inter-relate them. Such an attempt may not interest scientific philosophers, but will certainly be of interest to religious philosophers. Upto a degree it will be of interest to idealistic thought, because it will explain the stages of the assimilation of objectivity to subjectivity and *vice versa*, and idealism has to explain how such assimilation is possible.

had meant the kind of Cosmic Reason postulated here and akin to the concepts of Plato and Kant, he would have been nearer to the Vedanta than he is now. And what he could have meant by the immanence of God is the creative, dynamic inwardness of matter. Cosmic Reason cannot be a fixed, static structure of laws, but must also be a dynamic force, activating matter. Bergson has considered only the dynamic aspect of the Cosmic Spirit and left out the objectivity present in it, and activated by it. Cosmic Reason is certainly intuitive; but its intuition is rational. For it, as it has been pointed out above, the assertion of the object's existence is the same as the existence of the object. Logic is not discarded, but is absorbed by the creativity of the Supreme Spirit¹. We can have only glimpses of that rational intuition in some of our experiences. Bergson himself did not say that his own intuition is creative of the objects.

We may note a few important points in evolutionism, which are relevant to idealism. First, evolution is not a mere transformation of one substance into another, like milk into sour milk, but a gradual self-polarization into distinct subjective and objective poles, and a gradual withdrawal of that opposition into a self-contained unity. It is contrary to experience to say that evolution is a mere transformation or a mere change of structural formation. The defect of evolutionist philosophies is due to not noticing this peculiarity. Science studies matter by itself and the changes of its states, which are called qualities. Analogously, the evolutionist philosophers speak of our conscious being as a new emergent quality of matter. But this method of

1. This is what James Jeans must have had in mind when he said that God must be a mathematician.

explanation does little justice to our existence. Secondly, the ultimate stuff from which evolution starts cannot be matter governed by determinate laws, even if they are not called mechanistic. There must be a creative force within matter, controlling it as a totality, and acting as a unity. In the third place, this unitary force that can control the totality of matter and evolve into consciousness must be akin to our conscious being. It cannot be separate from matter, but must be its very inwardness. The determinate laws of matter—whatever they be—must be one of the expressions of the dynamic creativity of the inward Spirit.

CHAPTER XI

VEDANTA AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The mention of the terms—mind (*manas*), ego (*ahamkara*), reason (*buddhi*), witness-consciousness (*saksicaitanya*), existential consciousness (*svarupa-jnana*), attribute consciousness (*dharmabhuta-jnana*), etc.,—and the discussion of their nature and function show that there is an implicit phenomenology of consciousness in Vedantic thought. These entities are not merely logical constructions or concepts of a presuppositional logic, but ontological entities¹ as in phenomenology. Their reality is accepted through a phenomenological and existential analysis, which involves also presuppositional thinking. Husserl also is an idealist,² although his idealism is not derived from Berkeley, but from Descartes and Kant. But the phenomenology of the Vedantic idealism has its differences from Husserl's. The differences need to be pointed out for fixing the nature of Vedantic idealism and its phenomenology of consciousness.

It may be mentioned at first that the classical Vedantins distinguish three factors in knowledge—the

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1. Cp. "Husserl shifts from conditions of knowledge to conditions of being." M. Farber: *The Foundations of Phenomenology*, p. 541 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1943). Although phenomenology is said to be a method, it is a method that studies the forms of the being of consciousness. In any case, the Vedantic phenomenology of consciousness is an ontology also. Even reason is an ontological entity; not a mere logical function of mind.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 554. See also J. Passmore: *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 187 (Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., London, 1957).

ego or the subject-consciousness, consciousness of the object, and the object of consciousness. The first two are two kinds of consciousness, the third may be a material object. Secondly, the Vedantins have discovered that it is a peculiar nature of our consciousness to identify itself with some of its objects, as for instance when I say: "I am six feet tall", although my consciousness is not six feet tall and the six-feet tall body is also an object of my consciousness and I say: "I am conscious of my body." Thus my consciousness can identify itself with my mind as, for instance, when it is fixed on an object, at which time I am "the consciousness of the object"; it can identify itself with the ego as in the experience "I see the object", although the consciousness of the object is not that which possesses the consciousness of the object; and it can identify itself with reason as in the consciousness of "It is a pen". Thirdly, the I-consciousness is not the same as the consciousness of the object; the latter is possessed by the former. The former is called *svarupa-jnana*, which may be freely translated as existential consciousness or consciousness of own being¹. The latter is called *dharmabhuta-jnana*, which can be freely translated

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1. The word *svarupa* literally means "own form" and *svabhava* means "own being". But in the Vedantic literature they have come to mean "own existence" and "own nature" respectively. In the modern existential terminology, they would mean "own existence" and "own essence". The Vedantic schools argue over the question whether the Brahman is identical or different from the *atman* in being or in nature or in both. St. Thomas also was concerned over the question whether the soul is similar to God in being or in form or both. The Advaitins say that consciousness existence, and bliss (*saccidananda*) are not qualities of the Brahman but its very being (*svarupalaksana*), that is, they are "existential characteristics", which of course is a self-contradictory expression. *Svarupa-jnana* is, according to definition, the unrelating consciousness of an object and so knowledge of the very being of the object. The word can freely be translated as existential consciousness. But knowledge of the nature of an object will be relational. See *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 158 foll.

as attribute consciousness. According to Ramonuja, the two are different, although the latter has a dependent existence (*satta*) as an attribute of the former. But according to Sankara, although they are different at the phenomenal level, the latter becomes one with the former at the transcendental level and the former sometimes identifies itself with the latter at the phenomenal level. Sankara seems to be right because, in the act of perception itself, my existential consciousness is one with my perceptual consciousness, which is then my attribute consciousness, and my existential consciousness is not distinctly felt. That is, in the consciousness of the actual object in front, for example, the ink-bottle, there is only consciousness and ink-bottle. This consciousness is not of the form, "I perceive the ink-bottle", but merely "ink-bottle" although "That is an ink-bottle" and "I perceive the ink-bottle" are involved in it. Again, in the experience, "I am happy", my existential consciousness—that is, the I-consciousness—identifies itself with its own attribute, "happy". In the fourth place, my existential consciousness, although experienced as "I", is not a mere point of reference of different experiences or of attribute consciousness, but comprehends the whole experience; it is both the centre and circumference of experience—for which reason it is considered to be smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest¹. My existential or I-consciousness, if it is distinguished from mind, senses, body etc., looks like being narrowed down to a mere point; yet it is present wherever the attribute consciousness is present. When I am looking at a building, the whole face of the building falls within my consciousness and my existential consciousness also is present at every point

1. *Anoraniyan mahatomahiyan* (more atomic than the atom and more pervasive than the pervasive. According to Ramanuja, the *atman* is atomic, but not according to Sankara.

where the former consciousness is present. It is not limited even to my body. We cannot and should not try to understand the presence of either consciousness spatially; but in terms of its own acts. Thus reason, ego, mind and everything else fall within both forms of consciousness. But to fall within my consciousness does not mean to be a part of my consciousness. Other minds and other objects are still "other" to me. In the fifth place, the Vedantins mean by the ego (*ahamkara*) not the I-consciousness,¹ which is aware and is the pure witness of every act of consciousness, but the appropriator of those acts, the consciousness that identifies itself with a particular body. Ramanuja's position, at this point, is vague and he seems to be inconsistent. On the one hand, he accepts the ego-principle; but on the other, he says that the I-consciousness is not a mere witness (*saksi*), but is the agent of knowing and acting also. On this point, Sankara seems to be more in agreement with the Upanisads than Ramanuja.

The above, in brief, is an account of the phenomenological constituents of our conscious being according to the Vedanta. All the constituents have a continuity of being with one another, which is peculiar to consciousness, but not to the material world studied by science. Consciousness may, therefore, appear to be a mystery to science; but there is as much truth in the analysis of consciousness as there is in the analysis of matter. Now, Husserl's analysis is not exactly the same as the above. First, he brackets out the existence of the ego and the existence of the object, and attempts to make the intervening consciousness, the middle of the three factors, the Absolute². Although it

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1. It is called *ahamdhi* by Ramanuja and its level of transcendence corresponds to that of *saksi* in Sankara's philosophy.
 2. J. Passmore: *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 195.

may be called the methodological Absolute¹, it is still the Absolute for his phenomenology, and the ontological bent of the phenomenological consciousness is evident. But the Vedantins would say that the Absolute, if it is to be found at all, can be found in the existential consciousness as immanent in the ego that is bracketed out. The difference between the Vedanta and Husserl's phenomenology is due to the peculiar logical and epistemological interest of the latter and the predominantly ontological and existential interest and approach of the former. Second, the Absolute Spirit of idealism cannot be reached by bracketing out the existential consciousness and the existence of the object, but by bracketing them *in*. The attribute consciousness is certainly intentional; it is directed towards some object or other. But its intentionality starts from the "I", which is bracketed out, and so a part of the length of intentionality—to use a spatial expression—is cut out by Husserl. The Absolute—however it is conceived—must be an all-inclusive whole, and must transcend the attribute consciousness. To say that our attribute consciousness is the Absolute will be false, because even our rational consciousness commits errors. And we cannot show that the Absolute needs an attribute consciousness—although Ramanuja thinks otherwise—because knowing and being must be one for it, and a middle term is needed only if the conscious being of the Absolute is different from the being of the objects it knows. In the third place, Husserl distinguishes three agos: "(1) the world-immersed ego, or I the man; (2) the transcendental ego; and (3) the epoche-performing observer."² The three correspond roughly to the ego,

1. M. Farber: *The Foundations of Phenomenology*, p. 550.

2. M. Farber: *The Foundations of Phenomenology*, p. 554.

reason, and the pure witness consciousness of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, which calls them levels of the self, each latter transcending the former. But there is an underlying current—which looks like Humian—in Husserl's thought, namely, to treat the self as a stream of experience.¹ Indeed, he recognizes an awareness of the stream of experience.² But the awareness of the stream of experience must be distinct from the stream of experience. And this distinction holds true not only in the experience of the empirical ego, but also in that of the transcendental ego and the epoche-making observer. Self-transcendence is involved in every experience. The epoche-making observer is not found in Kant's thought—at least Kant was not very clear about it's presence—but is that of Husserl and that of the Vedanta, and may be called the highest ego because of the continuity of the conscious being of the lowest ego with that of the highest. But one doubts whether any of the egos can be found in the consciousness bracketed in by Husserl for his study. All the three egos are existential, not mere streams of consciousness. But existence is bracketed out by Husserl. It is the very nature of the ego to know itself as existing. So in knowing the ego, the existence of the ego cannot be bracketed out; and if it is bracketed out, then the ego cannot be known. Furthermore, the existence of the transcendental ego and of the observer cannot be known as an object of the consciousness of the empirical ego; it is known by the empirical ego through self-transcendence and through the continuity of being in that transcendence. Self-transcendence of the ego is not its destruction, but self-transformation; it is inward transformation, not transformation of man's outwardness.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 528.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

Yet that my rational consciousness—reason or the transcendental ego—commits errors shows that it is not completely at one with the objective world and is not the same as the objective reason, for which all assertions are true. Just as our transcendental ego is a presupposition of our empirical ego, Cosmic Reason is a presupposition of our transcendental ego. Reality, which excludes falsity, must be a direct correlate, without exception, of Cosmic Reason. For our reason or the transcendental ego, the objects presented may be false, and so we must not conclude that reality is directly presented to it. Cosmic Reason cannot, therefore, be contained in the consciousness bracketed in by Husserl. Not even the epoche-making observer can be contained in that consciousness; for that which makes the epoche transcends the epoche. Kant did not fully realize the ontological implications of his transcendental method; and he was even reluctant to give ontological status to his transcendental principles. He was concerned mainly with the formal conditions of knowing, but not of being. The true reason for his refusal to treat the transcendental principles as constitutive is that we tend to deal with the levels of inward transcendence as if they are objects of our outward consciousness. But he carried his refusal too far in regarding the principles as not ontological at all. He did not realize that his transcendental method was uncovering the transcendental levels of our inward being. What transcends a level of our inwardness is a presupposition at that level. Husserl's contribution lies in pointing out the ontological importance of the transcendental method. But his bracketing out the existential consciousness of the "I" and the existence of the object, and his treating the consciousness bracketed in as the Absolute of his philosophy prevented him from recognizing the reality of Cosmic Reason—which is the rational Abso-

lute—and from explaining why our transcendental ego commits errors in perceptual and inferential judgements. For even in a false perception, like that of mistaking a rope for a snake and in asserting that it is a snake, the categories of substance-attribute, cause-effect etc., are used by the transcendental ego, and its spontaneous activity is involved even in such illusory perceptions. Moreover, to bracket out the existence of the object is to withhold the assertion of the "That"; but I can withhold, if I am in doubt, the assertion of the "What" in illusion, but not of the "That"; and in hallucination, I may withhold assertion of both the "That" and the "What", but not of my existence. So my existence cannot be bracketed out so long as I am conscious whether of a real object, illusory object, or hallucinatory object. The ontological status of my being is the primary principle of philosophy.

CHAPTER XII.

VEDANTA AND EXISTENTIALISM

The existential aspect of our consciousness, which is held in suspension by Husserl, is the main subject of study of the existentialists,¹ some of whom were students of Husserl. Such a study was made by the classical Vedantins also. But in the beginning itself it has to be noted that the Indian philosophers made no distinction between Being and Existence². And except for Sankara and the Vijñānavādin Buddhists, existence is not confined to consciousness; and even for them it is only some metaphysical considerations which lead to that limitation. *Prima facie*, not only our consciousness and our conscious being, but also all objects experienced by our mind as having an independent existence of their own have existence. We have seen that even Sankara distinguishes four kinds of existence, the lowest of which is admittedly non-existence and belongs to objects of mere imagination. Thus existence is not denied to material

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1. It is easy to refer to Husserl and say that he is the most important phenomenologist, although his views are not the same throughout his life. But it is difficult to call any one the most important existentialist. There are at least six; and they hold different views; and some of them refuse to be called existentialists. I shall, therefore, take some of the conspicuous views which will be useful to fix the nature of Indian idealism. Almost all existentialists refute idealism in some way or another. Yet Indian idealism has some important features found in existentialism.
 2. They made no distinction between Existence and Reality too, which is more important than that between Being and Existence. See the author's article, "Being, Existence, Reality and Truth", *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, March, 1957.

objects. But ultimately, it is said to belong only to a conscious being within man, because existence cannot be something relative and dependent but autonomous; it can, therefore, belong only to the Absolute within man. And such an Absolute must be conscious and be inclusive of all objectivity. But although the Absolute is within us and is existentially one with the whole objectivity, I cannot reach it by expanding my consciousness outwardly over the objective realm, first because my consciousness is finite, and secondly because to be an object means always to be outside my own being. The Absolute, which is the root of my existence, is therefore reached inwardly. Only as identical with the existence of the Absolute can I make the total objectivity my own being. Only then is the foundation of existence reached. Nor can I isolate myself as a subject from the objective world—as the western existentialists do simply for the reason that the methods of study of the object are not applicable to the study of the subject. For my existential consciousness, as I find myself in the world, is founded on material existence, which is my body as an object, although my existential consciousness, as in dream, may know itself as moving and acting with its own body, which is different from the physical body. That is, existential consciousness itself may be mistaken; and it can be free from errors only when it is properly correlated with true objectivity. The truth of my existence is founded in this correlativity.¹ So in order to make objectivity a part of my being, I have to purify and universalize my existential consciousness, transcend myself inwardly, and become one

1. Although Heidegger and Sartre speak of correlativity, they do not seem to have noticed the correlativity of my existential consciousness and material existence. When this correlativity is lost, my subjective existence may become false and imaginary, as in dreams and fantasies.

with the Absolute. This process belongs not only to the intellectual life, but also to the ethical, aesthetic and religious life. The essence of spirituality is purification and universalization of man's inwardness.

A characteristic contribution of Vedantic idealism to the analysis of our consciousness is the distinction¹ between existential consciousness and attribute consciousness, which has already been explained. But existential consciousness is not simple enough to catch. Attribute consciousness is its projective power or energy, which reveals itself to it as its own. But existential consciousness reveals itself to itself only, but not to attribute consciousness, because the former can never become an object. But since I am a finite being, my existential consciousness does not reveal itself to me in its purity and entirety. My "I" is always—except in deep sleep—in the situation of subject-object relation. There is a detachment of my consciousness from my existence, and the detached consciousness is directed² outwards towards the object and becomes my attribute³. When my consciousness is directed towards the object, my "I" is not lost but is held back. Even when my consciousness is withdrawn from the object, my body may become the object and the "I" may still be held back. The peculiar difference is that my "I" identifies itself with my body, but not with the pen in front of me. At this stage, my existential consciousness is self-contradictory; because the "I" cannot be its own

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1. This distinction corresponds to Jasper's distinction between reflexive and intentional consciousness.
 2. This "being directed outwards" is called intentionality by western existentialists.
 3. As has been pointed out earlier, Sankara says that it has no existence apart from the existence of the existential consciousness, but Ramanuja says that it has a distinct existence of its own.

object, but as identified with its body it is its own object. This situation is a tension, a paradox.¹ The "I", as identical with the body, is the ego. The ego is still existential, because its nature is "I am"². Reflection reveals the inherent self-contradiction of the ego-experience, and the "I" realizes its transcendence. But this is not the only transcendence. There are other stages—reason, witness-consciousness, and Cosmic Reason according to Sankara, and reason, the I-consciousness, and Cosmic Reason according to Ramanuja—through which our existential consciousness passes in its transcendence until the Absolute is reached. The "am-ness" of my existential consciousness continues through all the stages, and each higher is a presupposition and basis of the lower.

One can see that Sartre's non-reflective *pre-cogito* and Jaspers' transcendence are anticipated by the Vedantins. The latter's encompassing is also anticipated³, because Cosmic Reason and the Absolute are not only transcendental but also encompassing. It is true that what exactly our "am-ness" or existential consciousness is at those stages will be difficult to say; they are transcendental and encompassing, only because our present existential consciousness is not at those stages but is lower. Sankara would say that transcendence and encompassing are

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1. This is like Sartre's "I am what I am not, and am not what I am."
 2. Sartre regards the ego as a thing, not as consciousness. But his view will not be accepted by the Vedantins, since it is opposed to our experience. Of course, the ego is a particular, is finite, and is one among many. But these characteristics do not make it a thing like the pen in front of me.
 3. P.A. Schilpp: *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, articles by K. Hoffman and G. Kraus. (Tudor Publishing Company, New York, 1957) For want of space, it is difficult to discuss details and differences. But the general trend can easily be seen.

experienced so long as our attribute consciousness has not become adequately inward and our existential consciousness is still conscious of the outward direction. When it is thoroughly inward, the state is absolute bliss or ecstasy. Ramanuja would accept that, even after the pure form of the I-consciousness is reached, the experience of transcendence and encompassing by the Absolute will stay. But even then, the state is one of absolute bliss, ecstasy, not of tension and anxiety.

Ecstasy is not understood by the Vedantins and even by the Buddhists in the etymological meaning of standing outside oneself, as it is understood by Heidegger and Sartre. True, to become identical with the object (*visaya*, that which binds or ties down) is to be bound down and so to lose the essential freedom of our existential consciousness. Existential consciousness, at the level of the ego, is thus bound down and is also one of many egos. There is then a tension within and a tension without, and there is, therefore, anxiety, fear, and all the other emotions. Emotions are, in their essence, tensions within our existential consciousness. They are its expansions, pullings towards objects. There is in them no ecstasy in the sense of joy, bliss or rapture, but disturbance. There is real ecstasy only when the object is experienced as part of our being, which is found in the state of deep sleep, when the outward direction of our consciousness, its intentionality, is reversed, when our being becomes intense and transcends the state of *diaspora*, the state in which it is diffused in the various forms of subject-object relationship. But in deep sleep it is shrouded by some peculiar darkness—*avidya*, Unconscious, Ignorance—and we think that we know nothing. Yet, deep sleep is a clue to the nature of Absolute Consciousness or Existence, which

also is an ecstasy, a blissful state of the highest kind, which can be postulated as the ultimate ground of our existential consciousness and of the states of joy which we are permitted to experience in aesthetic experience, dream and waking state. The ecstasy we experience in the sexual act and love is due—as Sartre¹ says—to the feeling that we have made the object of love a part of our being. But this ecstasy is only a transient and incomplete reflection of the ecstasy of the Absolute, which is not disturbance but peace (*nirvana*, *santi*), because no emotion pulls the existential consciousness of the Absolute outwards. In fact, classical writers—particularly the Kashmir Advaitins—recognized that emotions start from our existential consciousness and pull it outwards; and our existential consciousness is realized when they turn back and enter it again. This process is clearly recognized when the emotions are especially intense². This return process is experienced in the pleasure of aesthetic consciousness, which is the turning back of the emotions to our existential consciousness, when the object is apparently (*abhasa*) made a part of our own being. Moreover, as Utpaladeva says, our egos, in aesthetic experience, are made even one, as, for instance, when we are observing a beautiful dance of a beautiful damsel³. Of course, this one-ness is only apparent; true one-ness can be realized only when our consciousness is turned more inward than in aesthetic experience.

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1. *Being and Nothingness*, p. XLI. (Eng. trans. by H.E. Barnes, Methuen and Co., London, 1957).
 2. Utpaladeva: *Isvara-pratyabhijñā* with Abhinavagupta's *Vimarsinī* Vol. I, pp. 194-5 (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1918). This work has not been translated into English. Kashmir Saivism, which was destroyed by Buddhism, was revived by Sankara when he visited Kashmir.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 195. *Tatrapī kvacidabhasa pramatrā ekikaroti nitambinirṛta iva preksakan.*

Deep sleep and aesthetic consciousness are only clues to the experience of Absolute Consciousness, so far as its integrality and intensity of being (opposed to *diaspora*) and ecstatic nature are concerned. Similarly, the rational and ethical forms of our consciousness are clues to its rational and ethical nature. And its actual nature can be realized only by the self-transcendence of our ego. The Vedantins would say that the western existentialists, although they have realized the reality of transcendence, are afraid of working out its full implications, lest they should lose their finite individuality, which they accept saying that they are so doomed. Their desire to transcend it and their opposite desire to get stuck in it are due, it seems, to a lack of full philosophical courage. That the ego's "am-ness" transcends its particularity and becomes universal through intellectual, ethical and aesthetic activities can be boldly asserted by idealism¹, provided of course it covers the full scope of human experience and works out its full implications. But western idealism has so far been mainly rational and psychological, has not elucidated existence, and has not worked out the correlations of existence with the rational and other orders of being. And existentialism, except in the hands of Jaspers, has not merely ignored but also condemned reason, ignoring its existential nature. Reason has a role to play not only in determining the object but also in elucidating our own existence. One of the functions of reason is assertion, decision, whether the decision is made as an ethical choice or as the cognitive assertion of an object, e.g., "That is a pen". In either case reason is existential. The objective world is there for us because of the decision of our reason. The decision of the reason of the

1. Although opposed to idealism, Marcel makes his acknowledgments to Bradley now and then. See his *Metaphysical Journal*, p. xii. (Eng. trans. by B. Wall, Henry Regnery and Co., Chicago, 1953).

psychopath is different from ours, and so his world is different from ours.

The role of emotion in elucidating or showing our existential consciousness was known to the classical writers of India. Not merely nausea, anxiety and dread but also emotions like anger, love, compassion, and peace play this role¹. But they should be intense enough; and existential consciousness in its intensity and calmness, like the depths of the ocean, is revealed when the emotional disturbance settles down in aesthetic consciousness. It is revealed also in ethical consciousness. Authenticity or sincerity to one's existential consciousness is not an adequate criterion for man; it may be misunderstood as sincerity to one's ego-consciousness, which is also existential, though at a low level. True authenticity is to the Absolute Consciousness as is sincerity to it; it can be known by the ego rising to the level of Cosmic Reason with the help of its own rational consciousness, which in its turn depends for its own truths on the nature of the cosmic order understood with natural piety and patience. The freedom of our consciousness is not empty freedom, but a freedom the structure of which is the correlate of the cosmic order. Its freedom is the freedom from the particularized ego and from its whims, fancies and private inclinations. Transcendence is not license, but a check; but in truth: it is not even a check, because my "am-ness" then covers objectivity and there is no "other" that can act on me as check. Men who are ethical are, therefore, not necessarily "stinkers"² and are

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1. The classification of emotions (*bhavas*, some of which correspond to sentiments) is not the same as that of western psychologists. All the same, they are disturbances in our existential consciousness at the level of the ego. The word *bhava* literally means being. They are disturbed states of our being.
 2. A Stern: *Sartre: His Philosophy and Psycho-analysis*. p. 57. Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1953).

not guilty of "bad faith"¹, even though they obey something transcending themselves.

It is wrong to say—as Heidegger and Sartre have said—that Being belongs to the object, the Being-in-itself, and therefore its opposite, the subject, the Being-for-itself, is Non-being. That which reveals Being cannot be Non-being. That which is Nothing can reveal nothing. Consciousness is an act, it is a continuous act, a continuous self-affirmation. It is also a free act. It can act, because it is Being. Really, there is nothing like Non-being. Even the negation in "That is not green" is only a form or essence, not existence. Existence is always affirmative. The existential factor of the negative judgement is some seen colour like red, which is not green. Consciousness is, therefore, not a "hole of Being". Among the Indian idealists, only the Vijñānavādin Buddhists can be said to have held that pure existential consciousness is momentary and is Nothingness (Sunya, Void, Emptiness). But the Vedāntins do accept that Non-being can reveal Being. Nor does the fact that existential consciousness has no sufficient reason mean that it is absurd. This characteristic is not a defect, but a merit. If it has a sufficient reason, it will not be free. Further, as we have shown, the ego is certainly grounded upon something that transcends it. And the highest existential consciousness is the ultimate ground of everything; it is the Absolute, the goal of our finite existence. For its acts and actuality, there is no question, Why? It is, and acts. For us, to question why the Absolute

1. *Being and Nothingness*, pp. xxiii foll. See also *Christianity and Existentialism* by J. M. Spier, p. 62. (Eng. trans. by D.H. Freeman, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1953). We ignore their differences for the present.

exists is as meaningless as to question why the world is as it is. If existence is not essence, it is absurd to ask for its sufficient reason. Existence is self-dependent and self-subsistent, as Spinoza and the Vedantins in India say. What is self-subsistent does not have any reason for its existence. It is absurd to raise the question and absurd to give an answer. And "absurd" means opposed to reason, contradictory to the very premise with which we start, namely, that existence is not essence and is self-subsistent. The Becoming we find in the ego's self-transcendence is not like the becoming of a material object, in which process we may not be able to recover the original entity and may miss the continuity of any being; in my self-transcendence, my "am-ness" continues throughout, and the becoming is not the becoming of Nothing. My "am-ness" is not mere Nothing¹.

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1. Plato maintained that matter is Non-being—a view opposed to existentialism. The Vedantins would say that matter also, if it came out of Being, cannot be Non-being; Non-being can only be—in the language of the existentialists—an essence, but not existence. Essences, including Non-being, can belong only to the realm of Reality, which is a cosmological notion, but not to the realm of Existence, which is an ontological notion. (See the author's "Being, Existence, Reality and Truth", *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, March, 1957).

The existentialists may say that the present author, following the Vedantins, has not drawn any distinction between Being and Existence. Some distinction has been drawn. But as I showed in the above article, the word Being is very slippery when used in the English language. And in fact, its meaning cannot be fixed, since it covers Reality, Existence, and Truth also. Often the word Being is used to mean Existence; but we can ask also: What is the Being of Non-being? Even contradictory terms like non-A have their own Being. Being can be psychological and physical, affirmative and negative, rational and irrational.

CHAPTER XIII.

VEDANTA AND DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

The role allotted to our conscious being by Indian idealism in the constitution of the world rightly makes one think that, first, Indian thought has not separated psychology from philosophy, and secondly, there is a good deal of depth psychology in Indian thought, not in the pathological, but in the normal sense. Indian philosophy is not merely metaphysics but also meta-psychology. If man's conscious being is an essential ingredient of the world and if philosophical understanding of the world is man's understanding, then the world cannot be explained without, and apart from man's being, which is an essential correlate of the objective material world. But man's conscious being, Indian thought has shown, contains several depths, each one of which influences his understanding of the world and of himself. These depths are not necessarily the same as the depths discovered by the psycho-analysts. Jung, among the leading psycho-analysts of the West, has made good use of oriental philosophy in expounding his theories.¹ But the psycho-analysts made their approach to the study of psychic depths from the side of psycho-pathology; whereas Indian thought made its approach from the side of normal psychology. There are, therefore, bound to be differences of view, but which, if true, should be complementary to each other and should lead to a fuller understanding of

1. Cp. *Secret of the Golden Flower* (Kegal Paul, London, 1931), There is a large number of references to oriental philosophy in his works. See his *Collected Works*.

man's inward being and, consequently, to more comprehensive theories. It is significant to note that,* according to the Samkhya, the world of material objects evolves out of the ego (*ahamkara*)—a view incorporated by almost all the Vedantic schools, particularly those of the Pasupata and Pancaratra persuasions.

As in the previous chapters, it is not possible here to discuss the western theories. The Indian theory will be presented with incidental references to the western. Of the western psycho-analysts, Jung attempts to be philosophical. Adler also has no objections to be philosophical, and shows inclinations towards Neo-Kantianism². But Jung and Freud give us detailed accounts of mental structure and depths like the Vedantins.

Freud says that a psychology that cannot explain dream is useless as a psychology³. And one may add that a metaphysics or epistemology that cannot take into consideration the full implications of our being in dream and deep sleep is bound to fail as metaphysics or epistemology. The Vedanta has tried to understand the full philosophical significance of both the states, which are common to every man. Abraham Kaplan points out that Freud provides an empirical refutation of Locke's *tabula rasa* and of the Baconian doctrine that knowledge is obtained by induction³. Freud has shown that knowledge is determined equally by the forces (cathexes) residing in

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1. See Lewis Way: *Alfred Adler*, p. 90. (Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1956)
 2. Edward Grover: *Freud and Jung*, p. 19. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1950).
 3. *Freud and the Twentieth Century*, p. 207. (edited by Benjamin Nelson. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958).

the mind, which Jung calls archetypes. Because the words "cathexes" and "archetypes"¹ belong to abnormal psychology now, we may think that they are not operative in normal and rational knowledge. But rational knowledge, which is objective and has a truth-value, must also be determined by similar archetypes, only because rational knowledge also is knowledge. Some of these archetypes are called by Kant categories and are assigned by him to mind. One may, therefore, ask whether the categories do not function in normal perception, just as the cathexes function in the abnormal. And when the question is raised, the door to idealism is opened.

Adler, for instance, maintained that "the individual does not know the Absolute Truth. He adapts not to reality, but to the picture he has formed of reality."² In this view we find Kantian phenomenolism. Man uses devices for understanding reality and for adapting himself to it; and these devices are useful fictions, the "as-ifs" of Vaihinger³. But is man, then, doomed to know only falsity, useful in the case of normal people who use rational categories, and harmful in the case of abnormal people who use cathexes? As the Vedanta also says, the empirical world is the pragmatic world. But why is it useful? What do we mean by usefulness? And for whom is the usefulness meant? Is our criterion of usefulness meant for the normal mind only or for the abnormal mind only? And what is the structure of the normal mind?

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1. In fact, Plato used the word archetypes for his Forms, which are rational. Jung extended the meaning of the word to cover the forms of the Unconscious also. See C.G. Jung and W. Pauli: *An Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, p. 153. (Eng. trans. R.F.C. Hull. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955).
 2. Lewis Way: *Alfred Adler*, p. 91.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

In a very important sense—however much Freud, Adler, and Jung differ from one another in their doctrines—they have accepted the creativity of mind, the implications of which they have themselves not fully realized. At least for philosophy, the implications are of great importance. If mind realizes that it is creative, one implication is that it can transcend its own creation. This creativity is not always the kind of transcendence of which existentialists like Jaspers speak. Much less is it consciously voluntary. In both normal and pathological cognitions, the activity of the mind is, as Kant says, spontaneous. This spontaneity makes the psychopath think that the object he cognizes is real. But when he realizes that it is a creature of his mind, he becomes normal. Even in the case of normal cognitions, there is present the spontaneous creativity of mind according to certain forms, some of which Kant calls categories. Even the psychopath uses them; but in addition he overlays the result of his cognition with other creations, the creations of cathexes. Furthermore, he identifies himself with an ego which a knot of cathexes develops and he is thereby lost in the abnormal world. He is even unable to transcend the abnormal ego. His cure lies in restoring his ability to disentangle himself from that knot of the ego, to transcend it and become normal. But as the existentialist and the Vedantist analysis has shown, there is possibility of further transcendence, which is spiritual in nature, and by which intellectual, ethical, and æsthetic values are realized and communion with the Divine Spirit is obtained in religion.

Does depth psychology necessarily lead to the conclusion that knowledge falsifies reality? Does it logically lead to illusionism? Adler seems to think that it does¹.

1. Lewis Way: *Alfred Adler*, p. 92.

The creativity of mind enables us to transcend circumstances, which animals are not able to do because their being is completely identified with the "biological ego" which Nature has given them. But, on the other hand, this creativity "exposes us to an opposite possibility—that of committing errors in adaptation which would be outside the scope of less developed animals". In case of normal people, the created fictions are in some harmony with the true nature of reality; whereas in the case of abnormal people, the fictions created by mind are completely out of harmony and produce disaster. But what does "to be in harmony" mean? If fictions are at any time in harmony with reality, are they fictions? They must be true and be expressions of the true nature of reality.

There seems to be a missing link in the chain of thought which has led to the conclusion that what we can know must always be fictions, some useful and others harmful. The missing link is the truth that our mind does not create the object voluntarily, but spontaneously. Voluntary creation is mere imagination. But the world of neither the normal nor the abnormal mind is the result of mere imagination. Some image building is involved even in ordinary perception, *e.g.*, of the table in front of me. The clue to an understanding of spontaneity is furnished by the Vedanta in its epistemological analysis of dream.

Does the dream ego create its own objects? If it can, there will be no bad dreams. The objects are created for it, but not by it. But when we come back to our waking state, particularly during the process of coming back if we do not wake up suddenly with a shock, we can see how the forces which assumed the forms of the dream subject and the dream objects come back to our

being and settle down in our mind. It is then that we say that all the dream experience is false. I am conscious of the dream objects as real objects in dream, but I am not conscious of those objects as real objects in the waking state. But there is a continuity of my consciousness and of my "I". But if I was insulted by a friend in a dream, I do not feel insulted by him in the waking state, in which there need be no urge for retaliation. Again, the dream body is different from the body of the waking state. A physical hurt received by the former is not found in the latter, except in abnormal cases. If the ego is connected with the body, then the dream ego must be different from the waking ego, although there must be an inward connection between the two, since the latent impressions of each can be associated with those of the other. But although the two egos are different, the I-consciousness in both is the same. Hence the I-consciousness has to be distinguished from the egos of both the dream and waking states.

Yet, the ego of the waking state is the substratum, the source of both the dream ego and its objects. The field in which both appear is the former ego and the forces falling within it. For the dream ego, therefore, the presence of objects has spontaneity. Their appearance is the result of the categorial scheme mixed up with the complexes which are more or less subdued by the ego of the waking state in its perceptions. Thus the dream ego is the correlate of the dream objects, but is not the creator of those objects. And the correlated poles are due to the polarized activity of the forces of the ego of the waking state. These forces, through their activity, sustain both the dream ego and its objects. The dream ego is a knot¹ of one pole of these forces.

1. Cp. *ahamkara-granthi* (the knot of the ego). Ramanuja: *Sri Bhaya*, Vol. I, p. 24.

If the spontaneity of the subject-object experience of dream is to be explained by its being rooted in the ego of the waking state, then the spontaneity of the subject-object experience of the waking state can be explained only by its being rooted in a deeper ego, for which both the subject and the object of the waking state must be objects, just as both the subject and the object of dream are objects of the ego of the waking state. This spontaneity is natural and is part of reality itself. The ego perceives objects as they are presented by these deep forces. If the spontaneity of these forces is natural and free and has not become distorted, what we perceive is real; otherwise, it becomes fictitious. Neither the objects nor the forces are necessarily fictitious.

The postulation of the deepest, that is, the third ego explains why the Sankhya philosophers thought that the world evolved out of the ego. Neither the Sankhya nor the Vedanta speaks of three egos, because it did not attempt to relate its doctrines to the doctrines of depth psychology, and was interested more in showing the presence of the I-consciousness in the ego than in showing the structure of the ego. In fact, depth psychology, as we have it, was not known to either. But we have reasons for distinguishing the three egos. We have also to note that they are not unrelated. The impressions made on the ego of dream and waking state can be mixed up with the content of the third ego, which is the substratum of both; for the whole super-structure of experience rises through the third ego.

It has been said above that the *Mandukya Upanisad*, when discussing the three states of the *atman*, says that in deep sleep the ego (*ahamkara*) is absent. This interpretation

is accepted by both Sankara and Ramanuja. But they say that there is still some consciousness, which Ramanuja calls the I-consciousness (*ahamdhi*) and Sankara witness consciousness (*saksi caitanya*). Ramanuja says that the "I" in deep sleep is not conscious of any thing; so it has no attribute consciousness then. Then what becomes of the body, ego, etc., which are found in dream and waking states? They are merged in Prakrti (the unconscious primeval Matter), which entangles the "I" and in deep sleep covers it. As the ego is absent in deep sleep, we say: "I did not know myself also in deep sleep", since the identification of the "I" with the ego is necessary for saying: "I know this". But the "I" must have existed even in deep sleep, since it confirms that it knows that it did not know anything. The "I" is present in deep sleep, but the attribute consciousness is absent.

But Sankara does not accept the ultimate reality of the attribute consciousness. In deep sleep, the body, the ego etc., enter an undifferentiated state of the Unconscious, which is an object of the witness consciousness (*saksi caitanya*). "I know nothing in sleep, not even myself" means "there is consciousness of a pure undifferentiated darkness in which even the ego is not present." The undifferentiated mass is called the causal body (*karana-sarira*), in which are found the roots of the individual's empirical being. The causal body contains, in a latent form, all the forces—the categories and the cathexes, the ego, mind, senses, the organs of action, and the elements—in their psychic forms, so far as the individual is concerned; and it can be compared to the personal part of the Id of Freud's and of the Unconscious of Jung's. Sankara did not know the distinction between the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic. Had he known them, he

would have said that the causal body contains both. Interestingly enough, Sankara used the words *ajnana* and *avidya* for the causal body, and they can be literally translated as the Unconscious. The Buddhists used the word *avijnapti* also, for which the English equivalent is the same. The other words are Prakrti (Nature, Matter, the Inconscient), Maya (the Inexplicable), and Avyakta (the Undifferentiated). Even the word Maya does not stand for mere illusion, but also for a dynamic creative force (*sakti*). The psychological and metaphysical dynamic import of Maya is generally ignored in epistemological discussions, with the result that the word is incompletely and so wrongly understood. This Unconscious Principle is the source of all the spontaneous forces in our being—categories and cathexes, which are both phylogenic and ontogenic. Sometimes a distinction is drawn between the individual Unconscious and the cosmic Unconscious; and the two are called *avidya* or *ajnana* and Maya respectively. But it is also said that the former is a part of the latter.

The Indian philosophers have not given any doctrine of the categories like that of Kant or of cathexes and archetypes like those of Freud and Jung. But we can understand where they would place them, if the doctrines are presented to them. They originate in the Prakrti, Maya, or Ajnana. The Buddhists are definite in saying that *samskaras* (often translated as latent forces, instincts and impressions) originate in Ajnana (often translated as Ignorance). But they are not the instincts of any ego, as the ego itself is said to have its source in them, and to have formed out of them. On this point, the Vedantic and the Buddhist schools are at one. The ego that is formed out of these forces, we may say, is first the third

kind of ego postulated above; and through it, the forces create the other egos and their correlated objects. The forces are polar in their activity by which they sustain both the subject (ego) and its objects.

Spontaneity should, then, have a deeper significance than that found in Kant's philosophy. He indeed noticed that the categories work spontaneously in constituting the phenomenal world. But to whom do they belong? According to him, they belong to the mind; and this view created the misunderstanding that Kant was a subjectivist, and the mind to which Kant assigned the categories in saying, "Mind makes nature," was taken to be the ego's. Mind is one of the vaguest terms in western philosophy. It has come to cover the Unconscious also mostly after Freud's work, so that it now includes the ego and must else besides. The spontaneous activity of the mind is not the activity of the ego that perceives the objects, but that of a deeper level of being,¹ the forces of which create and sustain not only the phenomenal world but also the phenomenal ego. Spontaneity is the creativity of correlated poles. Kant indeed drew a distinction between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego, and later idealism equated the transcendental ego to the Absolute. But Kant himself did not clarify the relation between the two egos. And as the Vedanta, psychologically and philosophically, shows without separating the two standpoints, there has to be another stage somewhere between the transcendental ego and the Absolute Spirit; and that is

1. Jung refers to Kant's remarks on "the treasure lying within the field of dim representations." See footnote on p. 167, *Collected Works*, Vol. VII, Eng. trans. by R.F. C. Hull (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959).

the stage of Avyakta or the Undifferentiated Cosmic Unconscious, which is the creative force of the Absolute Spirit. The transcendental ego in the finite individual, as shown earlier, is our reason and is not even Cosmic Reason. But we may say that the latter corresponds to the former in its cosmic aspect. But the transcendental ego cannot be the Cosmic Reason; for it contains, as our experience shows, distorted psychic forces. But Cosmic Reason cannot be said to have any distortions. The Cosmic Unconscious, which works through it, cannot be distorted, only because it is cosmic. Spontaneity is really the force of the Unconscious, which is undistorted in Cosmic Reason and is distorted in various degrees in human individuals. The transcendental ego of Kant's philosophy is really the third ego postulated above, which is really our reason (*buddhi*) with all its imperfections. Corresponding to the Cosmic Unconscious, the individual contains the individual unconscious or personal unconscious, called "causal body" (*karana-sarira*) by the Advaitins. It is called the causal body, because it contains the seeds, the potencies of our being as we experience it. When Socrates said that our rational soul has to be realized, he meant that this transcendental ego has to be realized not with its distortions, but as attuned to Cosmic Reason. Similarly, when religious preachers exhort man to purify his soul, they must mean the purification of the transcendental ego, the removing of distortions in its spontaneity. The psycho-analytic method also has to be interpreted as aiming at the purification of man's spontaneity.

What, now, is the relation between the third ego and

1. At this point, one may compare the Vedantic Unconscious with that of Hartmann's.

the I-consciousness or witness consciousness?¹ We have to say that, for the Indian idealistic thinkers, the I-consciousness is, in its essence, different from the ego-consciousness, although there is identification between the two. The ego-consciousness can be an object of the I-consciousness, but the latter can never be the object of any consciousness except itself. The ego belongs to the Unconscious and is formed within it. It belongs to the objective field of the I-consciousness; and the latter has the tendency to identify itself, in the form of "I am", with the former. But it has also the power to free itself from this form of identification, and make the ego an object. Sometimes, the forces of the Unconscious, which constitute the ego, may be distorted and may produce a distorted ego, as in the case of the psycho-path. Even then, the I-consciousness identifies itself with the ego.

As has been mentioned, the Unconscious is not merely individual, but also cosmic; and in the cosmic sense, it is called *Avyakta*, the Unmanifest, the Undifferentiated. Spiritually speaking, it is the root of the world, material and mental. It is the root of the mental also in the sense that, when only the I-consciousness enters a part of the Unconscious and identifies itself with it, is the ego-consciousness formed. Yet, to whom does the cosmic Unconscious belong? It must belong to some Cosmic Consciousness or Supreme Spirit. Early Buddhism did not postulate Cosmic Consciousness or Supreme Spirit; but later the *Vijnanavadins* did. The Vedanta accepted its reality from the very beginning.

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1. We here leave out the eschatological doctrines for which we do not have sufficient evidence. It is not the aim of the work to discuss them, although the Indian writers associate them with the deeper forces of our being.

How is an approach possible from the side of depth psychology to the Cosmic Consciousness? It can be approached only via the I-consciousness,¹ not the individual Unconscious. There is significant similarity and uniformity in the categorical scheme and also, to a degree in the structure of complexes between man and man. And this uniformity implies a common Unconscious as the source. Again, the I-consciousness of every individual can transcend or rise above his Unconscious. But transcendence is not an escape from, but depolarization or absorption of opposite poles of experience. We have seen that the ego of the waking state absorbs into itself both the ego and the objects of dream. Similarly, the third ego absorbs into itself the ego and the objects of the waking state. In the waking state we are capable of effecting the transcendence of body-involvements by the I-consciousness. The I-consciousness can free itself from emotions, ideas, and other ego-involvements, if an effort is made by us. This is one of the reasons for our treating the waking state as the normal and the real. The psychopath, of course, cannot make the effort to transcend himself, until he is cured by the psychologist. But this "freeing itself" does not mean leaving back the forces which constitute our empirical being, but absorbing them into a unitary being without polar opposition. In the psycho-

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1. The reader may be reminded that I have been using the words I-consciousness and witness consciousness rather indifferently. Ramanuja uses the former and Sankara the latter to denote the level of being above reason (*buddhi*) or transcendental ego. The nature of the level is different for the two thinkers. I have shown that Sankara seems to be right. But Ramanuja also is right so far as he contends that the witness must be the knower. Without being a knower, I shall not be able to say, after coming down from deep sleep, that I know that I do not know anything in deep sleep. I am therefore using the words I-consciousness and witness consciousness for the same depth of being.

pathic state, the I-consciousness is entangled in a false ego, of course false in comparison with the true empirical normal ego; in the normal state, it is entangled in the normal ego; and in either case, it is restricted to an ego. But when it fully disentangles itself from the ego, it withdraws into itself not only the ego, but also the ego's objects by withdrawing into itself the forces producing them. At this stage, the forces become part and parcel of the I-consciousness. Even the witness consciousness cannot, therefore, be an abstraction, empty in essence of all content. In our experience only does it appear as an empty witness.

The forces which the I-consciousness makes part and parcel of itself and brings under its control belong to the being of the individual, to his Id or the Unconscious, which, however, has its fringes undemarcated and which spreads out into the Cosmic Unconscious. The individual Unconscious is like an eddy in the ocean of the Cosmic Unconscious. That is why the psycho-analysts say that they cannot fathom its deepest depths, which must be one with pure material energy. It is difficult to say where or at what point of evolution the pure material energy becomes even rudimentary consciousness. The Unconscious is unconscious only so long as it is not lighted up by consciousness and made part and parcel of itself. However, the cosmos or the objective world, which is the result of undistorted activity of the forces of the Unconscious, is the same for all individuals. So when the individual I-consciousness absorbs, in its transcendence, the common cosmic structure into itself, the result must ultimately be the same for all—the universal consciousness, called the Absolute by idealism, and the Supreme Spirit by religion. For unities for which one pole is the same for all have ultimately to be the same; for the other pole by itself,

which is the ego appearing as the I-consciousness in its abstraction is empty and cannot, therefore, constitute a differentiating characteristic. It is this I-consciousness in its abstraction that is called mere witness consciousness (*saksi-caitanya*) and that is experienced by the ego as an ego in its attempt at transcendence, although to be able to make this attempt gives relief to the psycho-path and a clue to spiritual depths to the normal man. In abstraction, it is mere Nothing, and one Nothing cannot be differentiated from another. But in its concreteness, because the content is the same cosmic objectivity, the I-consciousness of all must be one and the same and is the Supreme Spirit.

In the Supreme Spirit, the cosmic Unconscious which is absorbed, constitutes a dynamic force, a potency kept under control. The Unconscious is thus the power or energy (*sakti*) of the Absolute Spirit. But when it is let loose to act, it hides the Supreme Spirit, and transforms itself, through polarization, into the different centres of the subject-object world. The Absolute Spirit shines through each centre as the individual I-consciousness, without at the same time losing itself. This is the peculiar nature of creation, which is not like material transformation, but like the mental creation of dream. The machine works as it is planned to work and wears away; the organism grows and repairs itself; but spirit produces new forms out of itself without wasting itself in the process. The creative force of spirit is the Unconscious. The Cosmic Unconscious is not a reality that can exist apart from the Supreme Spirit, but is its creative energy.

Transcendence, as shown above, obtains, therefore a new meaning. It is not necessarily the mere transcendence

of the ego by the abstract I-consciousness, which in its abstraction is empty, and which Sartre calls Nothingness.¹ Some Buddhists may equate their Void (Sunya) to this Nothingness. But even they claim that this Void is the source of the world. But the source of the world cannot be Nothingness. If it is creative, its creative force must be the undifferentiated Unconscious. According to Sartre, there is a *precogito*², something existentially prior to the *cogito* of Descartes. This *pre-cogito* is contentless and is, therefore, absolutely free. This view does not agree with the Vedantic view., according to which I feel that my I-consciousness is empty only in its abstraction. In its concreteness, it is not empty, but dynamic. Sartre understands freedom as freedom of consciousness from its content. This freedom is what we experience when our being is still attached to the ego, when man feels the presence of the transcendence of the I-consciousness in his being and yet is unable to free himself completely from the ego. But the I-consciousness in its concreteness has the freedom of creating both the ego and its objects. And this freedom is complete in the case of the Supreme Spirit, which realizes that the Cosmic Unconscious is its own power or energy, and which makes it part and parcel of its existential consciousness.³

The I-consciousness is, in one sense, the centre of our being and, in another, its circumference. It is what

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1. See his *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 18 foll. (Mathuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1957. Eng. trans. by H.E. Barner).
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
 3. Jung thinks that the Unconscious can never be made completely conscious. (Edward Grover: *Freud or Jung*. p. 129, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1950). This is true for the finite individual, who is rooted in the Cosmic Unconscious. But at the level of the Absolute Spirit, the Unconscious becomes a conscious force. This root can be realized only in religious experience.

Jung calls *mandala*². As the centre, it is the smallest of the small; and as the circumference, it is the biggest of the big². In the analysis of the dream, we found that both the dream ego and the dream objects originate in the ego of the waking state. Thus both the ego and the objects of dream are within the ego of the waking state. The latter ego, can, therefore, be said to be the circumference of the dream experience. But there is continuity of consciousness between the two egos. I say: "I was hurt in my dream, but am unhurt now." The I-consciousness, we have to conclude, passes through the ego of dream to the ego of the waking state and *vice versa*, although the egos themselves are not the same. And ultimately when both the ego and the objects of wakefulness are withdrawn into the I-consciousness as its own forces, it becomes the circumference of everything. As present within the ego, the I-consciousness is the smallest of the small; but as comprehending both the ego and its objects, it is the biggest of the big.

For the I-consciousness,³ in its absolute nature, there is no problem of freedom; for then it is everything and

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 128 and 132.
2. Michael Fordham: *The Objective Psyche*, p. 46. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958).
3. I am using the word I-consciousness often, because it can be easily understood by western readers. It is really the witness consciousness of Sankara also. The witness consciousness can be the I-consciousness only with reference to the ego. But when the ego and its objects are withdrawn completely into the I-consciousness, the "I" in the I-consciousness disappears, and there will remain only the pure existential consciousness without the sense of the "I". Throughout there is continuity of my existence. As a mere witness, the I-consciousness may be compared to the *pre-cogito* and Nothingness of Sartre's, because the whole content is before it, but not within it.

there is nothing beside it from which it has to be free. The problem of freedom exists only for man. He is not merely the I-consciousness in its absolute nature, but also reason, ego, mind, life and the physical body. As mentioned earlier, each level transcends the next, and yet together they constitute the integrality of man. Within that integrality man experiences the tension created by the different levels of transcendence. The I-consciousness, although entangled in every one of the lower levels of being, feels its transcendence and, therefore, its freedom from it. Yet so long as man lives, it cannot completely detach itself from them, but feels that it is rooted in them. But I can make my body an object of my consciousness and feel the freedom from my body. Still, I cannot separate myself from my body, just as I can walk out of the room. Thus a tension is created and the exercise of freedom is limited. Complete freedom is realized only when there is no objectivity present before my consciousness. But when that state is attained, there is no problem of freedom, because then my experience will only be of the form, "I am" (*ahamasmi*), since in that experience everything is included in my existential consciousness. Then there is nothing to be desired, there is no want, there is no project as the existentialists say. My being becomes self-fulfilled (*apta-kama*). But then, as Sankara says, when everything is myself, there will be no feeling of the "I" also. Yet, if the source of our sense of freedom is to be traced out, it has to be traced to the different levels of transcendence in man's conscious being and their tensions. In absolute freedom, there can be no sense of freedom, because there is nothing from which I am to be free. The keenness of the sense of freedom is felt only so long as there is a limit

on freedom, an "Other" to my "I", which imposes a limit on my being and activity. Freedom is significant only so long as the subject-object difference lasts.

Plato said that the archetypes belong to reason; Kant said that they belong to understanding; and Hegel maintained that they belong to thought and that the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding is unnecessary. We may say that the archetypes referred to by idealistic philosophers belong to the rational being of man. The psychologists include the racial and the cultural types, and also the abnormal creative types, in the class of archetypes. But there seems to be no particular place given by them in their works to the Logos of Greek thought¹ and the Reason of the idealists. It may be detected in the Ego-ideal of Freud's and the rational part of the archetypal scheme of Jung's, but without any ontological status in the being of man². If the rational archetypes are dynamic, then Reason, also, as their source must be dynamic and, therefore, must have an existential status: it must be as existent as are the cathexes and other kinds of psychological urges. The cathexes in any individual are distortions of forces, which are otherwise common to all individuals, which are, therefore, cosmic and universal in their significance, and which have, for that reason, to be considered as somehow derived from Cosmic Reason. Reason in the individual, according to the Vedanta, is the normal ego raised to the level of universality. Cosmic

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1. Jung refers to *logos spermatikos*, but it seems to have very little to do with the Greek Logos, which is both Word and Reason. See *Collected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 207. (Eng. trans. by R.F.C. Hull. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953).
 2. Reason does not seem to have ontological status in the metaphysics of the existentialists also.

Reason is the source of the individual's reason and is to be found within it. The former is treated as the first evolute out of the Cosmic Unconscious (Avyakta, Ajnana), into which the Supreme Consciousness enters and becomes the Supreme Person (Mahan Atma) or Logos, a kind of cosmic I-consciousness. Out of it comes the individual's reason, into which again the cosmic "I" enters and forms the individual "I". This is the rational being of man, out of which the individual ego comes. In each of these levels the I-consciousness is present in varying degrees of contraction. Religion teaches us that the Supreme Spirit has to be realized by the expansion and universalization of the I-consciousness experienced at the lower levels. The religious man follows the advice. But the psychopath sinks into a distorted Unconscious and his I-consciousness gets stuck in it. However, the Unconscious need not be distorted in every individual; for out of it even reason originates.

Depth psychology has shown that man not only uses reason rightly but also commits errors and abuses reason. The abuse of reason is called rationalization. But if reason is present in all men, why does it allow itself to be abused? We have seen that reason is as much reactive as the complexes. We have, therefore, to say that reason, as existential, can become distorted in its workings. This susceptibility to distortion means that reason in the absolutely normal man—who is very rare—works, when not distorted, in the absolutely normal way with a perfect reality attitude; but in most men, it contains forces which refract the directions of its activity¹. Normal or normative

1. That is why the Samkhya says that reason, out of which the ego is born, contains merit and demerit, truth and falsity, strength and weakness etc.

reason is present in every individual's being; but it is overlaid by a defective and distorted reason working in him, which has to be purified and transcended, if the true reason is to be realized. It is the purified reason that becomes a real part of the Cosmic Reason (Logos). Abuse of reason and rationalization are due to the malformation of the rational being of man, which lies at the basis of his deep ego (the third ego).

The depth psychologists have brought out also the creative nature of emotions, particularly of the libidinous love; but they have not told us what emotions in themselves are. They have given us situational descriptions of emotions and descriptions of how they work. But they have not given us their existential nature. The existentialists have described the existential value of emotions like, dread, care and disgust, as clues to existential consciousness. Indian idealistic thought has regarded all emotions as having existential value. Sankara and Ramanuja wrote very little on their nature. Writers on aesthetics and rhetoric were satisfied mainly with their classification and application. But the literature of the Kashmir school of Advaita contains discussions of their metaphysical nature and has many valuable doctrines to contribute to depth psychology.

Emotions, according to the Kashmir school of Advaita, are vibrations (*spandas*) in our existential consciousness. When I am intensely angry, overjoyed, anxious, or in dread, there is a vibration of my being. When the vibration subsides, there is a feeling of my recovered being.

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1. This may be compared to the concept of *homostatis*, which is a physiological state of the stability of being. The Kashmir school, however, speaks of the emotional calmness of being after an intense

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After a man has recovered from grief or anger, we say: "He is now himself." When he is emotionally disturbed, we say: "He is beside himself." That is, emotions drag our being out of itself, place a fresh ego before it, and with that ego our being identifies itself. Yet, it is not lost, but stays back in tension. This process is what the Kasmir Advaitins mean when they say that the world is the vibration (*spanda*) of the Supreme Spirit. The difference between us and the Supreme Spirit lies in the latter allowing the vibration to occur without being overcome by it, whereas we are overcome by our emotions. The vibration is thus a pull of our existential consciousness, a force that pulls itself out of us, and pulls us with it. Emotions are thus a clue to our being.

The force which originates out of our being must belong to its depths and so to the Unconscious within us. At the deepest level of our being, namely, that of the Supreme consciousness (Spirit), this force is said to be of the nature of creative desire, which appears in us as the blissful creative desire of sex. Within our being it appears as the creative desire for a subject-object world. At its origin in the Supreme Spirit, its essential nature is Peace (according to Abhinavagupta) or intense Love (according to Bhoja), since the Unconscious is absorbed into the Supreme Consciousness and made its conscious part. But through various modifications brought about in our personal Unconscious, this root emotion is transmuted into several

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emotion subsides into its origin. It is a feeling of self-fulfilment of being, with a feeling of satisfaction born out of the removal of tension. For a description of the physiological state, see Ernest R. Hilgard: *Introduction to Psychology*, p. 51 (Mathuen and Co., London, 1959).

other emotions we experience. And it is transmuted in ways some of which tally with Freud's descriptions. But when the transformations subside, they sink into their origin, which is Peace or Love. Originally this force is an ocean of Peace or Love. But how and why it assumes the other forms, how it gets disturbed and begins to vibrate, we cannot say. We can only say that we can reach it, but we cannot say why it has come down to create the world. We can only say that purification of mind and a right ethical life are needed not only for communion with the Supreme Spirit, but also for a true comprehension of man's being and his world.

The transformation of man through ethical and scientific activities presupposes the reality of man's existential consciousness. And in order to understand how this transformation takes place, the different levels of the depths of his being have to be understood. To say that ethics presupposes a world that is amenable to ethical activity is not enough; for such a presupposition, although it was made the basis of idealism like that of Fichte, has also to be shown to be true to existence. Depth psychology has revealed that the ego and the world created for it are the products of the same forces; and the ego and the world agree with each other. But the psychopath's "I" is determined and fixed, and he cannot, therefore, liberate himself from his distorted ego and its world in order to have freedom of initiative implied in ethical activity. But Vedantic idealism shows that, although there is determinism of our empirical being at various depths, the I-consciousness has the power to transcend that determinism and so ethical action and responsibility are made possible. Ethics can obtain justification only if we accept the reality of Spirit

and of the creative forces within it. Neither materialistic nor psychological determinism is favourable to ethics, not to speak of the ability of either to justify religious experience and its truth value.

The depths of man's being, according to the Vedanta, will consist of (1) the Absolute Consciousness; (2) the Undifferentiated Unconscious, which is really the creative energy of the Absolute; (3) the Cosmic I-consciousness, Cosmic Reason or Logos; (4) the personal I-consciousness (according to Ramanuja) or witness consciousness (*saksi-caitanya*) (according to Sankara); (5) the personal Unconscious or the causal body (*karana-sarira*); (6) the individual's rational being (*buddhi*)¹; (7) the ego-structure (consisting of the three egos mentioned above); (8) the unitary sensorium or mind (*manas*, also called the sixth sense by some philosophers); (9) the senses (which are psychic by nature and which operate even in dream); (10) the organs of action (which also are psychic by nature and active in dream); (11) the projected objectivity (which also is psychic by nature and is seen in dream); (12) the vital principle which unites all the above with the physical body; and (13) the physical body². The

1. The English translation of the word *buddhi* is a problem. For the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa, it is cognition, and so may be translated as intellect, knowledge and cognition. But for the Upanisads and the Vedantic systems, it has all the import which the word reason has for Greek philosophy and has a substantive metaphysical status. For the Buddhist idealistic schools also, it has a metaphysical status. The more one studies the connotations and contexts of the word and its synonyms used in the Vedantic and Buddhistic systems, the more will one be convinced about the metaphysical import.
2. The number of depths given here is greater than the number given in the *Katha Upanisad*. But the section is written with western depth psychology in view, and with more problems to face than the Upanisad had to.

subject-object polarization begins from the seventh level; and distortions of being may start from the fifth. Each of the higher levels is the basis of the next lower, and is present in it both as the centre and the circumference and permeates¹ it. The higher contains the forces which create the lower levels. All the levels are integrated in man; and the integration takes the form "I am". But when the I-consciousness makes an attempt to transcend any of the lower levels, the latter becomes an object of consciousness, and it ceases to be a part of the experience of "am-ness". Man's normal integrality is maintained when distortions of the forces constituting his ego are removed right up to the fifth level. Upto that level, the field belongs to the psychologist; from the fifth upwards the field belongs to spiritual discipline. Intellectual, ethical and aesthetic activities are meant to raise the seventh level to the fourth, and make the latter concrete, when the fourth becomes the third.² After that, either self-surrender to the Divine Spirit or Yogic discipline will be of help. The source of the creative forces lies ahead at the second level.

Thus will Vedantic idealism develop its depth psychology and with its help also establish the reality of the ultimate spirituality of the world. Matter is what-

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1. Sankara would say that each of the lower levels is superimposed over the higher. But the superimposition is done by the higher itself through itself.
 2. I have not given the depths of our being as found in the works of Freud or Jung, for want of space. A summary exposition of their concepts is given by Grover in his *Freud or Jung*, Chapetr II. Besides, the present work is not interested in presenting the depths from the standpoint of abnormal psychology.

ever is objectified. The material world is not the objectification of the mind of men's empirical ego, but of a force which created his ego also. Man can, therefore, understand matter through patient scientific study. The material world is a correlate of the ego, not a creature of the ego.

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1. This presentation of the depths of our being which Vedantic thought can accept leads to many other problems, for discussing which a bigger book has to be written than the present one. The reader might have seen that I am following neither Sankara nor Ramanuja exclusively, because the aim of the present work is to show how the Vedantic thought transforms itself and develops in the light of modern ideas and challenges.

CHAPTER XIV.

VEDANTA AND SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE.

Scientific thought, as generally understood, works with the principle of determinism, even if the principle is said to exclude necessity in some cases. But disciplines like ethics, social and political philosophy, and religion work with the principle of freedom and assume that human consciousness is free. Kant was impressed by the starry heavens above and the moral law within, and made a tremendous effort to reconcile the determinism of nature with the freedom of the moral will. But Russell writes: "I cannot, like Kant, put the moral law on the same plane as the starry heavens. The attempt to humanize the cosmos, which underlies the philosophy that calls itself 'Idealism', is displeasing to me quite independently of the question whether it is true or false".¹ Russell is one of the most important of the philosophers who approach philosophy from the side of science, and he contends that the imagination of every philosopher "should be impregnated with the scientific outlook."² It will, therefore, be useful to start with a discussion as to how our idealistic thesis will react to his views and show how in this reaction it will transform itself. We can then obtain clues, to the way our idealism can accommodate science, and can give as

1. Bertrand Russell: *My Philosophical Development*, p. 131. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 19 59).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

much importance to the moral law within as to the starry heavens above. Furthermore, Allen Wood says that Russell "could not really be satisfied with his conclusions, when he came to ethical theory;"¹ and we can see why Russell's philosophy fails when made the basis of ethics. The reason can be given in one sentence; Russell finds no use for concepts like spirit, mind, and person. But the reality corresponding to them is of the greatest importance for ethics. Russell cannot place the moral law on the same plane as the starry heavens. If he represents the scientific outlook in philosophy—which he does eminently—we can understand why the modern scientific outlook has created an ethical crisis in world outlook. Now, should we not ask whether concepts like spirit, mind, and personality should not be retained in our philosophical expositions. And should they not be allowed to play an important role?

The greatest defect of scientific thought is its one-sided pre-occupation with the object, its explanation of the nature of the subject with the help of methods used for interpreting the object, and the consequent opposition to the acceptance of the being of consciousness or, as it is put, the reality of mind. The reason given is that conscious-

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 271. D.H. Munro, discussing Russell's moral theories on the basis of his *Principles of Social Reconstruction and Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* shows how Russell comes very near accepting the reality of spirit and "impersonal desires" in his ethics. (*Philosophy*, January, 1960, pp. 40 and 50). Had Russell attempted a common philosophical foundation for his epistemology and ethics, he would have become an idealist. His ethical ideas and the metaphysics he develops on the basis of his epistemology remain disparate. A great thinker who was deeply concerned with global problems of humanity stopped short of discovering basic solutions.

ness contributes nothing to the existence of the object. The reason given may be true or false; but consciousness contributes almost everything to the existence of myself. If I had never been conscious of my existence, I would never have existed. My own existence is also the consciousness of my existence.

But Russell reduces my existential consciousness to a logical fiction, which, however, he calls logical construction. He writes: "The subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction like mathematical points and instants. It is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities of the sort may or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assuming that they do. The functions that they appear to perform can always be performed by classes or series or other logical constructions, consisting of less dubious entities."¹ This can apply not only to the logical subject but also to the epistemological. Russell shows sympathy for Quine's theory that names are unnecessary and can be replaced by descriptions.² Descriptions are properties, which become propositional functions in logic. If I (as the subject) am the logical construction of properties A,B,C, then any property that belongs to me will really be the property that belongs to the result of the logical construction. The logical construction then becomes the particular. "Such complete complexes take the place of particulars, and in place of such a statement as 'this is white', we have 'whiteness is a constituent of a

1. Bertrand Russell: *My Philosophical Development*, pp. 135-36 and also p. 170.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

complex of compresence consisting of my present mental content."¹ The mental content is there only to give meaning to the demonstrative "this".

If the above view is a correct representation of Russell's, then what he says about pragmatism² can be said about his view also: It is dangerous. Logical construction approaches my being from outside, from the side of qualities and properties which are my expressions, and ignores my personality or individuality, which is the source of my expressions and initiatives. My freedom, which belongs to my acts but not to my properties, has no place in logical construction, since a logical construction can only be a finished product of what has already been expressed by me. It can be true of me after my death, but not when I am alive and can be the agent of free possibilities. My freedom also may be called my property; but property is a fixed attribute and freedom is not fixed. And the danger is that, when man is understood to be a logical construction of certain properties he may not fit into the mould of that construction; and a totalitarian socialistic ideology can, with philosophical justification, force him into the mould and destroy him. But if my being is approached from within also and then understood, then my properties (propositional functions) become my expressions, and the reality to which the expressions belong can be defended. I *am* not merely my expression, I *have* the expressions: the "I", its freedom and its reality, which are necessary for ethics, find their proper place in philosophy. A logical construction can, at the most, be

1. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

a representation of my "me", my personality as it appears to others; it cannot be an expression of my "I".

Perhaps no other philosopher supplies, in his own writings, more objections to his own doctrines than Lord Russell. He says that proper names are necessary in logic. Logical constructions represent structures, but "we should also need words denoting the terms that have the structure. These latter terms, so I maintained, would be denoted by proper names."¹ If so, it has to be admitted, that my "I" can be denoted only by a proper name. I am not reducible to my structure, because my structure is the object of my consciousness, and I can never be my own object. But Russell says that the subject in psychology, like the particle of matter in physics, can be treated as bundles of qualities and relations², i.e., as mere structures. Indeed, he adds that they can be regarded as related to such bundles. But he does not explain how my "I" is related to such bundles. And his general view that "the stuff of the world consists of things like whiteness, rather than of objects having the property of being white"³ makes one conclude that, according to Russell, the "I" does not *have* the bundles, but *is* the bundles.

Russell's method may be applicable to objects which are purely material. A mere material object is the same as the bundle of its properties and relations among them. It can be equated to the formula expressing its nature. An

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1. Bertrand Russell: *My Philosophical Development*, p. 165. Also cp. "We may say that a proper name is a word, not denoting a predicate or relation, which can occur in a proposition containing no variable.", *Ibid.*, p. 167.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 170-71.

electron is a bundle of the properties of behaviour observed and inferred. What we say about an electron can be said, in logic, about its formula, because what we know in the formula is all that we know about the electron. The name electron is a kind of short-hand symbol for the formula. But in the case of man and the subject of consciousness, the situation is different. "The author of Waverly" is a definite description of Scott like the formula of the electron. But the proposition, "The author of Waverly is lame," cannot be understood if there is no physical person who has the property of being the author of Waverly. Similarly, "The author of Waverly dreamt that he was torn to pieces by a wolf" cannot be understood, unless we accept he had a mind which pictured the scene in a dream. The dream body that is torn to pieces is not the physical body of Scott. The subject in epistemology has a deeper significance than being a logical construction. Russell criticizes Gilbert Ryle for not giving serious consideration to dream¹. But had he himself done it, he would not have treated the subject as a logical construction. Of course, as his interest was mainly in the scientific method and the starry heavens, he was not much interested in the subject. The result is that mind has become, for Russell, a construction of mental qualities. The noun has become an adjective or a propositional function.

From the point of view of idealism, "scientific outlook," as generally understood, necessarily leads to a kind of philosophical behaviourism. For the scientist, just as matter is what matter does, mind also is what mind does.

1. Bertrand Russell: *My Philosophical Development*, p. 248.

Doing is what an outside observer can see. But matter and mind in themselves are not observed, and are therefore ignored. Bits of behaviour are logically constructed into unities and are equated to mind or matter; and it is said that philosophy is thereby made to adopt the scientific method and can therefore be exalted to the level of science. Some of these bits of behaviour are called material and others mental, although it is difficult to understand why the latter are called mental if there is no mind. The answer given will be that "material" and "mental" are conventional classificatory terms. Bits of behaviour are bits of process, and we may call this philosophy logical behaviourism. Another school of thought similar to this is logical empiricism. Instead of constructing reality with bricks of behaviour, this school constructs it with sensations (A.J. Ayer). But reality is still a logical construction. Physicalism also belongs to this general line of thinking (Neurath).

The above line of thinking can never explain my I-consciousness. It is a particular existence that is self-affirming and can never be conceptualized. And without concepts—or descriptions—logical construction is not possible. We may not be able to explain it as a "ghost in the machine" or as a "parrot in the cage" or interpret it in terms of any of the known categories. Yet it cannot be denied. Ryle tries to explain mind in terms of dispositions¹ of the physiological organism. But I am not merely my dispositions. A disposition is a possibility of a particular kind of behaviour. If I am my dispositions, I

1. *The Concept of Mind*, pp. 123 foll. (Hutchinson's Quiverseely Library, London, 1949).

shall be a disposition of a complex of dispositions, since the dispositions must have some kind of structural unity. One is reminded here of Mill's definition of a physical object as a permanent possibility of sensations. But my experience reveals that I am not my dispositions, but I have the dispositions. It may be thought that the element of possibility in the working of dispositions preserves my freedom. But if I am my dispositions which belong to my body, I can hardly be said to be free. Furthermore, I can defy my dispositions. But this defiance is not possible if I am my dispositions; I must be distinct from them if I am to defy them.

Freedom is not constituted by possibilities of behaviour. We cannot equate freedom, to possibilities. The possibilities are due to my freedom, and my freedom is due to my consciousness of being distinct from all the properties with which logicians wish to construct me and with which I now and then identify myself; in other words, my freedom is due to my self-transcendence.

The philosophy of logical construction has another defect. It works only with terms and relations. For this philosophy, "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Brutus is younger than Caesar" are propositions with dyadic relations. "Killing" is a relation like "being younger than" and "to the right of". Here action is reduced to a relation. How then can logic be applied to reality, unless it openly recognizes that, as it is, it is applicable only to some aspects of reality, and unless it decides that it has to change its forms and structure to suit the form of reality it studies? Russell criticizes Hilbert for his formalism, saying that his theory of arithmetic has "the disadvantage of failing to

explain the application of numbers in counting.¹ Should one also not demand that a theory of logic should be capable of explaining the application of logic to the world? Russell is broad-minded and is not opposed to applications of logic to experience. He is as much opposed to bad and hasty metaphysics as he is opposed to every unreasonable opposition to metaphysics. But he could have seen that his theory of descriptions and logical construction is not applicable to understanding of the nature of the subject of experience. I may say: "My pen is to the east of my pencil", and the relation here may be regarded as indifferent to the terms. But in "Brutus killed Caesar", one cannot say that killing made no difference to Brutus and Caesar. The act of killing affects the being of both; but the relation "to the east of" does not effect the being of my pen or pencil.

Just as my "I" is not a logical construction of behaviour or even of my physical and mental qualities, Brutus also is not a mere logical construction of whatever all we know about his behaviour in history. "Brutus killed Caesar" does not mean that the properties called Brutus killed the properties called Caesar. For our knowledge, Brutus may be nothing more; but for himself, he is much more. He is the agent, the source of his actions. Even in the case of ordinary material objects which we treat as unities, *e.g.*, my pen, there is a core of individuality² that is not exhausted by the qualities. This individuality is particularly evident in the case of dream

1. *My Philosophical Development*, p. 110.

2. Josiah Royce attempted to show this. See *The Religious Philosophy of Josiah Royce*, pp. 51 foll. ed. by S.G. Brown (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1952).

objects. The pen seen in a dream is produced as a whole by mind. The stimulus in dream is central, not from an object existing outside my mind. Its qualities, like colour touch, and shape, are not obtained through the medium of different senses and then constructed into a unity; but the whole individual with all the known qualities is produced by mind. Even in the case of objects perceived in our waking state, their individuality cannot be seen without the activity originating from the centre of our mind. And through the projected individuality, mind is fixed on, attached and bound (cp. *visaya*, that which binds) to the object. An account of this activity of mind is missing in Russell's scientific philosophy, and is what idealism can contribute to a proper understanding of man in relation to his world.

Allen Wood writes: "One might sum up his (Russell's) public career as a philosopher, briefly and crudely, as - From Kant to Kant."¹ But Russell adds a footnote, saying: "I cannot subscribe to this formula. My final views are less Kantian than Allen Wood supposes. I will mention two points. First; though the external world is quite like the world of perception, it is connected with the world of perception by correlations, which are impossible in a philosophy which regards time and space as subjective. Second: the principles of non-deductive inference which I advocate are not put forward as certain or *a priori*, but as scientific hypotheses."² Now, what is the external world with which the world of perception is

1. *My Philosophical Development*, p. 262.

2. *My Philosophical Development*, p. 254.

correlated? If it is the world of electrons, protons, etc., these are only logical constructions. In his criticism of Ryle, Russell says that, according to him (Russell), an event is mental if somebody can notice it, and it is physical if no one knows it except by inference.¹ One would conclude, therefore, that atoms and their constituents, which cannot be seen but only inferred, are physical and everything else which can be seen is mental. But is not inferring also a mental process? If I infer the centre of the earth and perceive the surface, does the centre remain physical while the surface becomes mental? Or does the attribute physical apply only to microscopic entities? But electrons etc., are logical constructions and deserve the epithet mental much more than the pen which I am observing and with which I am writing. I cannot be writing with a mental object. Of course, Russell could not have meant that the pen is mental. But then his distinction between physical and mental is not applicable. We have to say that the pen is physical and also the electrons etc., with which it is correlated, is physical. The correlated terms fall within my knowing; the physical is physical for my knowing, and knowing may be perceptual or inferential.

The truth is that electrons are objects posited by reason, whereas pens and pencils are objects posited by perception. Moreover, unless we treat electrons as bundles of properties, they have to be considered as something more than the properties, and that something more will be what Kant calls *a priori*, something which our mind

1. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

projects into the bundle and sees. Again, reason is not absent in sense perception. Just as scientific approach treats the object as a completed complex (logically constructed) of properties and relates the complex and the properties, philosophy should relate reason (rational consciousness) with sense perception. Corresponding to the logical structure on the objective side, there is reason on the subjective side; and these two sides are not separate, although they can be separated in some activities. In Greek philosophy and western theology, Reason or Logos is much extolled. Heraclitus and Socrates taught that the aim of life is to realize the rational being (reason) in man. This teaching implies that reason has an existential aspect. But modern western philosophers in general care very little to enquire how this reason is involved in our intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic life. And their difficulty to understand the Greeks and the theologians is due to the confusing of reason with ratiocination. But ratiocination is an act performed by reason and is not itself reason. Reason is our conscious being at a stage higher than the ego. We have already mentioned this difference. But reason is, again, not a light hovering over the ego, but a dynamic agency supplying the *a priori* forms, as Kant said. He may be wrong in thinking that the forms he accepted are absolute. It is conceivable that the world could have been otherwise, in which case the categories could have been different. But given man as he is, the distinction between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* holds true. Furthermore, it is reason that has carried on the analysis of matter further and further and postulated electrons and protons; it is able to perform an analysis of space and time and come to the conclusion that they are not separate. Kant seems to be wrong in thinking that space and time are forms of sensation and that they do not belong to reason.

However, reason is able to relate ultimately space, time and energy and correlate them to perceived objects. It is able to correlate both groups, the ultimate physical objects and perceived objects, because it comprehends both, and both fall within the field of reason. If events, electrons or atoms are not constructs of reason, it will not be able to correlate them to perceived objects. Similarly, if perceived objects do not fall within reason, it will not be able to correlate them with physical objects. In studying the nature of electrons etc., we are studying the foundations of objective being and also, so far as our bodies go, the material foundations of our conscious being. And in asking for ultimate foundations, we are really asking for the foundations of our rational being.

Russell's philosophy—in fact every scientific philosophy, whether the philosophy is logical behaviourism, logical empiricism, logical positivism, or logical physicalism, which treats man as a logical construction—fails to explain the being of man and his freedom. The reason is that such a philosophy does not take into serious consideration the contributions of mind to the constitution of the world. To say that the world of matter could have existed without man is one thing; but to say that no mind enters the structure of the world it builds is another. If there were no thinking beings in the world, there would be no philosophy. But if there are some thinking beings in the world—man or some other species—then their mind builds up the structure they know. The mistake of Kant lies in not making clear that this mind is not the subjective mind, but is reason that has cosmic significance. And reason is man's rational being. There is another point which Kant has not brought out: the more the objective nature is analysed and understood, the more is the cosmic nature

of man's reason made explicit. Reason in man is not a windowless monad, but is one with the cosmic structure, in which different structures are created as different centres of experience. The question, How are mathematics and physics possible?, which Kant attempted to answer, is not merely a question about the structure of mathematics and physics, but also about the structure of man's being. Man's rational consciousness is a polar correlate of the objective world, and it is also another kind of correlate of man's physical body. The relation between my conscious being and my body is similar to the relation between the table and the atoms etc., which constitute it, with this difference that, with some effort, I can make my body the object of my consciousness, whereas we do not know that the table can distinguish itself from the atoms which constitute it. Thus man's rational consciousness is in two peculiar kinds of correlation, one with the objective world and the other with his own body. When the correlations are perfect, man's being is in complete harmony with the cosmos. When they are incomplete, man gets illusions and commits errors.

Illusions and errors, like dreams and sleep, are evidence of man's consciousness being independent of his physical structure, which is related to the structure of the cosmos. This independence means the refusal of my consciousness to be equated to the structure. Thus though correlated to the physical world, man's consciousness shows some independence from it. But when man's consciousness is in harmony with the structure of his body and that of the cosmos, it will have no illusions and commit no errors.

If Russell is prepared to accept that everything which is observed and can be observed by some one is mental,

then he cannot keep aside anything that he can call physical, since electrons etc., are posited by reason and are as mental as reason. What reason posits is existence also, and in positing the existence of anything it is positing the existence of itself. It may commit mistakes, because it is not fully developed in man; and so far as it is available in man's being, it is not at one with the whole cosmos. But even within limits, it has cosmic significance, and existential aspect. Man's ego or rather its distortions affect the right functioning of reason. And even in the case of calm and quiet thinking, man's ego picks up only some aspects of reason and uses them when reasoning. And even when the ego is completely held back, it is only a part of reason that is available for man's use. This is what can be meant by the finitude of man's reason, which is only a part of the Logos or Cosmic Reason and is sometimes distorted by psychic forces. But without accepting the cosmic significance of reason, we cannot explain how electrons etc., posited by reason can be physical.

The distinction between the ego and reason preserves man's subjectivity and privacy. Although western depth psychology has of late probed into the structure of mind and studied dreams for laying bare some of the mental depths, western philosophy has made little use of the depths in expounding its epistemological and metaphysical doctrines¹. The study of the depths with reference to those doctrines is complementary to the studies of perception,

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1. Indian thought also has not discussed many of the doctrines developed in this work. The roots of the doctrines are, however, Indian, Jung attempted to give some philosophy akin to the Upanisadic philosophy. But his conception of the self cannot easily be said to be that of the Upanisadic self, which is not a shadow.

inference, and physical reality found in Russell's philosophy.¹ When Kant said that "mind makes nature," we should not understand him as saying that my ego at the empirical level makes the pen with which I am writing. Nor is Hegel right in thinking that as reason posits the world, it is not necessary for man to study the structure of material world and that it is enough to understand the structure of reason. It is, on the other hand, true to say that by studying the structure of the material world man is probing more and more into the foundations of his rational being. For ultimately existential reason is one with material being in the form of "I am that", to which Kant gave the name rational intuition and intuitive reason. Just as I am one with my body and say, "I am this"—in which experience my body is included—Cosmic Reason is one with the ultimate structure of matter in a cosmic "I am this". My consciousness of my body is vague, diffused and unclear; and my consciousness of my body is, therefore, not completely rational consciousness. But wherever my rational consciousness is involved, as in perception or fixed attention on some part of my body, my cognition becomes comparatively clear. But for Cosmic Reason, everything must be clear; and although it is one with ultimate matter in the form of "am", its consciousness is not vague like ours. Furthermore, just as my I-consciousness transcends my reason, there must still be a consciousness transcending Cosmic Reason; for the nature of consciousness is always to transcend its own states in which distinctions can be

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1. H.H. Price says that comparative philosophy will be most fruitful if a way is found for reconciling the Vedanta with logical positivism. The present discussion, it is hoped, will give an idea about how the reconciliation can be effected. It will of course revive idealism with a transformed and deepened thesis. See H. H. Price: *Hibbert Journal*, p. 228 (April, 1955).

drawn. And the consciousness that transcends Cosmic Reason is the Supreme Spirit. These deeper depths can be revealed only through inward contemplation and spiritual practice. At this stage philosophy can be called mysticism; but it is a mysticism that does not conflict with scientific outlook, and will be true to the nature of man's conscious being. And the recognition of transcendence preserves the freedom of man.

The discovery of indeterminism, by Heisenberg, in the behaviour of microscopic entities and the view of Schrodinger that the laws of macroscopic entities are statistical with reference to macroscopic entities are not enough to defend the freedom of man from the standpoint of science. First, some scientists, like Einstein, do not think that indeterminism is ultimate, although at the present state of scientific knowledge we are unable to understand why electrons behave as they do and why sometimes they behave in an eccentric way. Explanations may be found in the future. Science can work and progress only if it accepts the principle of sufficient reason. But more important than the doubt about the principle of indeterminacy is the point that this indeterminacy is irrelevant for explaining human freedom. It is wrong to think that, because some electrons in my body behave in an eccentric way and get loose from their paths, I am free in my choices. I am free whether they follow their fixed paths or get loose from them. I am free because of my capacity for self-transcendence. But if am nothing more than a complete complex construction of the ultimate entities that constitute my body and mind, then I can never transcend the construction, and the unpredictability—whatever it be—of my behaviour will be due to the unpredictability of the behaviour of one

or more of the electrons which go into the construction. Such a conclusion cannot account for my sense of ethical responsibility and is not true to the nature of my I-consciousness. Scientific outlook, if it is to be true to man's conscious being, should give serious thought to its nature and structure. If it does, the result will be a comprehensive idealism, which will be able to account for scientific, ethical and spiritual progress and makes them possible. For its ultimate postulate or hypothesis will be a dynamic Supreme Spirit, which is the origin of mind and matter. But the Supreme Spirit can be postulated as the source of the world only when the world is made to include man's conscious being also as a correlate of its object. But if we start with the object only and construct man's conscious being out of it, the result will be materialism of some sort and determinism of some sort. I have to include my conscious being in the world, because the former is more important for me than anything else. My own existence is involved in my existential consciousness or I-consciousness. And it is with reference to it that my consciousness of objects and the objects of my consciousness have importance. Again, it is with reference to my rational consciousness that electrons etc., and their activity have validity. If my "I" and its reason were differently constituted, then these ultimate constituents of matter would be differently understood.

But the Supreme Being, as a postulate, is not a postulate like the postulates of geometry, from which theorems can be derived. We cannot derive the structure of the world from the concept of the Supreme Being. The nature of spirit includes freedom, creativity, self-transcendence. It is a postulate or foundation of my freedom, creativity, and self transcendence with reference to my being. And it is a foundation of the being of the material

world also. These characteristics do not permit deduction. One may say that such a concept has no use for science. But it has every use for a philosophy of man's life, which by nature is not opposed to scientific outlook, since man's life has to do with the material world. The Supreme Spirit is a postulate of man's existence itself.

The acceptance of the postulate of the Supreme Being does not involve the rejection of the use of logic or any other kind of construction, which makes its starting point the ultimate constituents of objective matter. I am not, as I find myself, the Supreme Spirit or even Cosmic Reason, although I partake of the nature of both. So whatever my reason and my mind, which are finite, reveal to me about the objective world is not only partial, but may also be false. My mind, because I am a new centre within the being of the Supreme Spirit, is not always existentially at one with its material counterpart. So my ego's knowledge of my mind is not the same as its knowledge of the nature of matter. I have, therefore, to study with patience and natural piety the structure of matter. It is not enough to treat matter as real, but also as independent of mind for purposes of study. For idealism, from the ultimate point of view, matter cannot be independent of mind and mind cannot be independent of matter. This is true not only for the Supreme Spirit but also for Cosmic Reason. Nor is matter, conceived as a dead inorganic substance, real for the Supreme Spirit. For it is part and parcel of the Supreme Spirit and is assimilated to it in its experience of "I am" (*ahamasmī*) which is similar to my experience of "I am" including, my physical body. But for me the ultimate structure of matter can be understood only by patient study, not merely by the experience of "I am".

It may also be noted that, just as we cannot deduce the structure of the world from the ultimate postulate of the Supreme Spirit, we cannot deduce the world from any concept of the ultimate constituents of matter. The philosophies of emergent evolution—which we have already discussed—are examples of failures of such attempts. Electrons, protons and even events are logical constructions; and crystals, cells and life are empirical realities. None of them can be deduced from the nature of events, which are now regarded as the ultimate constituents of matter. All that the thinking man can do is to start with the affirmation of his own conscious being with its two directions: inwardness and outwardness. Inwardness reveals several levels of self-transcendence; and outwardness reveals the ultimate constituents of matter. Idealism—if it is to accommodate science, ethics, and religion—will also be a new study of man, which may be called, in terms of its new approach and method, critico-integral humanism. It is integral, because it has to accept the integrality of the being of man; and it is critical, because it recognizes in that integrality the two directions of man's conscious being and all that the directions reveal. Both the Supreme Spirit and matter are real for man's consciousness, which cannot therefore be unreal. If man's consciousness has no existence, then neither the Supreme Spirit nor matter can have existence. For it is man's consciousness that has to assert the existence of either.

CONCLUSION.

The idealistic doctrine which has been presented in the preceding pages has travelled far from Sankara and Ramanuja. Yet, it is not alien to either, but has incorporated their basic ideas. It started with the Upanisadic insight into the correlativity of the ego and the objective world, incorporated the Upanisadic analysis of the ego's structure, and developed the thesis in a form that leaves the door of the structure open for the progress of science. Taking western philosophy as a whole, we can see that it has made tremendous progress. Man's theoretical (cognitive) consciousness has been probed into by the Kantians and the phenomenologists. The importance of his existential consciousness has been established by the existentialists. Serious attempts have been made to fathom the depths of man's being by the psychologists belonging to the school of depth psychology; and a few philosophical doctrines too have been developed out of the doctrines of the depths, although these philosophical doctrines have not been knit into any well-recognized philosophical system. They have, however, shaken pure logicalism and rationalism out of their self-complacency. Scientists and mathematicians, approaching philosophy from the side of their own disciplines, and developing theories of their methods, have formulated doctrines which are in conflict with those of the grand idealistic tradition. Traditional idealism, based mainly upon epistemological theories, has receded to the background in face of these great developments.

Indian idealism, making no distinction between meta-physics and meta-psychology and being interested

as much in the depths of man's being as in logical and epistemological doctrines, shows a new way of reconciling and co-ordinating the doctrines propounded by the new schools. Indian philosophy did not separate logic, epistemology, ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and religion. Although this mixing up has a disadvantage in that these disciplines could not progress much by each being tied to the others, it enabled the Indian systems to present a fairly unified picture of man and the world. At present, each of these disciplines in the West has made so much progress that it has forgotten its relationship to the others, has even tended to ignore their existence, and has come to think of itself as the only study for answering all questions about man and his life. True, in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and a few moderns like Hegel, these disciplines are not very much separated. But encyclopaedic philosophies with a unitary standpoint are not the fashion now. Like the epics of ancient literatures of the world, they seem to have disappeared. But along with them has disappeared a unitary and unified outlook on life, which humanity is badly in need now. What the world needs now is the restoration of a systematic unified outlook, not the scientific outlook which ignores man's conscious being, not the old religious outlook which, in its institutionalized forms, has proved to be one-sided in several ways and ignored the material being of man and his mundane values, but an outlook that can do full justice to all the aspects of man's being. Traditional idealism suffered for the inability to answer questions raised by science. In the West, though metaphysics was made often a kind of philosophy of ethics and religion, it was treated as a further development of physics and was called metaphysics. Man's inwardness, though recognised, was not fully explained. The result was the strong tendency to pull metaphysics down to physics, which

as a system is more tangible and verifiable. Hence also the demand that philosophy should follow the methods of science, particularly those of physics, and that man's conscious being should be ignored in philosophical discussions. The new outlook has consequently created an ethical crisis, not to speak of a crisis in religion. In this respect, Indian thought has had one advantage: it has never, so far, separated meta-physics from meta-psychology. Neither was disentangled from the other, so that metaphysics has not been superseded by physics. The depths of man's conscious being have not been separated from the levels of physical being, although the latter, for lack of progress of physical sciences, have not been fully explored. Indian thought, on the other hand, has its own defects in that it did not visualize the problems which some of these new disciplines posed. Its overwhelming interest in spiritual life and salvation prevented it from exploring the other aspects of life and existence more systematically and in detail than it did. It did explore them, so far as they were necessary for spiritual life; but it was not interested in going beyond. Yet, its interest in salvation and the desire to know what it is in man that obtains salvation led it to an analysis of man's conscious being with greater patience and perseverance than what western thought has shown. We find, therefore, in Indian idealism insights which can be useful complementaries to those of western thought.

But in its reactions to the western doctrines and to the modern challenges to idealism in general, Indian idealism cannot retain its thesis in the precise form it took in the philosophies of Sankara and Ramanuja. Man wants a philosophy which is constructive but not destructive of his life, of his existence, and of their values. Modern advances in knowledge have brought to the forefront

many new complex problems, the answers to which our classical philosophies have to accommodate. In the process of accommodation, they not only become richer but have also to modify the form of their thesis. Elaborating the difference between the philosophies of Sankara and Ramanuja is not so important now as to reconcile them in a constructive effort and make them react to the modern challenges. This reaction also must be positive and constructive, not merely negative and destructive. Destructive and negative criticism is as old as Nagarjuna (1st century B.C. or A.D.); but few will be content now with such a philosophy, although many may admire it and may even draw some inspiration from it. Man wants to know not merely that there is a better life, but also how to make his life better. The "how" can be answered only by a positive and constructive philosophy.

In a constructive effort, then, how does Indian Idealism transform its thesis in face of the modern challenges? (1) As the reader might have seen, idealism, if it is to be constructive, is not to be satisfied with explaining what the world is from the standpoint of the Absolute Spirit, in which the subject-object polarity is lost, but from the standpoint of man, for whom the polarity is real. Scientific philosophy—for example, Russell's philosophy—commits the opposite mistake of thinking that it can explain the world and man from the standpoint of the object alone, particularly matter, and that it can ignore man's conscious being which posits the object. Both the methods not only yield wrong conclusions when they attempt to explain man but also become harmful as philosophies of man and his environment. Philosophy has to take all three—man, the Absolute spirit, and matter—into its consideration and affirm their reality. (2) The philosophies of both Sankara and Ramanuja

contain important truths; and the new approach has to cut across both, utilizing and incorporating every truth it comes across. And in its progress and development, it has to incorporate much that western idealism and other philosophies contain. (3) It should recognize clearly the distinction between existential consciousness (*svarupa-jnana*) and attribute consciousness (*dharmabuta-jnana*),¹ and treat both of them as real. Existential consciousness is never a pale, hovering luminosity over matter, but is a dynamic, creative reality, with which matter has a form of identity which we experience in the consciousness of "I am", and in which our own bodies are included. Attribute consciousness can be a hovering and revealing luminosity, with which the objects are not identical. Yet, it is not unreal. Because it is not identical with the objects revealed by it, scientific philosophies are able to ignore its presence. Existential consciousness is one with the matter with which it is connected; matter is its outwardness existentially. Yet, again, existential consciousness is able to make the matter with which it is identical an object of itself and thus distinguish itself from that matter; it thereby shows its power of self-transcendence. Ultimate energy, to which matter is reduced by the scientists, is the outwardness of Cosmic Spirit; and because we know it by our outwardly spread attribute consciousness, we fail to cognize its inwardness. Cosmic inwardness can be known only through our own inwardness. And in the attempt to know it, our attribute consciousness becomes assimilated to our existential

1. One may compare the consciousness studied by the existentialists and the phenomenologists to these two kinds of consciousness. The scientific philosophers think generally of the latter, and say that consciousness does not enter into any causal process with the objects. The distinction is, therefore, very important, to remove the misunderstandings about the nature and function of consciousness.

consciousness. This assimilation belongs to the different types of spiritual discipline. (4) Attribute consciousness, because it belongs to existential consciousness and can be assimilated to it, must be a form of energy or projective power of the latter and must belong to its being. It has its distinctness only when outwardly spread. It is wrong to treat it as unreal, just as it is wrong to regard man and matter as unreal. (5) The so-called transformation of matter into the material world is not like the transformation of one substance into another; it is self-polarization and the projection of objectivity. Although the objectivity belongs to the being of the Supreme Spirit, it is independent of the consciousness of the finite spirit. The kind of transformation of one substance into another belongs to matter, but not to the spirit. A similar distinction will have to be made by those who treat mind as an evolute out of matter. The so-called transformation of matter into mind is not the change of one kind of substance into another, but the creation of a subjective pole for matter. If we suppose that my physical body produced my mind, then it must have produced its subjective pole of being, without itself being lost in the process, since matter is still available in my body. Similarly, the creation of matter by the Supreme Spirit is the creation of the objective pole without itself being lost in the process. That is, the Supreme Spirit is still available as the Supreme Spirit in spite of the creation of matter. Just as the scientist finds it difficult to explain how one single mass of interconnected events of energy produces different physical bodies, some of which become centres of experience, the idealist will find it difficult to explain how the Absolute Spirit produces different centres of experience—different I—consciousnesses in producing objectivity. We have to accept either as a fact. The credit of bringing this peculiarity

of the creative process, in which the being of the creating agent is not lost, belongs to Sankara, but not to Ramanuja, who thinks of creation as ordinary material transformation; and the evolutionists have to accept the presence of this peculiarity even if evolution is accepted as a process from matter to spirit. But we have found reasons for accepting the ultimate reality of Spirit, and its creativity in preference to accepting the ultimate reality of matter and its creativity. (6) The Absolute must definitely be recognized as inward to man, but not as outward to him. We may logically postulate an outward Absolute, but it will be nothing more than the world as a whole, which cannot be the Supreme Spirit; Nor can the idea of the world as a whole explain the presence of the dynamic creativity in the world, since it is a static concept. Furthermore, the world as a whole cannot be a foundation of our ethical or religious experience. (7) Although Greek thought contains the idea of a rational soul, contemporary western thought has missed the existential aspect of reason. Most of the existentialists also have missed it. Russell, while accepting the ethical crisis in present-day outlook, accuses Plato of mixing up logic and ethics in his concept of reason. In Indian thought, the existential aspect of reason is recognized and its cosmic significance also is appreciated. This aspect of reason will help solving the conflict between existentialists and logicians and present idealism as a more important philosophy than any other. It has also to be noticed that existential reason is inward to man and partakes of Cosmic Reason, which is similarly inward. Indian idealism, by joining hands with Greek idealism, can contribute much in this respect to world thought and to a solution of the ethical crisis in modern outlook. (8) The line of interpretation which has presented the Vedanta as illusionism and which has denied the reality

of man and matter has once for all to be given up. The modern scientific outlook and scientific culture in which we live have impressed on us the undeniable reality of the material world. Man can deny it at the risk of his own existence. To say that everything that is material is changing and momentary is one thing; but to say that, therefore, it is unreal is another. Philosophies which treat change itself as the reality, although one-sided, are antidotes to philosophies which maintain that reality is unchanging; they preserve the balance of our outlook. Even in Indian thought, there is a school (the Nairuktas) which maintains that Spirit is of the nature of pure activity. Idealism has, therefore, to accommodate the reality of both change and matter; to say that change and matter are unreal results in a one-sided and false philosophy of life and reality.

(9) The concept of evolution has come to stay, although it may undergo further differences of interpretation and application. We observe in nature, of course within certain limits, how some formations of structure develop new forms of being (which are called qualities by the evolutionists). Idealism has to incorporate the doctrine of evolution, while at the same time keeping in view that the idea of evolution of spirit out of matter cannot account for the truth-value of the various forms of our conscious being and of the forms of ethical and religious experience. Idealism cannot, therefore, treat the scientific theory of evolution as the only explanation of creation, but must propound also its opposite theory, namely, the evolution of the material world out of the Absolute Spirit, since this theory alone can account for the freedom, initiative, and ethical responsibility of the individual. It should, then, co-ordinate both these lines of evolution. For instance, in terms of Lloyed Morgan's philosophy, God, who is treated as the *nisus* within matter,

will be the Absolute Spirit, and matter will be the *nisus* within it; and this *nisus* having produced the ultimate constituents of matter, has the tendency to return to its original place within the Absolute Spirit. When we take the total picture of all being, there is no *a priori* reason for starting with matter and interpreting the evolutionary process as producing spirit; we may also adopt the reverse procedure. The former procedure helps scientific understanding; and the latter helps proper explanation of ethical and religious experience. In either case, the mystery of creative process cannot be removed. The two procedures, when co-ordinated, represent the total process as circular, which can cover the whole experience of man and can become the foundation for a total philosophy of life

(10) The explanation of the relation between the Absolute Spirit and matter is given by the western evolutionists in terms of quality and substance. That is, Matter is substance and spirit is quality. This idea is borrowed by the evolutionists (S. Alexander and Lloyed Morgan) from Spinoza. Ramanuja among the Indian thinkers reversed the concept and said that the Absolute is substance and matter is quality. The difference is due to the fact that the western evolutionists start with matter and Ramanuja starts with the Absolute. But as we have noticed, the concept of substance-quality or substance-attribute is not applicable to this relation. We have seen that matter is the projective energy of the Absolute Spirit; and even if we start with matter, spirit will be the projective energy of matter. Idealism, though co-ordinating the two movements in a circular process, refuses to start with matter, because, if we start with matter, spirit, which is projected by it, becomes its controlling agent, but not a passive obeyer of a matter. It has also been accepted by the scientists that energy is not a mere quality of something, but a sub-

stantive entity. Now, the substantive, controlling agent must be the projecting agency, not a product of projection. If it is the result of projection, it will be a passive product and cannot exhibit the freedom of initiative which is found in the conscious being of even men, who is finite. Just as Russell has pointed out that the subject-predicate logic is not applicable to our understanding of everything in the world, we have to say that relational logic also is not applicable to understanding the relation between matter and spirit from whichever term we start. Creative act does not fit into the subject-predicate logic or the logic of relations. (11) Indian idealism has to discuss, more patiently and constructively than before, the nature of the levels of our conscious being and their significance for epistemology. then only can the challenges of scientific philosophers and depth psychologist be met. This requirement holds true of western idealism as well. Scientific philosophies have not been able to meet the challenges of ethics and religion. And scientific psychology, particularly behaviourism, has not been able to meet the challenges of depth psychology, much less those of ethics and religion. Depth psychologies, in their turn, have not been able to meet the needs of ethics and religion, and generally they do not claim to being philosophies. And philosophies which attempt to meet the demands of ethics and religion have not been able to account for science. Philosophy, if it is to give these disciplines their proper place, has to start with man as a conscious being and broaden and deepen its thesis, instead of starting with matter—however it is explained by the scientists—or with the Absolute Spirit, which is not that which man, as man, at first and immediately experiences and which he can affirm with certainty. What man can first affirm without doubt is the immediate certainty of his own conscious being. The implications of his being are later discoveries. But

none of the implications can and must annul his being; if it does, it annuls at the same time, its own truth. What philosophy has to do is to reconstitute man's integrality in terms of all that it implies. Idealism has to become critico-integral humanism. For no philosophy that cannot answer the question, what man's being is with reference to his environment, can fully satisfy man's intelligence. But idealism will be critico-integral humanism only in method and starting point. In metaphysics, it will be a philosophy of the Absolute Spirit which accommodates, in the ways explained above, both man and matter. (12) Idealism—in short every philosophy which does not wish to ignore man's conscious being—has, in its epistemological and metaphysical discussions, to make full use of the epistemological structure of dream. The followers of Sankara made much use of dream, but not to the extent and in the way the present study has done. And they seem to have identified the dream ego with the waking ego; in any case, they are not clear on this point. Ramanuja and his followers flatly identified the ego of dream with the ego of the waking consciousness. Furthermore, Ramanuja's distinction between the ego and the I-consciousness is not very clear, since he attributes the experiences and the results of action to the latter, and does not regard it as a witness only. But we found reasons to believe that the dream and the waking egos are not the same, and that the two again are not the same as the third ego, which has been postulated, and that the three are distinct from the I-consciousness. Again, Ramanuja's view that the dream objects are real makes the epistemological problems fictitious. Sankara's position, in this respect, is more helpful. However, if the metaphysical implications of epistemology are to be fully appreciated, then the epistemological significance of dream has to be properly appreciated, as the ontological basis of the subject-object structure of dream can be grasped more easily than that of the waking experience. From the former we can obtain the proper clue to the understanding of the latter.

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